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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Horn of Africa attracted widespread attention only 
recently, when, following the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974 and 
through the subsequent Ogad.en War (1977) and aggravation of the 
Eritrean Insurgency (1962- ), it became one of the major
crisis areas of the world. Yet, little written work in 
the academic field is available to assist us in understanding 
the strategic situation of the region. Whatever meagre 
literature there is on this subject^" is focused on the 
region's strategic situation primarily in terms of global 
politics. Reference to the local milieu has been brief and 
casual. There has been little attempt made to relate the 
information in this regard to the present set of crises in 
any way other than in terms of a simple, cause-and-effect 
analysis. Neither has there been a real attempt to formulate,
This includes: Peter Schwab,'Cold War on the Horn of
Africa’ in African Affairs/The Journal of the Royal African 
Society, Vol.77, No.309, January 1978, pp.6-21. Mohammed 
Ayoob, The Horn of Africa: Regional Conflict and Superpower
Involvement/Canberra Paper on Strategy and DefenceHo. 18 
(Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, RSPacS,
ANU, 1978) . Tom J. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa 
(New York, 1976). J. Bowyer Bell, The Horn of Africa:
Strategic Magnets in the Seventies (New York: Crane, Russak
and Company, Inc., 1973). Mordechai Abir, 'Red Sea Politics' 
in Conflicts in Africa/Adelphi Paper No.93 (December 1973).
Most of the works on the area apart from the above, which again 
are not great in number, deal primarily with one or the other 
of the individual countries. The approach in these works is 
not inter-disciplinary but traditional, mostly historical.
A bibliography on the subject is attached at the end of this 
work.
2 The major research and writing for this thesis was done 
between July 1977 and July 1978. Thus, 'present'/'recent'/ 
'current' in this paper will generally refer to the period 
prior to the middle of 1978.
2out of this information, an indigenous pattern of strategic
relationships through a theoretical approach. If there is
such a pattern, it should be of use, not only in understanding
the present situation on the Horn, but also in making
projections in regard to its future.
The aim of this work is to help overcome the above
shortcomings in the existing literature on the subject. An
attempt will be made to both evaluate the local milieu as a
source of potentials for international conflict and
revolutionary crises, and to arrive at a conclusion as to
whether it presents any particular pattern of strategic
3 slrelationships and behaviour of the actors involved. A
concurrent aim will be to attempt to establish that the
problems of security on the Horn of Africa originate, primarily,
not as an extension of the global power political complex,
but from within the region itself. The local milieu of the
region will be analysed in terms of the two relatively
more permanent of its constituent factors, viz. the geopolitical
4setting and the historical process involved.
The complexity of the analysis attempted require 
conceptual parameters and structure particularly defined for 
this purpose. The geographical limits of the work, as set
by the term 'Horn of Africa' - employed, generally, to mean
3 An abridged version of a part of this thesis has been accepted 
for publication in Horn of Africa (quarterly; Summit, N.J.).
3 SiAt both states' (e.g. Ethiopia, Somalia) and sub-state 
(e.g. the Eritream Liberation Front, the West Somali 
Liberation Front) levels.
 ^Both terms, i.e. 'geopolitical setting' and 'historical 
process' will be defined broadly to include such elements 
as those of culture, ethnicity and socio-economic psycho­
dynamics .
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3the states of Somalia, Ethiopia and Djibouti, will include, 
for the purpose of this research, also such other adjacent 
areas as those which, though not part of these states, 
are, nevertheless, inhabited by societies primarily belonging 
to one or the other of these entities. This is justified 
by the fact that, as will be shown in the following chapters, 
the geopolitical and historical development of these 
societies, embracing as they do, all aspects of their life, 
including socio-economic and cultural - have been more in 
closeness with the Horn's system than as a part of the broad 
regions lying beyond, i.e. the Arab and the ethnic African 
regions of the continent. The Beja areas of the Sudan and 
the Northern Frontier District of Kenya are examples of such 
areas.
The study of the region's history, though brief, 
nevertheless, will try to encompass the whole of the time 
span involved. Starting with the beginnings of human 
settlement in the area, it will survey the whole period down 
to the contemporary events. However, much of the details 
dealt with in general studies of the area's history will 
necessarily be overlooked. But, at the same time, certain 
points that will seem to be of particular relevance to the 
theme of the present research, as outlined above, will be 
dealt with at greater length. This overall, if brief, review 
of the region's history is essential for the purpose of 
identifying and understanding the broad pattern of strategic 
affairs in the area, if any, and to trace the historical stages 
of the area's development.
4Historical information in this paper will be arranged 
in terms of a linear chronological projection, except for 
when the attempt at theorising may necessitate a diversion, 
even if at the cost of restatements, at places, of the same 
facts - in favour of a circular weaving of the data around 
particular concepts and hypotheses. The unavoidable 
restatements, however, will be only with differing purpose 
at different points and thus, will not really constitute any 
repetitions in terms of significance and relevance.
Further clarification is required in view of certain 
terms used in this paper. 'Conflict' will mean, here, 
strategic conflict, i.e. conflict involving military violence 
'International conflict' will be employed as meaning conflict 
with repercussions on an international level. 'Revolutionary 
crisis' will be used to term situations of confusion and 
tension owing to actual or potential socio-political change. 
The term 'global politics' will mean international politics 
on a global level, i.e. that involving the major actors of 
the world-wide international system. This will be so as 
to avoid a confusion between international politics on a 
global level and that on only a regional level - that may 
arise from the use of the term 'international politics' to 
denote, as is often done, the former kind of international 
politics. 'International politics' here will mean any kind 
of international politics involving international actors - 
whether global or regional.
5The work will proceed through five successive and 
interrelated chapters. The one following the present will 
be 'The Geopolitical Setting', which, having assessed the 
plausible effects of geopolitical facts on contemporary 
strategic situation in general, will attempt to describe, 
firstly, the geopolitical realities of the Horn, and then, 
the ways in which these realities affect the present strategic 
situation in its particular setting. concurrently, it will 
try to identify a geopolitical pattern of the strategic 
relationships and developments on the Horn of Africa.
The next two chapters will deal with the historical back­
ground of the present crisis. The first of the two, 'The 
Historical Process', starting with an inquiry into whether 
or not historical background affects present conditions at 
all, it will proceed to study the comparatively remote part 
of the area's history - the period prior to its becoming 
interwoven into the mainstream of world politics. The 
Horn's affairs, during this period, generally in isolation 
from the global political system, might have developed a 
historical pattern of strategic relationships and behaviour, 
as more or less independent of extra-regional involvement.
The chapter will simultaneously narrate the historical 
developments on the Horn during this remote period, relate 
these developments to its present conditions, and, try to 
identify a historical pattern of realtionships and 
events emerging from them. The next chapter, 'The 
Historical Process in the Global Process' will trace the
6historical developments since the area became, through 
large scale and incessant European interference (15th 
century onward), a part of the then Eurocentric global 
political system. It will try to assess the manner in which 
the events of this period contributes to the potentials 
for crisis on the Horn, as well as examine whether the 
historical pattern identified in the preceding chapter keeps 
on persisting in the affairs of the Horn, inspite of its 
being subjected, now, to the global system with all its 
multifarious extra-regional influences. This chapter also 
identifies the ways in which this part of the area's history 
confirms, strengthens or modifies this pattern.
The concluding chapter integrates and restates the conclusion 
reached in the body of the work and will suggest their 
relevance to the present strategic conditions on the Horn.
7CHAPTER II
THE GEOPOLITICAL SETTING
Introduction: The Role of Geopolitics
Geography plays an important role in the shaping of 
social conditions, which are but a complex of human behaviours. 
This is because all human behaviour, in the ultimate analysis, 
is a set of interactions between man and his milieu - and 
milieu inevitably includes geographical factors. In fact, 
the geographical setting is a basic foundation for any 
milieu.
International security relations, in turn, are but 
a complex of human behaviour in the setting of an international 
system. Thus, a study of the geographical setting is a 
primary necessity in the understanding of any area of 
international security. For this reason, it is desirable 
that the study of security in the Horn of Africa 
be started with a survey of the geostrategic realities of 
the area. ^
The above,,however, is not to suggest any kind of acceptance 
of the idea of geographical determinism. One need not agree
'The facts of physical geography and their bearing upon men 
and states are among the most fundamental influences upon 
world affairs. Location, climate, topography, size, shape, 
nature of the soil, possession or lack of raw materials, and 
sources of irrigation have a vital bearing upon the conditions 
and relations of states. National security, economic well­
being and the relative national power which a state can bring 
to bear in world affairs are intrinsically connected with 
them. An understanding of international affairs begins 
with these facts and their influences.': Norman J. Padelford 
and George A. Lincoln, The dynamics of International Politics 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962), p.51.
8with the view held by the traditional geopoliticians that
geography inevitably plays the cruical role in determining
2behaviour and their consequent events. Geographical factors
may, but also may not, play such a crucial part. The role
is inevitable, but not inevitably crucial. But, on the
3other hand, in spite of the established inadequacy of 
traditional geopolitics, the fact remains that geography can 
become the crucial factor in certain circumstances. Thus, 
for instance, the geographical limitations of being landlocked 
and surrounded by South Africa affects the foreign policy of
I refer here to the five leading traditional geopoliticians: 
Rudolf Kjellen [The State as a Form of Life, 1916]; Alfred 
Thayer Mahan [The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 
1660-1783, 1890]; Halford Mackinder [democratic Ideals and 
Realities, 1919; revised, 1943]; Karl Haushofer[Politisehe 
Geographie und Geopolitik] and Nicholas J. Spykman [The 
Geography of Peace, 1944.]. Their deterministic bias is well 
reflected in such dictums of theirs as 'Who rules East Europe 
commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the 
World Island; who rules the World Island commands the World.' 
(Mackinder, quot. in Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln,
op.cit., P •78) - and, 'Who controls the Rimland rules
Eurasia, who rules Eurusia controls the destinies of the 
world' (Spykman, quot. Padelford and Lincoln, op.cit., p.80). 
For a brief introduction to traditional geopolitical thoughts, 
vide Padelford and Lincoln, op.cit., pp.75-81; Richard Muir, 
Modern Political Geography (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.,
1975), pp.192-198.
3 The traditional geopoliticians cancelled each other's 
deterministic propositions. The last of them seems to have 
cancelled his own (as much as anybody else's) determinism, 
by his comment, 'the geographical determinism which seeks to 
explain by geography all things from the fourth symphony to 
the fourth dimension paints as distorted a picture as does 
an explanation of policy with no reference to geography'.
For Spykman's own deterministic ideas, vide fn.2 above. For 
a criticism of the deterministic views, vide: Raymond Aron,
Peace and War/A Theory of International Relations Fr., 
translated by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1962, 1966), pp.182-203.
9Lesotho. In spite of being a Black African nation, she,
contrary to the general Black African policy of hostility
towards the White regime of South Africa, maintains
cooperative and peaceful relations with it. Similar
considerations crucially affect the policies of Afghanistan,
4Nepal, Bhutan and Laos also.
The Setting
5The region, as already defined is more or less a 
triangle with the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean coasts as 
two of its three sides (Map).
It is a central highland cut into two by a rift valley* 56 78
7and with a vast periphery of semi-desert lowland.
The Highland tilts towards the northwest of the triangle 
as a whole, forming the heart of the Ethiopian State. Most 
of the coastal Periphery of the lowlands encompasses the 
Somali-inhabited areas in the east of the triangle, including 
Somalia as well as the disputed Ogaden and the rest of the
OHararghe province of Ethiopia. The Periphery is almost
For a discussion on certain aspects of the problems of 
landlockedness as faced by Lesotho, vide: T. Thahane,
'Lesotho, an Island Country: the Problems of Being Landlocked'
in The African Review/A Journal of African Politics 3 
Development and International Affairs , (Dar Es Salaam) Vol.4, No.2, 1974, 
pp.279-290. For a general discussion on landlockedness, vide: 
Muir, op.cit., pp.57-60. Also, my 'Antarjatik Samparka 
Samasya/Bhoobaddhata' (Bengali: 'Problems in International
Relations/Landlockedness')in the Bichitra, Dacca, July 1972.
5
Vide j supra: Ch . 1, pp.2-3.
6 This central highland will be referred to in this work as 
the 'Central Highla-nd( s) ' , the 'Highlands' or the 'Core'.
7 This will be referred to as the 'Periphery' , the 'Peripheral 
Lowlands' or the 'Lowlands'.
8 Spelled also as Harar, Harrer.
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10
pushed into the Red Sea by the Highlands at one point in 
9Eritrea. In general, however, Eritrea also is a part of 
the Periphery. The Ethiopian provinces of Sidamo, Samo-Goffa, 
Kaffa and Wallaga also fall mostly in this Periphery.^
There are two river systems on the triangle. One is 
that of a set of more or less parallel rivers running from 
the Highlands westwards into the Sudan. The other one, 
of similarly parallel rivers, runs eastwards across the 
Periphery into the Indian Ocean.
All these rivers cut across international boundaries: 
the first system that between Ethiopia and Sudan; the second, 
that between Ethiopia and Somalia. However, the 'catchment 
areas' of all these rivers remain well within the boundaries 
of Ethiopia.
Among the major rivers in the subregion there are two 
exceptions to these systems: the river Awash, which runs
south from Lake Abbe, and the river Onomo, which runs north 
from it. Neither of these crosses any international boundaries.
'The plain of the Samhar, which separates the Ethiopian 
highlands from the sea, is only about fifty miles wide at 
a point .... It is at this point that the Ethiopian 
escarpments are nearest to the sea'. Mordechai Abir,
Ethiopia: The Era of the Princes/The Challenge of Islam
and the Re-unification of the Christian Empire/1769-1855 
(London: Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd., 1968), p.5.
10 The distinction between the 'Core' and the 'Periphery' 
becomes blurred in the southwestern parts of the Horn. The 
two overlap each other and make the dichotomy the least obvious 
in this particular part of the system. Moreover certain 
features (e.g. rain forests, negroid pagan population, etc.), 
uncommon to both the 'Core' and the 'Periphery' also appear 
here. This is true in many of the aspects of geopolitics 
under consideration. This point will be further discussed 
in course of this chapter.
11
There are eleven big lakes, all of which (except the 
biggest two) along with the two 'exceptional' rivers, form 
a physical barrier, supplementing the rift valley and 
dividing the whole subregion into two (Map, pp. 2-3, 9-10).
Human Factors
In ethnic terms, the triangle may be divided primarily 
into a predominantly Semitic Core coinciding more or less 
with the Highlands'^ and a non-Semitic, mainly Cushitic
12Periphery coinciding in the same way with the Lowlands.
There are no pure Semites on the Horn. But the Amharas of 
Highlands descend from the Sabaean Semitic migrants of ancient 
times. These Semitic groups intermarried with the local 
Hamites, and thus took the name Abyssinian (from the Arabic 
'Habash' - the 'mixed'): G.K.H. Trevaskis, Eritrea/A Colony 
in Transition: 1941-52 (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford
University Press), pp.4-5. 'Abyssinian' is used both as 
synonymous with, and wider than the 'Amhara'. In the latter 
case, it denotes 'the historic kingdom of the highlands' (my 
emphasis). Frederick J. Simoons, Northwest Ethiopia/Peoples 
and Economy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1960) , 
pp.vii-viii, fn.l. The above explanation of the term 'Abyssinian', 
though accepted generally, is nevertheless controversial. It 
is also suggested that 'Abyssinia' derived from the tribal name 
'Habashat' (as distinct from 'Habash'). Trimingham, cited by 
Simoons, op.cit., p.vii, fn.l. The 'Habashat' were one of the 
tribes from South Arabia: Stephen H. Longrigg, A Short History
of Eritrea (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945, p.ll). 'Semitic' 
and 'Semite' in relation to the Horn's population will mean, 
in this work, the Semitized mixed society originating from 
the Sabaean settlements.
12 The whole of the Periphery, except a part on the extreme 
fringes in the west, is Cushitic. The western fringes are 
Negroid in ethnicity. The Agaw and the Sidamo, inhabiting 
parts of the Periphery in the southwest are also taken to be 
non-Cushitic. But some writers regard the Agaw also as part 
of the Cushitic stock. Cf. reference to 'the Cushitic 
inhabitants notably the Agaw': Edward Ullendorff, The 
Ethiopians/An Introduction to Country and People (London:
Oxford University Press, 1960-1961), p.98; '... other Cushitic
peoples, such as the Agau (Agaw) ...' George Lipsky, Ethiopia 
(New Haven, Conn.: HRAF Press, 1962), pp.45-49. The Afaw, 
in fact, seem to be of two types. The Agaw, in general, are 
closer to the Gallas and Somalis (Cushitic): Lipsky, ibid., 
pp.343-44. But, those of them living on the
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While the Semitic Core is more or less a homogeneous Amharic 
13society, the non-Semitic areas may be divided into at
least four major sections: (i) the Somali lands, (ii) the
14Afar areas, (iii) the Beja areas, and (iv) the land of 
the Oromos (Map).
The Highland Core coincides with the seat of Coptic
Christian settlement, while the Peripheral areas are Moslem.
However in the west centralmost parts of Ethiopia, both the
Highlands and the Peripheral areas are inhabited by
considerable numbers of pagans.
Culturally, and particularly linguistically, the triangle
is Hamito-Semitic at the base. The Semitic element in this
'base' is of ancient Sabaean origin, supplemented to different
degrees at different places by relatively later Semitic
15(i.e. Arabic) and other, non-Semitic elements. The proportion
12 (cont'd)
Highlands Core are perhaps Semitic - descendants of Moses, 
according to their own claims. They are a part of the general 
society of this 'Core' in terms of their culture and religion 
also. They are Amharic speaking Christian agriculturists 
like the rest of the 'Core's' population. Lipsky, ibid., 
p.44. The 'Core'-'Periphery' dichotomy seems to prevail 
even if over-riding the apparent unity of the Agaws.
The Sidamo area is mostly inhabited by the Sidamo, a 
non-Cushitic people. However, the Sidamo feel themselves 
integrally united with the Galla, a Cushitic people, flanking 
them on both sides. This they feel as part of the 'Oromo' 
group. All these groups are non-Semitic (see map). Sidamo 
are also known as Sidama.
13 The Highlands are Abyssinian, and thus, homogeneously 
Amharic. Vide3 supra, fn.ll.
14 The Afars are also known as 'Danakil' (singular: Dankali).
15 The whole subregion, except for a few enclaves in the 
west, conforms to this generalisation. Lipsky, op.cit., 
pp.52-61.
13
of Sabean Semitic gradually increases with altitude and 
closeness to the Highland Core of the triangle. Thus, 
Tigrinya, the language of Tegre and the Eritrean highlands,
is closer to Ge'ez, the African form of the ancient Sabaean
17 18Semitic; next is Amharic, the language of Shoa and its
surroundings. On the other hand, the Somali language is so
close to the latter Semitic, i.e. Arabic, that there is
19argument as to whether or not it is itself a form of Arabic.
Vide ibid.? map, p.53.
17 My interview with Mr Mesfin Alazar, Eritrean exile,
Sydney, 1978.
18 Spelled also as Shewa, Shawa.
19 Thus Somalis vacillate for and against the use of Arabic 
script for their language. At independence in 1960, at 
first, they found themselves unable to decide. E.A. Bayne, 
Birthday for Somalia3 American Universities Field Staff/ 
ReportsNortheast Africa Series, Vol.VIII, No.l (Somalia), 
1961, p.2. Later they accepted the script (Lipsky, op.cit., 
p.52) but abandoned it in favour of the Latin alphabet in 
October 1972. Keesing's, op.cit., p.26392. They identified 
themselves with the Arabs in joining the Arab League a 
little more than a year later, in February 1974. ibid.
The Somalis claim their origins to be Arabic and take pride 
in it. Robert L. Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia 
(Chicago and London: the University of Chicago Press, 1966),
p.9. Claims of this kind are more of cultural than racial 
significance. They represent, not the actual position as 
to the racial origins of the people concerned, but their view 
of themselves. Cf. the claims of many Indian Moslems, 
essentially non-Semitic in actual terms - to be Arabic, 
Persian or Turkish in origin. Similarly, the Somali claim to 
Arab origins, in spite of its objective baselessness, is 
significant in indicating their cultural affiliation with 
the Arabs. For Arab element in Somali descent, vide: infra: 
Ch.III, pp.71-72.
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The same is true of certain of the Eritrean dialects.
21Galla is also close to the latter Semitic elements, i.e. Arabic.
And finally, Arabic influences are so strong in the southwest
and the western fringes of the Periphery that it has become
22the lingua franca in those areas.
In socio-economic terms, the society of the Central
2 3Highlands is built on a feudal agrarian base, while the
The Eritreans on attaining autonomous status in federation 
with Ethiopia, proclaimed Arabia as one of their two official 
languages. Tigrinya was made the other. Significantly, they 
refused to accept Amharic, the lingua franca and the only 
official language for the rest of the Ethiopian Empire as 
even one of the official languages. A significant portion 
of Eritrea speaks pure Arabic, while many others speak such 
related dialects as 'Beja' and 'Afar'. Particularly, the 
'Beja' dialect is spoken in Arab Sudan also. Lipsky, op.cit., 
pp.52 and 57-58. In Eritrea, Arabic is the lingua franca, 
ibid., p .51.
21 The Galla also, like the Somalis, claim to be Arabic in 
origin. This claim is presumably primarily in racial terms, 
but also cultural. Lipsky, ibid., p.40. For the cultural 
significance of such claims see footnote 19 above.
^  Lipsky, pp.50-51.
2 3 Amhara feudalism is discussed in all the writings on the 
Ethiopian social/economic system. Vide: for example: Patrick 
Gilkes, The Vying Lion: Feudalism and Modernisation in Ethiopia 
(London, 1974); Lipsky, op.cit., pp.62-68. Allan Hoben, Land 
Tenure among the. Amhara of Ethiopia (Chicago, Lond.: the 
University of Chicago Press, 1973), p.l. Frederick Gamst, 
Peasantry and Elites without Urbanism: 'The Civilization of
Ethiopia ’ in Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.12, 
No.4 , 1970 , pp. 373-92 . John Markakis, Ethiopia: Anatomy of a 
Traditional Polity (Oxford, 1974) . Peter Schwab, Decision- 
Making in Ethiopia (London, 1972) and Human Rights in Ethiopia 
in Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), No.1, March 
1976. John M. Cohen, Peasants and Feudalism in Africa: the 
Case of Ethiopia in Canadian Journal of African Studies (Ottawa), 
Vol.III, No.1, 1974, pp.155-7 and Ethiopia: a survey of the 
existence of a feudal peasnatry in Journal of Modern African 
Studies (Cambridge), Vol.XII, No.4, December 1974, pp.665-72.
Gene Ellis, The Feudal Paradigm as Hindrance to Understanding 
Ethiopia in Journal of Modern African Studies , 14,2 (1976) , 
pp. 275-295 and Feudalism and Peasantry 3 Social Structure and 
Development in Ethiopia (1976). At the same time, it also 
has been noted that the fuedal characteristic, essentially 
marking Ethiopia Proper do not apply to the other parts of the
(cont'd)
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Peripheral societies are, basically, a pre-feudal nomadic
24pastoral system.
23 (cont'd)
present State of Ethiopia, which constitute parts of the 
'Periphery' identified in this work, vide, e.g. Gene Ellis,
The Feudal Paradigm . .._,p.278.
24 In 1953, at least 75% of the total number of Somalis in 
Somalia were pastoral and nomadic ('migrant'). E.A. Bayne,
From Clan to Nation, Northeast Africa Series, Vol.X, No.2 
(N.Y.: American Universities Field Staff Report Service),
1963, p.2, fn.l. The Somalis in general, as viewed by even 
as urbanized and westernized a Somali as the Chief of the 
country's only armed force at independence, is 'free to 
wander ... with our herd with nothing between ourselves and 
the sky ... He will not change'. They have not changed to 
any considerable degree since the statement was made in 1960. 
This statement may be taken as significant not only as an 
objective statement of the Somali position but also as a 
subjective indication of their tendencies and preferences 
for a nomadic way of life, and the fact that these tendencies 
and preferences are too strong to be wiped out with ease by 
even the forces of urbanization and westernization. Cf. 
reference to 'reluctant [to change] and tradition-loving people 
[of Somalia] ' Anthony Sylvester, The Somalian Road of Self 
Confidence in Impact International, London, 22 February-7 
March, 1977, p.4.
Even as late as 1974, in spite of deliberate and strenuous 
efforts by the Somali government to build up permanent 
settlements out of the nomadic population, at least 70% were 
still nomadic. Vide: ' . . . nomads ... 70 percent of our
[Somalia's! people are precisely that' Barrah, President, 
Republic of Somalia, quot. ibid.
The Oromos of the Periphery, particularly the Borana and 
other southern and western Oromos are nomadic/pastoral while 
those on the Highlands, and thus closer to the 'Core', are 
settled. The dichotomy prevails in religion too; while the 
Oromos are mostly Moslem, those close to the 'Core' have, 
through intermarriages with the Amhara, become almost inseparable 
from the latter. Lipsky, op.cit., pp.41-42. Alys Reece,
To My Wife, 50 Camels.
The Eritreans of the lowlands and also of some parts of 
the Highlands, have been classified as from among 'The Major 
Nomadic Peoples', Lipsky, op.cit., pp.45-48.
The Sidamos, like the Galla, are nomadic, when from the 
Peripheral areas. Those closer to the 'Core' are agricul­
turalist. Most of the Sidamo fall in the 'Core'. ibid., p.49.
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In short, the Horn is composed, roughly, of two
contrastable units: (i) a Central Coptic Christian feudal
25agrarian society in the Highlands controlling the catchment
areas of all the river systems in the area; and (ii) a
Peripheral set of Moslem nomadic pre-feudal pastoral societies
on the semi-desert coastal lowlands controlling.all the
outlets from the interior into the world outside. However,
2 6the political geography of the area, a relatively artificial
and thus less permanent factor, does not coincide with this
structure set by all the other aspects of its geography.
2 7This will be discussed later.
The Horn of Africa faces the seas on two of its sides 
(north and south) and a more or less impregnable land frontier
Ethiopia Proper has been referred to as 'feudal' and 
'feudalist'. Cf. '... the people of Eritrea have been waging 
an armed struggle against ... feudal Ethiopia' (my emphasis): 
Anonymous, The Eritrean Liberation and the African Revolution, 
in Liberation, monthly (Eritreans for Liberation in North 
America), Vol.II, NO.2, February 1973, p. Also,
'... feudalist Ethiopia ... collaborating in the oppression 
of the Eritrean people ...' (my emphasis): Anonymous, United
States} Lsrael and Ethiopian Collaboration in Struggle, p. 
These extracts from Eritrean sources significantly show the 
Peripheral's view of the feudal character of the Highland 
'Core'. First, they view this as a point of distinction 
between themselves and the 'Core'. Secondly, their i.e. the 
Peripheral's own tendencies are antifeudalist - a fact that 
supports our proposition (below) that the body political 
tendencies of the two systems/set of systems are in direct 
mutual opposition. By 'body political tendencies' we mean 
tendencies evolved through development as a political society. 
'Body politic' is political society.
2 6 'Political geography' and 'geopolitics' are often used 
interchangeably. It is desirable to draw distinction between 
the two terms. Political geography is geography as shaped by 
political considerations and boundaries while geopolitics is 
politics as shaped by geographical factors.
27 Vide infra: pp.17-41.
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on the third (west). It is obvious that the Peripheral 
areas, facing the seas, are open to the world while the 
Central Highlands remain relatively inaccessible and land­
locked. On the question of maritime access to and from the 
rest of the world, the Peripheral coasts may be divided into 
two: (i) the Red Sea coast, and (ii) the coast on the Indian
Ocean.
Of the two coasts, the one of the Indian Ocean, i.e. the
2 8Somali coast, is more safe and accessible than the coast
on the Red Sea, i.e. the Eritrean one. This is because of
29the fact that the Red Sea is virtually a closed sea. It 
has two physical outlets it is true; but, given their width 
of less than 24 miles, these outlets lie within the legal 
jurisdiction of one or the other of the adjacent states.
Both the outlets lie within the military range of both the 
respective littorals.
Political Geography
The political geography of the area has two aspects:
(i) the geography of what might be called the 'natural' socio­
political development of the area, and (ii) that of its
2 8 Maritime 'safety' here is in terms of political safety 
i.e. safety from interference and politically decided 
obstruction.
29 For this reason, the Sea has sometimes been referred to 
as a 'Lake'. Cf. such a reference in Jeane-Claude Gillebaud, 
Africa's Horn of Troubles/Battling for the Lake of Arab Peace, 
in The Guardian, July 17, 1977. Also in A.S., Red Sea/Whose 
lake will it be? in Impact International, London, 8-21 April 
1977, pp.5-6. Mordechai Abir, Red Sea Politics , in Conflicts 
in Africa„ Adelphi Papers (London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1972).
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present political boundaries and the political nature of 
its system or systems.
"fhe first aspect is a more permanent, deep-rooted and
natural phenomenon than the second, which is relatively
artificial, recent and temporary. The geography of the
'natural' socio-political development is a matter of natural
30evolution through conscious and unconscious interactions
31of a primarily intra-regional character. So, not very 
surprisingly, it tends to coincide with the other natural 
aspects of the geopolitical setting in question. In terms 
of 'natural' socio-political development, the Horn of Africa 
has come to be composed, by this time, of two mutually hostile
Interaction being a kind of behaviour, may generate from 
conscious decision or subconscious tendencies and habits. 
Long-term repetition of similar conscious behaviour may result 
in a subconscious habit and a particular tendency associated 
with it. 'Natural' socio-political developments usually 
proceed through' a combination of both such conscious and 
subconscious/unconscious types of behaviour. Thus, for instance, 
the Amhara's treatment of the non-Amharas of Eritrea as 
inferior was initially the result of a conscious realization 
of a real inferiority of the latter's civilization - say, in 
terms of education. The non-Amharas of Eritrea were really 
inferior in these terms, when the Amharas came in contact with 
them for the first time some centuries back. But the 
continuation of this type of treatment at present does not 
generate from any conscious realization of any such inferiority 
on the part of the non-Amharic Eritreans - as such inferiority 
is no longer a fact. But the habit of treating them as 
inferior has persisted. So, the treatment of the Eritrean 
non-Amharas as inferior at present is not a conscious behaviour 
but a subconscious pattern of intraction. The 'natural' socio­
political development in this case is a combination of these 
initial conscious and later subconscious interactions. The 
result is the continued Amhara treatment of the non-Amharas 
of Eritrea as inferior notwithstanding the real changes in 
the original situation.
31 The 'natural' socio-political developments on the Horn of 
Africa have been the results of mainly regional interaction. 
Extra-regional forces only supplemented the regional forces in 
the process. It is the combination of conscious and subconscious 
tendencies from within, as behind the developments, that make 
them a process of natural evolution.
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units, viz. (i) the system, of the Central Highlands, and
(ii) that of the Periphery. In terms of body political
tendencies, the two are in direct opposition and conflict
with each other. While the former is unitary, centralist,
32imperial, expansionist and perhaps racist - the latter is
its direct opposite. It is a pluralistic, somewhat 
3 3democratic, multiracial confederal system, containing the 
former.
This presentation of the situation is a description of
the inherent tendencies that have grown up within the entities
34of the subregion, as sets of characteristic features and 
not necessarily by current position.
32 Being racist in inherent tendencies is different from being 
such in conscious policies. Socially superior societies usually 
tend to be racist. They tend to treat the other societies as 
inferior and to preserve their own purity. This naturally 
results in social discrimination. This is quite natural.
Cf. the development of the caste system in India as a device 
to preserve the purity of the Aryans. However, such tendencies 
may become irrelevant with change in conditions. Vide: for 
instance, supra, fn.30. In such cases such tendencies are 
reduced to mere discriminatory prejudice without any real basis. 
For a brief discussion on the development of the caste system 
in India as a device to preserve the purity and superiority 
of the Aryans, vide: my Foreign Relations of Bangladesh: The
Historic Pattern (Dacca, 1976).
33 The Peripheral systems are traditionally democratic in 
essence, though not necessarily in exact line with the classical, 
western model of democracy. There have been 'Sultans', 
i.e. 'raonarchs'. But their role has involved more prestige than 
actual power, which rested with popular councils. On a higher 
level, again, there has been a democratic approach, where 
power rested in what may be termed, in the modern western jargon, 
a Senatorial system. A comparable system may be seen in the 
Sultanates of Malaysia. This, which may be called 'Sultanic 
Democracy', still persists in some parts of the Periphery, 
e.g. in the Afar areas.
34 ,This aspect will be discussed in greater details in later
chapters.
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The present political position in the area, in terms 
of geography, coincides with none of the foregoing aspects 
of its basis structures. The geography of these present 
political conditions involves: (i) the nature of the area's
boundaries, and (ii) the nature of the political systems 
within these boundaries. None of these conform with the basic 
political structure.
As for the international boundaries on the Horn, not
one among these relates to any of the basic aspects of its
geopolitical structure: its ethnic system, economic
considerations, geophysical structure or historic 'natural'
socio-political development. In fact, these basic aspects
are what, significantly enough, have been traditionally
regarded as bases for justification of actual or claimed
35international boundaries.
Ethiopian - Somali-an boundary cuts across the Somali 
people and has no geophysical features to support it. It 
neither coincides with the line of distinction between the 
body-politics concerned, nor has it any historic continuity 
or stability to back it.
The boundary between Somalia and Djibouti also cuts 
across the Somali people. It also fails to satisfy all of 
the above-mentioned criteria of a justifiable boundary. The 
Djibouti-Ethiopian boundary also is unsatisfactory in a
Vide. For a brief discussion on boundary claims on the 
basis of 'historical, ethnic, geographical or strategical 
reasons' and economic necessity, Muir, op.cit., pp.176-177.
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similar way. It cuts across the ethnic unity of the Afars.
In the same way it cuts through the geophysical unity of
the Danak.il Depression. It too cannot justify itself in
terms of any of the generally accepted criteria for inter-
3 6national boundaries.
Neither do the boundaries of Ethiopia with Sudan nor 
that of Somalia with Kenya conform with the basic geostrategic 
realities of the area, as outlined above. The former cuts 
across such ethnic groups as the Beja and other non-Semitic 
peoples, as well as such geophysical unities as the Beja 
lowlands. The latter cuts through the ethnic and geophysical 
unity of the Somali lands.
The presently de-internationalized boundary between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea also fails to conform with the fundamental 
geostrategic realities. It cuts through such closely knit 
ethnic groups as the Tigrinya-speaking Christian Semitics.
It also cuts across the Ethiopian Highlands, incontestably 
a single geophysical unit.
Implications of the Setting
The above conditions present us with a super-imposed 
real situation in the area that clashes with the realities 
of its basic character. This signifies a total basis for 
contradiction throughout the region. The above conditions 
present us with a system super-imposed on a more natural 
system that evolved through ages.
For discussion on this in greater detail see below 
pp.22-36.
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It is on this geopolitical basis of contradiction, 
built upon and fed by the elements of history, that the basic 
threat to stability and security in the area rests. That is, 
the problems of security in the Horn of Africa region generates 
primarily, though not exclusively, from within the region 
itself and its nature. The secondary factor, extra-regional 
involvement and aspirations, also derives from the geostrategic 
nature of the region.
To begin with, the boundaries of the region fail to 
reflect its basic geostrategic realities as outlined above.
They also clash directly with these realities. This centrally 
contributes to all but one of the major problem situations of 
the region: (a) the Somali problem including the West Somali
Liberation struggle, (b) Eritrean Insurgency and (c) the 
Djibouti Question. The single exception is the Ethiopian 
Revolution and Civil War.
The boundaries, while tying up such parts of the 'Periphery' 
as the Ogaden, Eritrea and the Oromo and the Afar areas - with 
the 'Core' into one single state (Ethiopia), at the same time, 
cut through such Peripheral, geopolitical and socio-economic 
entities as those of the Somali and the Afar areas - forcing 
the entities' members into separation and economic hardship.
Thus, the tying up of Peripheral areas like the Ogaden,
Eritrea, the Afar and the Oromo areas with Ethiopia Proper, 
i.e. the 'Core's' system - into the one single state of 
Ethiopia,has naturally resulted into a set of intra-state 
conflicts between these Peripheral areas on the one hand,
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and the 'Core'-based system of the Ethiopian state on the
other. These conflicts have translated into the separatist/
autonomist struggles of 'West Somalia' (West Somali Liberation
Front - WSLF); Eritrea (Eritrean Liberation Front - ELF ,
(Eritrean Liberation Front - Popular Liberation Forces ; ELF-PLF)
the Oromo (Oromo Liberation Front - OLF) and the Afar areas
37(Afar Liberation Front - ALF).
At the same time, these separatist struggles, in some
cases (e.g. 'West Somali', Afar), where the international
boundary has cut through one or the other of the Peripheral
socio-political entities - have been supplemented by
irredentist movements to unify the split entities. Thus,
the 'West Somali Liberation' struggle is supplemented by -
in fact, originates from - the Somali irredentism, aiming
at unifying all the Somali inhabited lands into a single 
3 8state and is openly sponsored by the Somali Republic.
Somalia has consistently and constantly denounced all of its
The OLF is a less-known of the insurgent movements of the 
Horn. for this and for the SALF (Somali Abo Liberation Front). - 
another of the less-known movements, vide: Africa Confidential, 
Vol.19, No.11, 26 May 1978, pp.5-6.
3 8 According to the mainstream of the movement, this state 
is, naturally, the Somali Republic. Vide: infraj fn.40. To 
Ethiopia, unification of the Somalis, if any, should be 
within her bounds.
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present borders, the Somali-Ethiopian, Somali-Kenyan and Somali- 
39Djibouti. While there is not enough evidence available to
The Somali Republic was established in 1960. Its open 
sponsorship and patronage of the Somali irredentist moves are 
reflected in its Constitution as well as the flag. 'The 
Somali Republic shall promote ... the union of Somali 
territories, ...' The [Somali Republican] Constitution 
(1 July 1960). First Part, Art.6/4: quot. in Somali Govt., 
Somalia at a Glance (Mogadishu, 1964) , p.55. The Somali 
Republican flag incorporates a five pointed star on it, each 
of the five points representing one of the five Somali areas; 
former Italian Somaliland, former British Somaliland, former 
French Somaliland, the Somali areas under Ethiopian control 
and the Northern frontier District of Kenya. Vide: Murumbi, 
Kenyan representative, speech at the OAU, Second Extra­
ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers, Dar Es Salaam 
(12-15 February 1964), quot. in Hoskyns, op.cit., p.57.
The Somali Republic appears to still follow this policy, 
after over a quarter of a century. For example, during the 
Ogaden crisis of 1977, the Republic supported the irredentist 
insurrection led by the West Somali Liberation Front. It 
went to the extent of even sending its forces to support the 
insurrection. Sunday Nation3 Nairobi, 12 February 1978. 
Editorial: The tide of war turns against Somalia, The Nairobi 
Times, Nairobi, 12 February 1978 , p.6. The Baghdad Ovserver 
Baghdad, Vol.VII, No.3025, p.l.
The Somali-Ethiopian boundary has been denounced, though 
only occasionally and implicitly, by Ethiopia also. Cf.
'... the historical frontiers of Ethiopia stretched from the 
Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, including all the territory 
between them [i.e. also Somalia] ... there is no record in 
history either of a Somali State or a Somali nation ... During 
the 19th century ... Ethiopia ... [was] robbed of all its 
coast line ... [including] Somalia ... Italian aggressors ... 
used our Ethiopian coastline of ... Somalia to carry out 
attacks ... we ... the Ethiopians will have claims to make 
[on Somalia, across the present Somali-Ethiopian boundary]: 
on the same basis as Somalia, and more on historical and geo­
graphical reasons': Aklilou Habta-Wold, Prime Minister of
Ethiopia: speech at the OAU Summit Conference, Addis Ababa,
May 1963; '... according to Ethiopian tradition, what is now
the Republic of Somalia formed part of ancient Ethiopia ...
In more recent times, Ethiopian Emperors have, on various 
occasions, asserted their sovereignty at least over the northern 
part of Somalia' : Mesfin (Ethiopian writer) , The Ethio-Somalia
Boundary Dispute, pp.27-29, , quot. in Catherine Hoskyns,
Case Studies in African Diplomacy : 2/the Ethiopia-Somalia- 
Kenya Dispute 1960-67 (Dar Es Salaam: Oxford University Press,
1969), p.3. Also, the formal acceptance by an Ethiopian 
authority of petitions by Somali tribesmen from the Somali 
Republic for their 'reunion' with Ethiopia, and the publicity 
given by the Ethiopian Government to the incidents. The Times, 
London, referred to in African Recorder (New Delhi),3-16 
December 1962, pp.345-346.
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make a certain assessment of the attitude of the Somalis 
outside the Republic, from whatever evidence is
40available,they also appear to subscribe to the idea.
This is natural. The Somali people are a very close-knit 
ethnic unit. They are all homogeneously non-Semitic as 
distinct from the neighbouring Amharas. They all speak 
the Somali language, and in general, strongly profess the 
same Islamic religion. This strong following of this one 
common religion means that all of them are bound in one
Cf. 'We, the political parties of the Northern Frontier 
District of Kenya (NFD) ... are members of a single Somali 
nation ... We want to reunite with our brothers with whom 
we can evolve an administration suited to our way of life.
The only form of administration that is any good to us is 
a Somali administration. This is centred on Mogadishu and 
we shall unite with it.
'... our destiny ... is the unity of all Somali people... 
Together with our brothers we shall resist any further betrayal 
of our birthright': Statement by the Somalis of the Kenya
Northern Frontier District (March) 1962), quot. in The Somali 
Govt., The Somali Republic and African Unity (Mogadishu, 1962), 
Appendix 2, pp.33-35. Also, the West Somali Liberation Front's 
appeal for international assistance to '... our just struggle 
for freedom and unity [with the Somali Republic].': Extracts 
from an WSLF statement, quot. in The Young Pakistan (Weekly), 
Dacca, Vol.XXI, No.385, 24 August 1969. In Djibouti, it is 
significant that both the country's major nationalist 
movements have been treating their country as a part of the 
Somali entity. This is reflected intheir official names, 
viz. the African Peoples League for Independence of French 
Somaliland and the Front for the liberation of the Somali 
Coast. The latter has had its headquarters in Mogadishu, 
i.e. in the Somali Republic. Vide: Karl Lavrencie, Jibuti/Is 
it going to be a new Angola? in the Impact International, 
London, 12-25 December 1975.
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single socio-legal system. Given so many things to share 
in common and their clan-based social system, this makes 
the Somalis a very closely-knit social unit. The Somali 
boundaries cutting through this unit, simply obstruct the 
normal social intercourse among its members, inevitably 
irritating the Somalis on both sides of the border and tempting 
them to do away with these obstructive divisions.
Feelings of this kind are generated also from the fact 
that these boundaries equally obstruct even the normal sub­
sistence economic activities of the Somalis, most of whom 
are nomadic cattle-herders, accustomed to move freely through­
out the Somali lowlands from place to place for the seasonal 
pastures, and finding the borders a severe obstacle to their 
livelihood. Even the urban and settled Somalis are not free 
from the effects of this irritation. Almost all urban Somalis 
have close relations and property outside the city - left 
very much a part of the pastoral fabric of economy. So,
41
The strength of Islamic feelings amongst the Somalis is 
significant also because this distinguishes them from all their 
immediately neighbouring societies, including the Moslem Afars. 
The strength of the Somalis' Islamic attachment has always 
been evident, ever since their conversion, as much obvious in 
the statement by its present 'Marxist' President that, 'Islam 
is our ethical basis. Somalis are 100% Muslims ... Islam too 
is a progressive creed ...' as in the 16th century Jihad, the 
19th century resistance under the 'Mad Mullah' or the inclusion 
of 'encourage[ment] ... of the ... Islamic peoples' as one 
of the national objectives in their liberal democratic 
Constitution of 1960. Vide:J. Bowyer Bell, op.cit., p.ll;
Hess, op.cit., pp.130-148. Somali Republican Constitution, 
First Chapter, Art.6/4; A.S. Somali a/Marrying Islam with 
Communism in Impact International, London, 26 November- 
9 December, 1976, p.8. On the other hand, the Afars are only 
' norninal-Muslims' and 'really pagans'. Mordechai Abir,
Red Sea Politics in Conflicts in Africa3 Adelphi Paper No. 93, 
London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(1973), p.33. E.F. Bozman (ed), Everyman’s Encyclopaedia, 
Vol.IV (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1958), p.248.
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policies made by the urban elites of Somalia also are very 
much directly affected by the irritation caused by the Somali 
boundaries.
Certain other aspects of these boundaries also contribute
to the Somali irredentism. For instance, the complete network
of routes linking the two 'regions’ of the Somali Republic
in the shortest, cheapest and smoothest way is left under
Ethiopian control. Somalia aspires to gain control over
this area for economic and strategic convenience, and to
assist her efforts at greater national integration. ^The
northern and southern 'regions' of Somalia have consistently
shown two separate personalities through such indications as
patterns of political rivalry and concern with the maintenance
4 2of a balance of the two regions' interests. These two 
regions came to develop such separate personalities due to 
a number of factors. Perhaps the most important of these 
is the difference in their respective colonial experience. 
Other factors, such as differing tribal affiliations and 
proximity to Arab countries in the north or East Africa in 
the south also have contributed to this distinction. Whatever 
the causes and their order of priority, the distinction has 
come to be a reality to be reckoned with, even within the 
stronger framework of Somali nationalism. This postulates
Cf. for instance, the assassination of the Republic's 
President Abdirrashid Shermarke, by a member of 'a northern 
tribe which felt that it was not adequately represented 
in the Parliament'. Keesing's, op.cit., 23762. Also, the 
careful balance maintained between the north and the south 
in the composition of the Revolutionary Council after the 
coup of 1969; the Chairman, Gen. Barrh was from the south. 
The Vice-Chairman, Gen. Korshal was from the north, ibid.
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a requirement for increased intercourse and integration
between the two ’regions' as a precondition for Somali
nation-building,^ ^ in which these separate personalities
4 4would be dissolved into a single national ethos. And
for that purpose, the acquisition of this intermediate
territory along with its network of communications is
45undoubtedly a matter of great significance.
Both the major rivers of Somalia have their catchment 
areas on the Ethiopian side of the existing boundary. If 
Ethiopia stops or adversely controls water in these rivers 
at the upstream, Somalia's economy may suffer heavily. This 
is particularly so in view of the fact that pre-capitalistic 
economics are always crucially dependent on the natural
The same will apply to other incoming regions if and 
when such 'incomings' occur.
Subordination of the lesser collective personalities to 
the overriding national ethos is a must for nation-building. 
This requires strengthening of the overriding ethos at the 
expense of the lesser ones, involving dissolution of the 
latter into the former. This dissolution, however, has not 
always to be total, i.e. to the extent to cause a complete 
integration. National ethos can be built up as stronger 
than that of the subnational character in a federal framework 
too. But this is not easy if the federal units are not 
of at least a roughly equal standing in terms of political 
weight and leverage. In such cases, nation-building mya 
have to involve the idea of an integral national -personality. 
Somalia faces a similar position. Her 'regions' are over­
whelmingly disproportionate. Nation-building in Somalia 
is likely to require not a federal, but an integral state.
45 Communication between the north and the south has been a 
major concern of the Somali Republic. It has been observed 
that 'the importance of the first all-weather ... road linking 
northern Somalia with the South [one of the first major 
projects of the Republic] , needs no emphasising'. Karl 
Lavrencic , Somalia: Living without Russia in Africa Magazine 
(London), No.83, July 1978, p.40.
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sources of water.^ It is only with the advent of capitalism,
bringing with it such factors as industrialisation, the
rise of a market economy and the increased role of commerce,
that dependence on control over sources of water lessens.
At the same time, industrialisation may introduce newer
uses of water and thus increase demand for it. Thus,
while industrialised economies may need increased consumption
of water, the cruciality of their dependence on it will be,
nevertheless, lesser than a non-industrialised economy.
Ethiopia, in view of her recent changes, may start
thinking in terms of unprecedented rates of industrial- 
4 7isation or, more likely, may start thinking of modern 
irrigation systems. These may lead to an increased
The extent of the Somalis' dependence on water may be 
understood from the following observation by a writer:
'... when I asked Somalis if a mullah would have the right 
to forbid the use of well [for religious reasons! ... I was 
told that the mullah would be run out of town, so precious 
is water'. This is particularly significant in view of the 
fact that the Somalis, in general, are very religious.
E.A. Bayne, Somalia on the Horn/A Counterpoint of Problems 
Confronting One of Africa's New Nations, p.5, fn.2. In contrast, 
advanced agriculture can reduce such dependence on the 
natural sources of water with such means as water-reservoirs.
47 The Ethiopian Revolution is likely to take to the Soviet 
brand of socialist thinking. The Soviet model of development 
will stand for rapid industrialisation of even a primitive 
feudal society. The Soviets have curtailed the centrality of 
industrialisation in their thinking on development programmes 
for the less-developed countries, in recent years. Notwith­
standing this, industrialisation remains a basic theme in 
the Soviet model. Vide: for the role of industrailisation in 
the Soviet model, Charles K. Wilber, The Soviet Model of 
Economic Development: A Re-examination, in Roger E. Kanet
& Donna Bahry (eds), Soviet Economic and Political Relations 
with the Developing World (N.Y. Praeger Publishers, 1975) ,
P•44; and Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, The Soviet Union and 
the Third World: From Khrushchev’s ’Zone of Peace’ to
Brezhnev’s ’Peace Programme’, in Kanet & Bahry, op.cit., p.5.
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exploitation of her rivers. This, in turn, may result in 
Ethiopia's controlling of the rivers shared by both her 
and Somalia. This, as already discussed, would prove to 
be disadvantageous or even fatal to the Somali economy.
All this remains, still, only a potential situation.
But the potential is serious. This is particularly so 
because present policies are very often formulated on future 
apprehensions.
The Somali lands on the Ethiopian side of the border 
are known to have reserves of valuable minerals, e.g. gold. 
Speculations, including those about oil, add yet greater 
value to the area. These areas are a source of significant 
dairy products. One of the main sources of Ethiopia's coffee 
lies in this area and coffee is one of the bases of the 
Ethiopian economy. All this makes the area an important 
economic prizQ.
Just as the Somalis have objective reasons for 
irredentist claims on the Somali lands now under Ethiopian 
control, the Ethiopian Government also has its own reasons 
to fight such claims, and thus, contribute to the continued 
confrontation on the issue. Control over these areas gives 
her a strategic edge of balance of strength against Somalia,
50 According to recent (1974) reports, oil has been 
discovered in this area. Africa Report, 1974.
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a traditional source of threat to her security. The 
Ethiopian control over this area, as already shown, keeps 
Somalia weak. This control also provides Ethiopia Proper 
with an important cordon sanitaire through which the Somali 
Republican forces can never proceed with full military 
speed and fury, as consideration of safety for their own 
Somali kith and kin in this area will prevent them from, 
for example, engaging in massive aerial bombardment, and 
tank operations. This factor, in turn, will affect the 
Somali fighting capability and their chances of success 
against the Ethiopian Core, which, in any case, will feel 
freer in a total war, whether deep inside Somalia - or even 
in the rebellious Somali lands within her own boundaries.
The resources of the area and its good communication 
network also makes it a prize that Ethiopia cannot give up. 
Ethiopia's most strategic rail and road communications run eithei 
through or next to it connecting her with Djibouti, her traditioi 
al and the most important outlet to the world since Ethiopia 
depends considerably on her foreign trade, she cannot afford 
to lose these strategic lines of communications. This in
51
51 The three greatest threats to Amhara Ethiopian Core in 
history came from or via Somalia. The first, the Jihad (16th 
century) 'the greatest threat' to Ethiopia '(d)uring the 
last 700 years' started from northern Somalia and took over 
almost the whole of Ethiopia. The second, the 'Galla invasion' 
and immigration (16th century onward) which posed an even 
greater threat to the Amhara state, started from southern 
Somalia and took over the whole Ethiopian South, moved as 
far north as Bale, and at one stage, about the middle of the 
eighteenth century, made as serious inroads into the governing 
elite as to have almost occupied the imperial power. The 
third, the Italian attack, invasion and occupation started 
from Italian Somaliland. Vide: infra, Ch.III and IV. Also 
Thomas M. Coffey, Lion by the Tail/The Story of the Italo- 
Ethiopian War (London: Ilamish Hamilton, 1974) , pp.3-33.
However, the Italians used their Eritrean colony" also for 
this purpose.
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turn adds one more reason to Ethiopia's special interests 
in gaining, and later unwillingness to lose, her Somali 
inhabited areas.
Finally, given the very many centrifugal forces and 
secessionist movements within the Ethiopian state, yielding 
to any one of them may add to the optimism of the rest of 
these movements and thus to their intensification. Holding 
on to these Somali territories is thus crucial for Ethiopia's
own continued unity and existence in the present geographical
, 52shape.
So, from both sides, the Ethiopian controlled Somali 
inhabited areas remain a prize worth acquiring and retaining, 
even if at the cost of continued and expensive struggle 
and intermittent, fullfledged wars.
The Eritrean problem is also a product of the artificial 
nature of a boundary. The boundary between Ethiopia Proper 
and Eritrea cuts across the Amhara-Tigrais. Before its 
de-internationalisation in 1952, it also deprived Ethiopia 
Proper of its closest outlet to the sea.
This had led to the Ethiopian struggle for the de­
internationalisation of the boundary to unify the outlying
5 2 'The Somali claims on the Ogaden have been regarded in 
Addis Ababa as a mortal threat to the stability of the Empire. 
Ethiopia as a [plural] state simply cannot accept the 
legitimacy of ethnic separatism - a concession that would 
lead to further demands and ultimate fragmentation'.
Bell, op.cit., p.25.
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Amhara-Tigrais with the mother society as well as to
54acquire theEritrean coast. This in turn resulted m  
the extinction of Eritrea as a separate entity and thus 
the Eritrean struggle for independence. In the ultimate 
analysis, the artificiality of the boundary, at least to 
a significant degree, causes the present Eritrean problem.
The Ethiopian Emperor, Haile Selassie, repudiated this 
boundary, even before it was actually de-internationalised 
in 1952, for its 'complete artificiality'. Selassie, radio 
broadcast, 28 March 1950, cited in Keesing’s
p.10841. This he did in the name of the identity of cultural 
and social life and the virtual identity of language between 
the peoples on both the sides of the boundary. 'The Ethiopian 
thesis [repudiating the boundary] was based on the ... fact 
that the vast majority of the populations of Ethiopia and 
Eritrea are of one ethnic affiliation ...', Dr Serson Bekkele, 
Ethiopian Charges d'Affaires in Kenya, in the Sunday Nation, 
Nairobi, 20 February 1977.
Cf. Selassie's repudiation on 28 March 1950 of the Ethiopian- 
Eritrean boundary in the name of 'landlocked Ethiopia's vital 
need for access to the sea' and his demand for control on 
the port of Massawa on the Eritrean coast 'in order that 
the economic development of Ethiopia ... shall not be further 
delayed'. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, op.cit. The 
Ethiopians have always been craving for an open water outlet.
For instance, even before their bid for the Eritrean coast 
they engaged in negotiations with Britain in 1943 for 
a coastline around Zeila in Somaliland in excnange for a 
part of Ogaden, around Wal Wal. Vide: Thomas M. Coffey,
op.cit,p.7. A number of Ethiopian memoranda to the four 
power Conferences (U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., France) held in 
the immediate post-W.W.II period (late 40s) to consider the 
disposal of the former Italian colonies, also claimed Eritrea 
in the name of cultural identity and Ethiopia's need for 
an outlet to the sea. There were military/strategic 
considerations also. Cf. reference to the fact that 'Eritrea 
has been used by colonial powers as a base of aggression 
against Ethiopia' as a justification for the Ethiopian claim:
Dr Serson Bekkele, Ethiopian Charge d'Affairs in Kenya,
Eritrea: the Ethiopian case (commenting on the memoranda),
Sunday Nation, Nairobi, 20 February 1977.
55 Certain other geopolitical factors also supplemented the 
Ethiopian drive for the Eritrean coast. Ethiopia paid more 
attention to the acquisiton of this than to the other alter­
native - the coast on the Indian Ocean. Eritrea remains a 
prize for Ethiopia not only because it contains both of her 
only two ports (Assab and Massawa) - already under her control, 
but also because of the fact that around 20% of Ethiopia's 
industry lies in Eritrea. Eritrean oil and oil refinery
(cont' d)
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The potentially dangerous situation of Djibouti also 
is due to the artificiality of its boundaries. These 
boundaries hold two separate ethnic groups, the Afars and 
the Somali Issas together into a state that has, at least 
outwardly, neither the viability nor the will to exist 
as an independent unit. Both groups have the majority of 
their members outside these boundaries, in neighbouring
Ethiopia and Somalia, and there has been a manifestation 
among them, of a desire for unification with the greater 
mass of their respective societies. These emotional 
tendencies are supplemented by the realisation that the 
territory, with almost no production of any significance 
at all, cannot carry on as an independent unit?a On the 
other hand, this situation presents strong cases for 
irredentist claims by both the neighbouring states on this 
country. The strategic value of the territory and its port 
of Djibouti strengthens these irredentist tendencies. Lying 
at the narrow entrance of the Red Sea and serving as the
55 (cont'd)
(Assab)^ also enhance her importance. 'Ethiopian secessionists 
zntensify their struggle', Sunday Nation, 20 February 1977.
Two of the main political groups of the Issas, the Front 
for the Liberation of the Somali Coast and the African 
Peoples League for Independence of French Somaliland reflect, 
in their very names, their view of the country as a part of 
a greater Somalia. Vide: supra, fn.42. This latter has 
been identified as 'Pro-Somali', Impact International, London, 
23 April-13 May 1976, p.3. The Issas in general have been 
identified as 'pro-Somali', The Standard, Nairobi, 19 
December 1977. On the other hand one of the major Afar 
groups, the Movement for the Liberation of Djibouti has been 
termed as 'Ethiopia-based', Impact International, 22 April- 
12 May 1977, p.3. The Afars traditionally owe allegiance 
to the Afari Sultan, whose seat has been inside Ethiopia.
The Sultan, however, at present, is a fugitive in Saudi-Arabia
56a It is observed, in terms of economic conditions that, 
for Djibouti, the outlook will be bleak'. Africa South of 
Sahara^ 1977-78 (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1977),p.34
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traditionally most important outlet for the Ethiopian
interior, the port is an international prize in both
5 7commercial and military terms. All this combined sets
the situation as potentially ideal for an inter-tribal civil
5 8war with external involvements. * Any such crisis at this 
particular point of the region is very likely to involve 
all the powers on both the sides of the Strait, and along
D/ The present 1976 chief minister [of Djibouti] Mr Ali 
Arif Burhan ... is an Afar and Afar tribes overlapped in 
Ethiopia. On the other hand, the Issas extend into Somalia.
These extensions and overlapping ... have given rise to 
respective Ethiopian and Somali claims. ... [A statement 
issued by the Ethiopian foreign ministry in 1976] said that 
since most of the major tribes in the territory live in 
Ethiopia also and since there are historical and geographical 
links between Ethiopia and the territory and since 60% of 
the [sic] Ethiopia's foreign trade is conducted through 
Jibuti, the territory had a great ... strategic importance 
to Ethiopia's peace and security'. Anonymous, Decolonization> 
French Style/Jibuti triangular in Impact International (London), 
27 February-25 March 1976, p.32. For the Somali irredentist 
claims, vide also: supra,p.24, fn.39. Also, 'Facing Aden at the 
mouth of the Red Sea, Jibuti also occupies an unenviable 
strategic location inviting the attention of powers other than 
France alone'. Decolonization: French Style/Jibuti triangular3og.cit
There are indications pointing to this possibility. For 
example, Cf. the alleged terrorist activities of the 
exclusively Afar M.P.L. (Peoples' Liberation Movement), and 
following resignation (18 December 1977) of the five Afar 
Members of the Djibouti Cabinet en masse and including the 
Prime Minister, complaining of the Government's 'tribal 
oppression' - within six months of the country's independence 
(June 1977). Also reported links of the M.P.L. with forces 
across the borders in Ethiopia, and the Issa dominated 
Government's ban on it (18 December 1977). The Standard,
Nairobi, 19 December 1977.
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with them, the Great Powers with whom they are closely 
59linked.
The geography of natural socio-political developments 
in the region and the consequent basic tendencies of its 
various political societies clash with that of its existing 
political systems. This poses an inherent element of 
crisis in the geostrategic setting of the whole area. As 
mentioned above and as will be elaborated later - Ethiopia's 
traditional characteristics have been those of a pre­
capitalist feudal conservative centralist autocratic system.
60A sudden break with it in favour of the socialist democracy 
under multiple leadership, to which it was committed as 
a result of its Revolution, resulted in a contradiction.
This contradiction of the imposed position and the traditionally 
inherent tendency of the Ethiopian body-politic has in turn
The fact that the countries adjacent to the Strait, Bab- 
el-Mandeb are extraordinarily zealous in their ideological 
commitments to either of the Great Power camps (e.g. the 
P.D.R.Y., Ethiopia, and until recently, Somalia) - or 
strategically bound with either of these groups (e.g. Djibouti) 
makes this particularly probable. While the first three 
states have zealously claimed to be Marxist, the last one 
is bound with the West through a military pact with France. 
Notwithstanding the French connection, Djibouti is an 
object of international Marxist interests also. Cf. for 
example,inclusion of Djibouti in the recent Soviet and Cuban 
planned Marxist Confederation of the Red Sea States. According 
to the plan, the confederation is to include Ethiopia, Somalia, 
P.D.R.Y. and Djibouti. A.S.,Red Sea/Whose Lake it will be? 
Impact International (London), 8-21 April 1977, p.5.
60 Mohammed Ayoob, The Horn of Africa: Regional Conflict
and Super Power Involvement (Canberra Papers on Strategy 
and Defence, No.18: Canberra, the Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre, A.N.U., 1978), p.14.
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led to a continued crisis in the country. The imposed
system has already started to show its failure to withstand
the forces of the inherent 'natural' socio-political
tendencies. Thus, the promised and emerging socialist
democracy seems to have already turned into a military
dictatorship tending towards a state capitalist system.^
The system of plural leadership has been brought down to
6 2the original absolute centralist autocracy. The initial 
promises of a confederal/federal relationship among the 
provinces have been subdued under ferocious integrationist
Cf. The aims of the 'Ethiopian National Democratic 
Revolution Programme' announced by the Revolutionary regime 
on 21 April 1976: 'the people will cast their free and secret
ballot to elect a revolutionary people's assembly - which will 
assume the high authority of Government'. However, already, 
within two years of the revolution, one could see in the 
vague phraseology of this announcement, indications of a 
possible diversion from this promised course: cf. also,
in this announcement, indications to the effect that the 
elections may be limited to parties favoured by the 
revolutionary regime only and that the democratic republic 
may be built only 'under the leadership of a party of the 
Proletariat' Addis Ababa radio, 21 April 1976.
6 2 The course of this transition may be discerned in the 
reports published in the Press on the area during the 
post-Revolutionary period. Summary of these reports may 
be followed in the Keeing’s Contemporary Africa Confidential3 
Africa Report, volumes of this period. For the final 
elimination of the hardcore Me 'ei Sone , the last of the 
groups rivalling the Dergue, vide: Africa Confidential,
Vol.18, No.18, 9 September 1977, pp.4-6.
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r o
policies. The actual present seems to revert towards
a conformation with the inherent tendencies generated by
the past. This reversion is occurring through a process of 
6 4crisis. It is not only due to the forces of the natural 
socio-political tendencies of the Ethiopian polity. There 
are other factors also working in this direction, viz. the 
deliberate effort to set the Ethiopian Revolution as a close 
replayof the Soviet Revolution of 19 l~J and the precipitation 
of emergency situations in Eritrea and the Ogaden. But 
the independent and crucial role played by the factor of 
inherent tendencies is obvious from the fact that the 
'reversal' in the policy was already underway, quite before 
either of these secondary factors came in. It may be 
suggested with more justification that the emergency situations, 
particularly that in Eritrea were a result, and not a cause, 
of the policy of ' r e v e r s a l ' T h e  remarkable concern with 
equating the present Ethiopian situation with the Soviet 
revolutionary one, in turn, is a product of the emergency
6 3 Vide: The revolutionary regime promised 'regional autonomy' 
for each nationality in Ethiopia, including Eritrea, Addis 
Ababa Radio, 21 April 1976. But, 'Eritreans will have none 
[of such autonomy]', and then, the regime went as far as 
to eliminate even those of the main architects of the 
Revolution who would continue to think of Eritrean self- 
determination as one of the possible means of solving the 
Eritrean problem. Cf. for example, the elimination, in July 
1977, of the leadership of the Me'ei Sone, the political wing, 
ideological mentor and one of the top-most units of the 
initial corporate leadership of the Ethiopian Revolution (1974) 
for, amongst other things, their belief in Eritrean independence 
as one of the possible options. Karl Lavrencic, 'Ethiopia/ 
the sick man of Africa' in Impact International (London),
29 May-10 June 1976, p.5; 'Ethiopia: Dergue comes out on top' 
in Africa Confidential, Vol.18, 9 September 1977, p.5.
^  Ethiopia is in a serious state of crisis ever since its 
Revolution, 1974.
6 5 Vide: my interview with Tadesse Kahsai, Eritrean exile,
1977, Sydney.
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situations in Eritrea and the Ogaden. These crises not only
brought the situation close to the Soviet revolutionary crisis,
but also necessitated, the deliberate equation of the
Ethiopian situation with the Soviet experience in a bid to
win Soviet sympathy and support. Soviet support was critically
needed in view of the shaky regime's inability to face the
crises and the general reluctance of the West to come forward
with substantial assistance in facing them.^
Similarly, the Somali society tends to be more suited
6 7to a pluralistic and loosely organised Islamic and democratic,
6 8but militant system rather than a centralised, strictly 
disciplined, marxist dictatorship. Somalia was put under
6 9the latter form of political system through the coup of 1969. 
This has resulted in a crisis situation within Somalia, which, 
while not very visible, nevertheless has been forcing the 
actual situation imposed by the coup to revert in conformity
The recent developments including the Ethiopian regime's 
deliberate and obvious effort at equating the Ethiopian 
situation with the Soviet Revolution of 1917, and Western 
policy towards the Ethiopian revolutionary regime, will be 
discussed in some greater detail in later chapters. Vide also 
Ayoob, op.cit.
6 7 For the strength of Islam amongst the Somalis in Somalia,
Vide: supra,pp.25-26.For that in Djibouti, Vide: Djibouti 
declared Islam as the State religion at independence , Dawn, 
(Karachi), 3 July 1977.
Vide: supra, p.19. For a general description of militancy 
as a part of the Somali temperament, vide: Alys Reece, To My 
Wife,, Fifty Camels (London, 1953).
6 9 Cf. The centralization of all powers of the President,National 
Assembly, Government (Administration), Supreme Court and the 
Forces into a narrow based, military Revolutionary Council of 
twenty five - in one of the first acts of the Revolutionary 
regime (October 1969). Also, its ban on all political parties 
and major newspapers; its rhetorically expressive renaming of 
the country as a Democratic 'Republic' like Marxist E. Germany 
and N. Korea. Keesing ’ s , p. 23672 .
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with the inherent tendencies.(The crisis situation inside
Somalia is not visible, not because it is not there - but
because of the strict suppressive measures of the Government
that keep it from coming out on the surface). Thus, Marxism
70has had to be wedded with the anti-Marxism of Islam and
the Government has had to discard its initial pacifict position
on the question of Somali unification, for instance - in
71favour of a more militant stand. The signs of a situation
[In Somalia] Revolutionaries have had to 
adjust Socialist ideas for local consumption ...
Marx and Islam have been wedded into the 
national philosophy of Iska Wah Ugabso ... 
that, according to Comrade General President Siad, 
in no way conflicts with Islam.
Bell, op.cit., p.34. Vide also, A.S., Somalia/Marrying 
Islam with Communism, op.cit. Even after this wedding, as 
late as in 1976, the Somali regime had to continue its fight 
against 'Islamic intrigues'. Jean Claude Guillebaud, Africa’s 
Horn of Troubles/Battling for the Lake of Arab Peace, in 
The Guardian, 17 July 1977, p.13.
71 For the initial pacifist stand, one may note the statement 
by the Somali Ambassador in Paris (22 October 1969) that the 
new regime in Somalia intends to have good-neighbourly 
relations with all contiguous countries. Also, the 
Revolutionary Council Chairman, Gen. Siyad's statement 
(25 October 1969) that the regime would not interfere in 
other countries' internal affairs and would respect the 
OAU Charter - which stands, in general, for the existing 
borders, and thus, against the militant Somali irredentism 
aiming at undoing the Ethio-Somali, Somali-Kenyan and 
Somali-Djibouti boundaries. For later 'reversion' to the 
original militant irredentist position, vide: supra, p.24, 
fn.39; infra, Ch.V.
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of crisis underneath the quiet surface of suppressive
72discipline also leak out now and then.
The Topography
The topography of the region justifies special emphasis 
in this analysis. It not only contributes to the inherent
For example, cf.
[In] Somalia ... the northwest region national 
security court sentenced one man to death by 
firing squad and five to life imprisonment for 
forming an anti-revolution [anti-regime] secret 
movement. The National Security Court sentenced 
Mahmud Mohammed Musa to 10 years imprisonment 
for slandering ... scientific socialism [i.e. the 
state ideology}. Another court in Tagdayp sentenced 
12 young men between 20-30 to prison for 10-15 
years for waging propaganda against socialism 
[state ideology].
Vide: Impact International, London, 13-26 September 1974, p.3.
'It is insecurity all through, right from the office 
messenger to the top ... anything said by anyone could lead 
to doom': Hussein Haji Ali Damleh, defecting Somali Ambassador
to Kenya, Nairobi, February 1978, quot. in the Standard, 
Nairobi, 1 March 1978, p.l. '... Organized resistance cells 
... formed to topple General Barre [the regime]. A number 
of Ministers, ambassadors and top civil servants who had 
fled the country ... formed the Somali Democratic Action 
Front' to overthrow the regime. Standard, ibid.
... six Army officers were apprehended for 
activities against the security of State [the 
regime] ... They were summarily put on trial, 
sentenced to death and executed. The figure, a 
far cry from the 80 or 50 reported outside 
Somalia, was announced by independent sources.
These executions occurred in the north, near 
Hargeisa.
More serious was the army revolt in the 
Mogadishu area on April 9. The coup attempt is 
understood to have been master minded by Col. 
Abdullahi Yusuf, officer commanding the sector 
at the juncture of Ethiopian, Kenyan and Somali 
Frontiers, but carried out by Lt. Col. Mohamed 
Sheikh Osman, commander of an Air Defence Unit 
near Mogadishu ...
Africa Confidential, Vol.19, No.9, 28 April 1978, p.3.
Such reports, though infrequent, are significant.
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tendencies of the region towards crisis, but also supplements 
these in a significant way by providing a favourable terrain 
for revolutionary warfare. This, in effect,means that this 
particular factor encourages organisation and thus realisation 
of the potentials of crisis by credibly promising success 
to such organisations. The geostrategic setting in general 
provides conditions that may lead the region's peoples to 
think of upsetting the status quo, and thus creating crisis. 
This significantly increases the possibilities of actual 
crises in the region.
A considerable portion of the Horn of Africa is 
mountainous highlands full of steep and numerous cliffs 
which provide excellent cover for guerrilla operations.
At ’the same time, for counter-insurgency forces from without, 
these highlands can be formidable obstacles. This remains 
true for such.forces from one part of the highlands (say, 
the Amhara Core) sent to operate in another part (say the 
Eritrean highlands). These two factors combined, make these 
highlands a very favourable terrain for guerrilla warfare.
On the Peripheral plane too, the topography is favourable
for guerrilla warfare. The harsh and vast deserts offer a
formidable barrier for any outsider sent to quell any local
insurgency. Given the flat and monotonous landscape of the
desert with little or no permanent physical features to
serve as landmarks, it also turns out to be an obstacle as
confusing and fatal as the highland ranges. For the local
*
insurgents, however, this is not much of a problem; the 
land, being their home, is very well-known to them.
43
The flatness of the landscape also provides an advantage 
in the field of military mobility. On such landscapes, 
operations can be launched with significant speed. But, 
for the alien forces, this advantage may be offset by the 
relative lack of knowledge of the terrain and that of support 
of its population as compared with that likely to be enjoyed 
by the indigenous guerrillas.
If a guerrilla organisation decides to combine the 
highlands or a part thereof, with the peripheral lowlands 
or, again, a part thereof, it acquires perhaps the best 
possible geographical terrain for an overall strategy. A 
brief discussion of the classical strategy of revolutionary 
war will be useful in clarifying this point.
A classical revolutionary war proceeds through three 
73stages. In the first stage, the revolutionary organisation 
has to prepare and act in secrecy, confining its operations 
to ambush and hit-and-run activities. In the second stage 
the revolutionaries require safety and isolation, more than 
secrecy. During this phase, they have to maintain a territorial 
entity t wherein they carry out reforms to serve as display 
models indicative of their declared intentions. At the same 
time, they raise and train, in the safety of this entity, 
regular forces to fight an open war at the third and final
73 Vide: for the three stage formulation of revolutionary 
war, Mao Tse-tung, The Three Stages of the Protracted War3 
in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign
Language Press, 1968), pp.210-219. Also, Robert Thompson, 
Revolutionary War in World Strategy: 1945-1969 (London:
Seeker & Warburg, 1970), pp.4-5.
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stage. This last stage involves conventional warfare and 
acquisition, preferably very rapidly, of control over the 
whole of the country.
In the above-mentioned case, the revolutionary movement 
may depend on the coverage given by the topography of the 
highlands for the secrecy, safety and isolation required 
at the first two stages. At the third stage, the revolutionary 
forces may come out from their highland base and expect 
to sweep over the rest of the country with exceptional rapidity. 
The flat landscape of the lowlands may make exceptional 
swiftness a possible and critically favourable factor in 
their winning the final, conventional war.
Moreover, in this conventional showdown, the revolutionary 
forces would enjoy a particular initial advantage, at least 
against that portion of the regular forces and their 
installations that may be stationed in the open of the flat 
lowland. These latter forces would be vulnerable to surprise 
attack. The revolutionaries, on the other hand, in their 
safe hideout in the mountains, would always have the freedom 
to choose the time to start hostilities, according to their 
own convenience. The advantage of the first and surprise 
strike would always give the revolutionary forces an extra 
military balance of advantage from the outset of the con­
ventional hostilities.
This means that any revolutionary movement taking the 
whole of the Horn, or any contiguous combination of its high­
lands and the lowlands, as the terrain of its planned war, 
would find such territory very much conducive to victory.
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Of course, such other factors as the relative strength of 
the opposing conventional columns and the support of the 
local population will play crucial roles. But if the 
revolutionary movement is on a classical pattern, the 
protracted course of the revolution and the aforementioned 
'combination' of the highlands and the lowlands into a single 
revolutionary terrain is likely to shape these factors in 
the revolutionaries' favour. They are not supposed, 
according to the 'classical pattern', to enter into the 
third or conventional stage of the war until they have built 
up a conventional force comparable to the counter-insurgency 
forces. And the 'combination' will essentially mean the 
gradual winning of the masses of the plains also on the 
revolutionaries' side during the early stages of the war.
The Eritrean insurgents, incidentally, find themselves 
exactly in such a position. Another case may be that of the 
Ethiopian struggle of the anti-regime Ethiopian Revolutionary 
Party (ERP) .
The topography of the region, thus, promises high 
credibility of success for revolutionary struggles. It 
particularly helps the Eritrean liberation struggle and the 
underground movement of the ERP.
The topography of the region brings in other elements 
of inherent crisis also. For example, there are certain 
topographical barriers and units that suggest certain manifest 
and natural frontiers for the countries of the region. Given 
the artificial nature of the existing boundaries and the 
rough coincidence of these suggestive barriers with the ethnic
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line of division also, these may tempt some of the countries 
to strive for their realisation as the actual legal border.
One particular case calls for serious attention. A complete 
line of physical barriers, composed of a chain of lakes, 
two rivers, a couple of mountain ranges and a long rift 
valley, separates the Amharic core of the Ethiopian state from 
the traditionally hostile, rebellious Somali inhabited rest
74of the country. This serves the Somali claims that these
latter areas are a country entirely separate from Ethiopia
and which, thus, should be liberated from her 'colonial
occupation'. The line of barriers also obstructs military
operations against the area's rebels, from the Ethiopian
centre. These factors strengthen the position of the Somali
irredentists and further encourage both revolutionary crisis
7 5and international military conflict in the area.
Conclusions
The study of the region's geopolitical setting leads 
to the following conclusions:
1. The region's geographical factors present a pattern 
of relationships between the various units of the region's 
system as well as that of the course of events within those 
units.
74 Vide: supra, pp.9, 11, 22 and 23.
The West Somali rebels, as an organised 'Front', have been 
active since 1964. Vide: Statement issued by West Somali 
Liberation Front, in Young Pakistan, Dacca, op.cit. There 
have been actual international conflicts between Somalia and 
Ethiopia in the area in 1964 and 1977.
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2. This pattern is that of a constant inter-actor contra­
diction between the Central Core of the system which corresponds 
to the traditional Ethiopian Highland society of the Amharic 
people - and a set of Peripheral societies, corresponding to 
the Somali Republic, Djibouti and such outlying areas of
the present Ethiopian state as the Eritrean Lowlands, Ogaden 
and the Oromo areas.
3. The pattern suggests particular collective unconscious
or subconscious socio-political tendencies for the Ethiopian 
Core and the Peripheral societies including Somalia. At 
present, the superimposed existing systems of both
Ethiopia and Somalia not only do not correspond to, but also 
clash with, their respective socio-political tendencies.
This presents situations of internal contradiction in both 
the states' societies.
4. Thus, the region's geostrategic setting presents a 
complex situation of crises of both inter-actor as well as 
intra-actor character.
5. This crisis situation is inherent in the objective 
conditions of the region's geostrategic setting, completely 
independent of any external factors, e.g. global politics.
6. The region's geostrategic setting, for both its abstract 
crises-potentialities and concrete physical conditions,is 
conducive to subconventional warfare.
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CHAPTER III
THE HISTORICAL PROCESS
Introduction: Role of the Historical Process
A study of the historical process of any phenomenon 
is as basic to its understanding as that of its geographical 
position.^ This particularly applies to social conditions 
including international relations and security situations.
The role of historical background may be perceived in 
terms of three separate, though interrelated aspects, 
viz. (a) direct and simple effects of past experience on 
the present conditons, (b) historical patterns of behaviour, 
and (c) stages of historical development.
As already seen, all social conditions involve human
2behaviour which in turn is a set of interactions.
Interactions involve a past-present relationship. Each present 
action is a reaction to a past action. This means, inter­
action, and ultimately, all social conditions essentially 
involve history.
Then, repetition of the same or similar kind of behaviour 
results in habits, i.e. patterns of behaviour. Experience 
of such repetitions in the past i.e. in the relevant historical 
background, leads to a particular pattern of behaviour. Such
Vide: Raymond Aron upholding Montesquieu's view that 
'geographical position and the experience of centuries 
[history]' transform the collective 'habits or custom' into 
'national idiosyncrasy' which result in diplomatic behaviours 
typical of the particular nation [group] in question. Aron, 
Peace and War/A Theory of International Relations (Fr., 
translated by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), p.289.
Vide: supra^ Ch.II, pp.2
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pat't’BrnS tend to persist in the present behaviour also.
This is as much true with human collectivities as with 
individuals.
Finally, societies in general, pass through a more of 
less stereotype set of successive stages of development.
For instance, societies usually pass on from the hunting 
stage to the nomadic pastoral one, and from there, to the 
feudal and capitalistic systems. By tracing the historical 
background one can better understand the nature of the stage 
at which a particular society exists at a given time. This 
also can help in understanding the direction of the society's 
future.^
Thus, a study of the historical background involved 
is also, like that of the geopolitical setting, of a 
primary importance in any effort to understand the present 
conflict situation on the Horn of Africa and to its projection 
into the future.
Ancient Horn of Africa
The Horn of Africa has been inhabited from times 
unrecorded. The most ancient inhabitants were probably 
Negroids, remnants of whose societies still exist as enclaves 
scattered over the region, particularly in its south western
Particularly Marxist analysis interprets all situations 
with deference to the stages of development. But many non- 
Marxist analysts also refer to such stages of development 
in their studies. Cf. W.W. Rostow, Stages of Eaonomic Growth/ 
A Eon-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1971). In fact, 
ever since the concept of an evolutionary nature of history 
was established through the initial works of Hegel (1770-1831) 
and Darwin (1809-1882), the concept of stages of development 
has become a common and accepted term of reference in 
analysis of conditions.
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fringes. The Negroid inhabitants were subjugated and over­
whelmed by Cushitic migrants from northern Sudan. Even 
though these newcomers intermarried with the pre-existing 
Negroids, the population in the area developed as a pre­
dominantly Cushitic stock.4
The Cushitic invasion and settlement of the Horn of 
Africa was followed by a similar invasion and settlement by 
Semites from across the Red Sea.
A section of the Sabaean Semitics crossed the narrow 
strip of the Red Sea in the south, and settled on the coast
5on the other side: sometime between 1,000 B.C. and 100 B.C.
The permanent Sabaean settlement on the Horn was a 
significant event: it introduced the element of a body political
conflict^ in the area which continued to influence the overall 
situation subsequently. The Horn would see, henceforth, 
a persistent existence of, and conflict between two equally 
unyielding societies on the same scene: the Semitic and the
Cushite. It was not for the first time that the area came 
to hold more than one society. There had been both Negroids 
and the Cushites in this same area before the Semitic onslaught
'At the time when we get first glimpses of Ethiopian [The 
Horn's] history, the Cushitic peoples of the country appear 
to be in full occupation of the region . But 'Negro 
aborigines' existed even before that and 'negroid races ... once 
had possession of the entire area [the Horn]'. George A. Lipsky, 
Ethiopia/It s peopleit s society 3 its culture (New Haven: HRAF 
Press, 1962) , p.7. Edward Ullendorff, The Ethiopians/An 
introduction to Country and People (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1960 , 1961) , p.47. This obviously shows the Negroids 
to be the earliest known stock on the Horn.
J Lipsky, op.cit.
6 I.e. conflict between political societies. Vide: supra3 
Ch.II, p. fn.
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and settlement, and there were many more sub-societies within 
these two units. But never before had the system held more 
than one single independent unit at the same time. The
7Negroids were essentially subjected to the Cushitic order.
This was made possible by the numerical as well as the 
cultural inferiority of the Negroids. But now, the numerical 
superiority of the Cushites critically balanced the cultural 
superiority of the Semites. Neither of the two adversaries 
could completely subordinate the other. The system, thus, 
was split, for the first time, into two competing and con­
flicting units. These, supplemented by such other factors 
as differing environmental experiences, difference in religious 
and other aspects of collective value orientation, crystallised 
over centuries into the present dichotomy.
The Sabaean settlement was important also because it 
introduced a disparity in the stages of development on the 
Horn, where society hitherto had been uniformity pre-feudalgand nomadic pastoralist. The Sabaeans brought with them
9 10agriculture, and thus, essentially the feudal system.
Vide: supra, p.50.g With probably a few insignificant pockets of hunting and 
fruit gathering groups. As about the generally pre-feudal and 
pastoralist nature of the Cushites, it still persists.
Vide: supra, Ch.II, p.15.
9 '..."Sabaeans", Semites ... newcomers brought with them 
... agricultural techniques ...', G.K.N. Trevaskis, Eritrea/
A Colony in Transition: 1941-52 (London, N.Y., Toronto:
Oxford University Press), p.4.
^  The feudal system still persists among the Semitic society 
of the Horn and in general distinguishes it, along with certain 
other factors, from the other peoples of the area. Vide: 
supra, Ch.II, p.19.
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As an advanced and thus stronger class neighbouring a 
relatively backward one tends to dominate it, this disparity 
resulted in the introduction of a struggle between two socio­
economic systems and a contradiction between two stages of 
historical development. Thus, the Sabaean settlement on 
the Horn not only brought in two independent units in its 
system but also set their pattern of relationship as that 
of a struggle, rather than of co-existence, or co-operation.
It also brought a different kind of political organisation
to the area. While the Cushitic societies were simple,
democratically oriented, minimally organised, and intertribal
confederal systems, the Sabaeans brought about the ideas
which consequently gave rise to the institutions of highly
organised, absolute monarchy. The two societies, thus, were
committed, even if only implicitly, to two diametrically
12opposite political ideologies. Their conflict was thus bound 
to take an ideological dimension too. This ideological 
incompatibility was not confined to the political arena alone.
There have been, though not many, efforts at interpreting 
the Horn's history and situation in terms of class struggle 
between socio-economic units. Vide: e.g. Dennis Walker's 
unpublished draft paper on the Ethiopian Revolution (Melbourne, 
1977?). John Markakis, 'Social Formation and Political 
Adaptation in Ethiopia' in Journal of Modern African Studies 
(11,3), pp.361-81.
However, any effort to interpret the condition only or mainly 
in terms of class struggle amounts to unifactorial determinism, 
and thus is not acceptable. Class struggle is only one 
dimension of the basic contradiction between the Central and 
the Peripheral societies of the Horn.
12 '... "Sabaeans", Semites ... brought with them some know­
ledge of political organisation'. Trevaskis, op.cit. However, 
it is not true, as this quotation may imply, that the pre- 
Sabaean, Cushitic elements on the Horn did not have any 
political organisation at all. They had it, though very 
minimal in degree.
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A whole set of new values, particularly as organised in
the religion of Judaism, along with its cultural system,
13was introduced by the Sabaeans to the Horn. In fact, the 
Sabaean settlement brought in two separate worlds to exist 
and to interact within the same system. For reasons already 
stated, the pattern of the interaction turned out to be one
14of conflict rather than of cooperation, or even coexistence.
One aspect of the Sabaean cultural contribution to 
the area with important, though not very immediate or apparent 
consequences for the region's future history was the
15introduction of female circumcision, an ancient Arab practice. 
Over the centuries it became an uncompromisable aspect of 
the Abyssinian culture. In the long run, it became a serious 
issue of theological confrontation within the society, adding 
one more factor of contradiction and crises to the scene.
For example,
Opposition to female circumcision ... has 
become a practical problem ... in connection 
with the Roman Catholic missions to Abyssinia 
in the 16th century ... The missionaries 
forbade it among their female converts, with 
the ... result that no Abyssinian would 
marry them.
13 Vide: reference to 'cultural contributions of the Semitic 
immigrants from Southern Arabia, among whom a large number 
were specifically Judaic [many others, vaguely under the 
Judaic cultural system]'. Lipsky, op.cit., p.7 [emphasis mine].
^  Vide: supra, p.5 2 .
15 Wylde, Modern Abyssinia (1901), p.161 and Goodrich Freer, 
Inner Jerusalem (1904), p.121, cited in James Hasintgs, John 
A. Selbie and others, Encyclop.aedia of Religion and Ethics 
(N.Y.: T & T Clark, 1910), p.679.
Hastings, Selbie and others, op.cit., p.669.
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This had multiple consequences. Besides adding one 
more factor of contradiction into the society, it also 
put check on the growth of the Catholic population in 
the area both in terms of conversion and reproduction. 
One can imagine a completely different course of 
history of the region in case the Catholic faith could 
have won the Monophysite Ethiopia into its fold. The 
whole value system would have experienced a drastic 
change with regard to the social, economic and politico 
military aspects of the affairs of the area. The 
consequences would have affected even the present times
Christianization of the Region
The Semitic civilisation became predominantly
Christian during the period between 330 and 340, and
has remained so ever since. Christianity became the
18state ideology. The Semitic society was
commissioned by the Byzantine centre of
18 'Ezana, ... the Ethiopian King of the Axumite 
period, who reigned in the fourth century, was 
converted to Christianity, which became the 
official religion of the country [Axum: Semitic/ 
Semitized body politic on the Horn] and the accepted 
religion of most of the people between 330 and 340'. 
Lipsky, op.cit., p. 3.
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Christendom as the Christian outpost in Eastern Africa,
with the objective not only to protect but also to expand
19the faith in that region. The conditions which led to 
the Christianization of the Ethiopian polity are not known 
in detail. But it seems that the Ethiopian monarchy, in 
particularly unfavourable circumstances during the fourth 
century, sought and achieved the assistance of a Syrian 
Christian, Frumentus, at the cost of letting him become the 
virtaul emperor. Frumentus' idealism and zeal for Christianity, 
combined with his remarkable statesmanship, virtually brought 
in Christian Byzantine imperial control over the country.
Under this, the Ethiopian monarchy was led to formal Chris- 
tianisation which was a logical consequence of the conversion 
of the dominant elite. A brief reconstruction of the scenario 
of the time under discussion, from the meagre information 
available, will make it clearer.
Queen Regent Thywa Sofya of Abyssinia, after the death 
of her husband King Ella Amida, became very dependent on 
Frumentus, the Syrian Christian, originally a prisoner slave 
but later the empire's treasurer and secretary. The Queen 
Regent had 'no more faithful subjects in the whole kingdom, 
to share with her the cares of government till her son 
[Infant and later Emperor, Ezana] should grow up'. Her 
dependence on Frumentus created favourable conditions for the
'The country [Axum, i.e. the Semitic body-politic] came 
into contact with the Byzantine Empire and undertook a 
special mission to protect and extend Christianity in East, 
Africa'. Lipsky, op.cit.
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Christianization of the country. Having acquired virtually
the imperial power, 'Fruraentius ... sought out those of
the Roman merchants', i.e. Levantines or Greeks who were
Christians and urged them 'to establish conventicles in
various places to which they might resort for prayer'. He
provided them with 'whatever was needed, supplying sites
for building and in every way promoting the growth of ...
20Christianity'. Christian 'Syrian merchants were active
at this time in Adulis [on the Red Sea coast] ... and ...
the Syrians thus made their impact alike in the fields of
21religion and commerce'. The polity was virtually brought 
under Christian control.
Ezana, brought up under the supervision and influence
of this zealous Christian, at coming of age and to power,
'accepted [his virtual regent] Frumentius of Tyre as
Christian bishop and established Christianity as the State 
2 2religion'.
The Christianization of Ethiopia and its projection 
as the Christian outpost in East Africa added one more 
dimension to the Ethiopian character: a conscious and zealous
expansionist tendency. So far, the two competing and con­
flicting units had a natural tendency to expand against each 
other. But, so far, this tendency was only unconscious and
20 R. Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia18 80-1925 
(Addis Ababa, 1968), pp.33-34.
21 Conti Rossini cited in Pankhurst, op.cit., p.35.
Pankhurst, op.cit.22
57
resulted from such other, conscious and direct motives as 
the preservation, or obtaining of economic prizes.
After this introduction to Ethiopia of a global
ideological vision of its own position and responsibility
this subconscious expansionist tendency was converted into
a conscious, and thus stronger, behavioural motivator. The
ethnic contradiction had taken conscious ideological dimension
also, acquiring its full form, a few centuries later, with
the assignment in Islam of a similarly missionary role to
23the Cushites of the Peripheral Lowlands.
The way in which Christianization took place was 
significant. It not only set precedents for, but also 
reflected, a particular aspect of the Ethiopian political 
behavioural tendency - preparedness for ideological submission, 
if need be, in the interest of more concrete political 
interests. This same trait was shown repeatedly in the 
polity's subsequent history. To mention only two remarkable 
instances one can look at such submissions by Emperor Lebna
Islam is open about its expansionist zeal. Mohammed, the 
Prophet of Islam, asked all Moslems to contribute to its 
expansion. Vide: Mohammed's sermon at the 'Last Pilgrimage' 
cited in Akram Khan, Mostafa Charit (in Bengali, Dacca).
Also, 'Muslims in succession are duty-bound to communicate 
the message of Islam to the world', Editorial in Islam and 
the Modern World (Dacca), Autumn & Winter 1978. And, '... it 
is the duty of all the Muslims of the world, wherever they 
may happen to be, to arise for Islamic revolution [which 
includes the expansion of Islam as one of its goals]'.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Hukumate Islamiah (in Persian:
On Islamic Government) , quot. in Impact International3 London,Jan 
February 1979. Also, my Iraner Biplav (in Bengali: The 
Iranian devolution, Dacca, 1979) . Vide3 for elaboration on the 
Islamization of the Peripherals and other relevant points 
infra3 pp.63-77, 86-83 and Ch.IV, pp.94-97, 100-102, 106, 1 
110-11, 121, 148-58 and 177. Also, Ch.II, pp.12, 16, 22,
39-40.
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Dengel in the 16th century and by the present Ethiopian 
regime. Lebna Dengel submitted to the Roman Catholic order, 
against which the Ethiopian national Monophysite Church 
had been struggling for centuries - simply to achieve 
decisive Portuguese assistance against the almost fatal 
Moslem onslaughts in the early 16th century. The present 
Ethiopian regime committed the country to the Soviet version 
of Marxism, to achieve its support in the face of opposition 
from various quarters including the domestic front. This was 
a submission to an ideology directly opposite to the one 
to which the Ethiopian polity has been committed from time 
immemorial.
The introduction of Christianity had another important 
implication. It added a serious element of centripetality 
in the Semitized society, increasing its crisis potentiality. 
Christianity, due to its having experienced serious 
persecution in its earliest times, inherently bears a potential 
for contradictions and conflict. Due to the persecutions 
it was not until at least a couple of generations after the 
origin of the faith that something of its doctrines was 
put down in written form. Many of the initial teachings 
had been lost or distorted during the intervening period, 
leaving the organisers of the doctrines with serious ambiguities 
and missing links in the teachings. This led to many serious
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contradictions and consequent bloody conflicts. Once
introduced to this unfortunate factor, '[T]he Ethiopians
[also] proved their capacity for hairsplitting theological
arguments by great outbursts of religious disputation over
the form that the monophysite doctrines of the Orthodox
25[Coptic] Church should take Given 'the basic
2 6political nature of religious issues in the country this
inevitably led to 'hairsplitting' political contradictions
from which the Ethiopian polity has continued to suffer.
The expansionist policies of the Semitic civilization
of the Horn led to the occupation of the Yemen and from there,
2 7an assault on Mecca in the Hidjaz. The city was the ideolo­
gical centre of pagan Arabia, and assault against it was essen­
tially part of the ideological mission zealously undertaken by the 
Christianized Semitic society of the Horn. There were other, 
non-ideological factors also, e.g. political and economic.
But whatever the motives, the fact remains that this assault 
was a result of the consciously undertaken expansionist policy
The inherent potential for contradiction and crisis is far 
greater in Christianity than in those other doctrines which 
could be fortunate enough to be able to enjoy a protected 
development during their initial stage - during and immediately 
after the death of its proponent. Thus Judaism and Islam 
are less vague on their doctrinal fundamentals and thus 
have had fewer ' fratricidal' sects. Judaism enjoyed a long 
period of protection under successive Jewish kings. Islam 
also enjoyed similar protection. For the vagueness, possible 
distortions, and consequent fragmentation of early Christianity, 
vide, John Hick (ed.), The Myth of God Incarnate (London:
SCM Press Ltd., 1977) .
25 Lipsky, op.cit., p.13.
26 ibid.
27 Hijaz, Hejaz, Hegaz.
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on the part of Axum, the centre of the Semitic civilization
2 8on the Horn, which stemmed from its Christianization.
The assault failed, but left the stateless central
Arabian society with a feeling of insecurity. To counter
the Ethiopian Yemenite threat, the Central Arabs called
29in Persian interference.
This in turn brought direct Byzantine interference also; 
thus, Central Arabia became a victim of international rivalry 
and conflict. Local anarchy, now supplemented by that of 
international power politics, made life miserable in the area.
The Ethiopian ^  pe.dition to the Hidjaz and its consequent 
factors, along with other forces of fusion led, as a reaction, 
first, to efforts at some form of security organisation with 
Mohammed's participation, and then, to the State of Islam under 
him. Islam,- in parts, was a reaction to a prevailing disorder
30and insecurity aggravated by Christianized Ethiopia's missionary zeal 
Thus, the Christianization of Ethiopia and its adoption of 
a missionary role as the outpost for the faith, contributed 
along with other factors, to the rise of Islam in the seventh 
century. A favourable attitude of the Ethiopian polity 
towards the faith in its infancy, as will be seen later, 
assured its continued existence and rise as a political power 
with serious consequences.
Pankhurst, op.cit., pp.47-48.
29 ibid., p .48.
30 Ameer Ali, The Spirit of Islam (London: Methuen, 1965) , 
pp.lxviii-lxix, 13.
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Ethiopia Becomes an Inland Polity
The Semitic onslaught against the Cushitic lands continued 
and, boosted by the rise of Islam as a political power, 
overran the northern realms of the Cushitic domains, i.e. those 
in the north of Africa, also. However, unlike the Horn of 
Africa, there the Cushitic civilization failed to persist 
and compete against the Semitic onslaught. Rather, it was 
completely assimilated into the Semitic civilization of the 
Arabs. This could be possible because, here, unlike the Horn, 
the Cushites were inferior to the invading Semites, not 
only in culture, but probably also in numbers. More important, 
with a revolutionary message, it had a weapon that the 
earlier Semites on the Horn lacked: an appeal for the local,
Cushitic masses themselves in favour of the incoming new order 
as against their own, by now oppressive, ancien regime. In 
this regard, the positions of the earlier Semites on the 
Horn and the latter ones in the north of Africa were diamet­
rically opposite. On the Horn, the Cushites lived in a loose, 
free social system with egalitarian overtones and encountered 
in the Semitic civilization, a relatively rigid, elitist and 
oppressive monarchy, which, naturally enough, they rejected.
In North Africa, on the other hand, the Cushitic society, 
by the time of the Semitic onslaught, had already advanced 
to the feudal elitist stage. As compared to this oppressive 
system, the new order of the Semitics looked like a liberating 
force, and thus, was, in general, welcomed.
The Semitic acquisition and acculturation of North Africa, 
particularly Egypt, resulted in a reinforced flow of Cushitic 
migration to the Horn. There was already a trickling 
continuation of the migratory flow of the earlier Cushites
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that had resulted from the climatic transformation of the 
north of Africa in antiquity. Now, pushed by the Semitic 
onslaught, those of the northern Cushites who could neither 
accept nor tolerate the new Semitic order in Egypt and Sudan, 
migrated to the Horn along the coast of the Red Sea. Some 
other Cushites, having accepted Islam and the missionary 
zeal along with it, also started migrating to the Horn.
Both the Cushitic groups migrated, though due to different 
causes and with differing motives, but jointly strengthened 
the Cushitic entity of the Horn. The result was a forced 
shift of the Semitic society from the coast to the interior.
The Semite's power on the coastal Lowlands of the 
Horn declined as a direct consequence of the Arab invasion of 
Egypt. Its effect was to force the Cushitic tribes of 
eastern Egypt and the northern Sudan southwards and, thereby, 
to project their Cushitic kinsmen already in the Northern 
Highlands and Barka Lowlands on to the Plateau. The Semitic 
civilization on the coastal lowlands crumbled under the 
invasion of the Cushites. Cut off from the sea by a wedge 
of lawless tribesmen, Axum, i.e. the Semitic entity, was 
cut off also from the commerce upon which its prosperity 
and power had been founded. Thus the early Abyssinians of 
Axum were forced to expand southwards into the Central 
Highlands. ^
Trevaskis, op.cit., p.5. Also Jean Doresse, Ethiopia 
(Fr. Tr. by Elsa Coult, London: Elek Books & N.Y.:
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1959), pp.90-91.
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This geographical shift of the Semitic society into 
the interior leaving the Peripheral areas for the Cushites 
gave shape to the particular geopolitical setting of the 
struggle in the area that still persists. The Semitic 
civilization became identical with the Central Highlands 
and the Cushites' confederacy, with that of the Peripheral 
Lowlands (map) . The former had, by this time, taken up the basic 
characteristics that were to remain constant for centurie 
to come, down to the present period. It was central, a 
highland society, unitary and centralist, Christian of the 
Monophysite Coptic faith, and finally, hostile towards the 
other independent unit, the Cushites of the Periphery.
Islamization of the Horn's Periphery
The Moslems had viewed the Horn as a fertile ground
for Islamization right from the beginning of the Moslem
State in the seventh century. The Prophet of Islam
called Bilal, an Ethiopian comrade of his, 'The first
32fruits of Abyssinia'. Obviously,more 'fruits' were expected.
At the same time the Christian power of Ethiopia showed, at 
the outset, sympathy and later, for a long time, a generally 
peaceful indifference and toleration towards the new system 
Islam. This was natural: Christian Ethiopia, engaged
as it was, in a crusade against the pagans as well as the 
Jews on the Horn could feel very close to the Moslems across
32 Pankhurst, op.cit., p.55.
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the sea, engaged in a similar crusade against the same, common 
adversaries. A common cause could bind the two anti-Judaic 
anti-paganist forces into mutual sympathy, toleration, and 
even cooperation.
Relations between the Ethiopians and Islam were at
first cordial. Thus when Mohammed sent some of his followers
to Ethiopia, calling her 'a country wherein no one is wronged'
and a 'land of righteousness' for a refugee from the Meccan
33persecution, they were given refuge and protection, and, 
at one stage, the Ethiopian king, Armah himself accepted 
the new religion. ^
Ethiopia's favourable attitude towards Islam in its
earlier days was significant. First, it demonstrated as
many other events in the polity's history will show, the
polity's tendency towards a conservative reversion towards
its past. In this specific case, as in many others, it
was a reversion towards the Judaeo-paganic values, as salient
in Islam. But, in fact, it showed a tendency to revert
towards the past in general.
Then, perhaps, it also shows another aspect of the
Ethiopian collective character already mentioned: preparedness
for ideological submission, if need be, for more concrete
political convenience. Armah 'was in no position to fight
against Islam' and therefore 'saved his country from Arab
35invasion by his submission'. 
ibid., pp.49-54.
34 1 Lipsky, op.cit., pp.7-8.
35 E.A.W. Budge, A History of Ethiopia ( London, 1928), Vol.l, p.273. 
However, this version of the motive behind the acceptance of 
Islam is controversial.
65
This favourable attitude played a crucial part in the
final rise of Islam as a political power, which 'necessarily
transformed the entire Middle Eastern balance of power and
3 6had profound economic consequences', and which ultimately 
affected, along with the whole world, the Horn of Africa 
also. We will discuss the impact of the rise of Islam on the 
Horn later. But here we will briefly refer to the role 
which the favourable attitude from Ethiopia played in the 
rise of Islam as a political force.
The availability of safe refuge for the early Moslems 
in Ethiopia
was of deep importance in the history 
of Islam. It convinced the Quraish of the 
sincerity and resolution of the converts 
and proved their readiness to undergo any 
loss and any hardship rather than abjure the 
faith of Mahomet.
A bright example of self-denial was exhibited to the whole 
body of believers who were led to regard peril and exile 
in 'the cause of God', as a privilege and distinction. It 
must also have suggested the possibility that the hostile 
attitude of their fellow citizens, combined with the merits 
of their creed, might secure for them within the limits of 
Arabia itself a sympathy and hospitality as cordial as that 
offered by the Abyssinian King; and thus it gave birth to 
the idea of the'greater Hegira' - the emigration to Medina. 
This emigration provided Islam with a base for its state 
without which one wonders whether it could have become the 
formidable force that it became. Hence the Ethiopian attitude 
towards Islam in its early days contributed, perhaps even
36 Pankhurst, op.cit., p.49.
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crucially, to its rise as a political force that was destined 
to play a central part at a later stage in the Horn's history.
Favourable attitudes of both the Christian Semitic 
and pagan Cushitic societies towards the Moslems helped bearing 
more 'fruits' to their efforts at planting Islam on the Horn.
37First established at Massawa, as early as in the seventh century,
Islam gradually spread towards the Ethiopian plateau and by the
beginning of the fourteenth century, the majority of the
people inhabiting the vast lowlands between the sea and the
eastern edge of the Ethiopian plateau were Moslem, and the
Moslem state of Ifat had been established high up the Awash
valley on the eastern frontier of the provinces of Shewa.
By about A .D . 1400 a number of additional Moslem states, Hadya,
Fatayar, Dawaro, and Bali - had been established to the east
3 8and south of the Ethiopian Massif.
However, Islamization in the area, as a permanent and 
significant factor began in and remained confined to the Peripheral 
lowlands. This is significant as this points to a fundamental 
difference between the Core and the Peripheeral societies.
The Peripheral societies, finding Islam compatible to their 
tendencies, readily accepted it. The Highlands, on the 
contrary did not do so. It is not due to the physical 
obstruction presented by the Highlands topography. Islam 
has shown success in surmounting similar topographical 
obstructions in Afghan and Kafiristan highlands, and to cite
37 Abir, Ethiopia: The Era of Princes, op.cit., p.xix.
3 8 R.H. Kofi Darkwah, Shewa3 Menelik and the Ethiopian
Empire/1813-1889 (London: Heinemann, 1975), pp.1-2. Furtherdiscussion on the rise of the Moslem states: znfra3 pp.67-77.
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relatively more accessible but nevertheless challenging
highlands-those of the Balkans. Apart form this, the physical
barriers of Ethiopia itself have been overrun by Islamic
forces, as will be seen below, during the Jihad of the 16th
century. At least three times Islam has made its inroads
across the physical barriers into Ethiopia claiming its 
39government. Moslem enclaves are found scattered all over 
40the Highlands. All these point to the fact that it is 
not physical inaccessibility but an unacceptibility on the 
part of the Ethiopian society that accounts for Islam's 
restriction to the Periphery of the Horn. It is Islam's 
compatibility with the tendencies of the Peripheral societies 
as in contrast with its incompatibility with those of the 
Highlands that has been responsible for Islam's spread in 
and confinement to the Periphery.
Islamization of the Periphery:_Rise of Moslem States
Mention has already been made of the fact that a disparity 
in the stages of development was introduced on the Horn 
with the Sabaean settlement around 100 B.C.41 Since there 
v/as no conscious deliberate effort at overcoming this disparity 
between the Core and the Peripheral societies, the disparity 
continued and was apparent in both the socio-economic and 
the state-developmental situation even as late as the 10th 
century.
39 Under Ahmad Gran (16th century) and Lidj Yassu (20th 
century). i
40 J.S. Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1952).
41
Vide: supraj p.51.
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While analysis of societies in terms of stages of 
development on the socio-economic level is already known, 
such analysis on the state-developmental level seems, still, 
to be non-existent. A brief diversion to discuss the latter, 
here, will be useful. A study of the historical development 
of various states can possibly suggest a general pattern 
of stages of development at this level also. There are 
reasons to believe that, in general, states pass through 
the following successive stages:
(a) the nomadic state, non-territorial or, strictly 
speaking, the pre-state stage;
(b) the city state stage;
(c) the cosmopolitan, imperial state stage;
(d) the nation-state stage;
(e) the supra-national stage.
In the first, nomadic state stage, there is a rudiment 
of the state, with an organised population, subordinate to 
the sovereign will of the chief or the concensus of the 
society. But still, the concept of a rigid territorial limit 
is not very consolidated, though some form of the sense of 
territory (hunting or grazing spatial limits) is present.
In the second- stage, when these nomadic groups start settling 
down with the acquisition of agricultural and commercial 
skills, the state takes the form of a city state. The polity 
is much more organised and territorially limited. City 
walls are very often visible proofs of this sense of 
territorial limits. But still, the group is too little 
advanced to be able to comprehend the idea of a polity
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transcending the limits of its own immediate community.
Greek city states of antiquity or the African coastal city
states of the last millennium (e.g. Kilwa, Brava, Mombassa,
etc.) are examples of states in this stage of development.
In the third stage, the city states, gradually tied up in
commercial relations which both originate from and increase
their mutual interdependence, join to evolve into an imperial
order. The intermediate, hinterlands also are included in
the order. The society, however, is still too backward
to submit to the idea of some kind of federal arrangement,
giving each constituent city or people some kind of equality
with the other units in terms of its own development. The
state is a conglomeration of differing peoples, which are
not equal in terms of autonomy. Some peoples are subject
to others and, given the generally feudal character of the
socio-economic system at this stage, this is inevitable.
The Holy Roman Empire and the Hapsburg Empire of medieval
Europe and most of the present states in Asia and Africa
4 2are examples of the State in this stage. With the growth 
of the bourgeoisie and related factors connected with the 
growth of capitalism and the breakdown of the feudal system, 
democratic ideas flourish and peoples take over the role of 
individuals as the units in active politics. This leads to
The present Asian and African states of this character, 
however, in some cases, claim to be democratic and/or federal 
But in fact, most of them are imperial systems involving 
subordination of one group by another within the same state. 
This kind of subordination is a fact not unnoticed altogether 
Vide, e.g. reference to 'internal colonial structure' to 
denote this: Z.A. Bhutto, quot. in Dawn (Karachi), 16
February 1971.
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the competition for power amongst peoples, i.e. nations 
which breaks up the imperial system and thus results in 
nation states. Almost all modern European states, particularly 
those of Western Europe, are examples of the State in this 
s tage.
At the same time, certain factors, including deliberate 
efforts at 'nation-building' and 'national unification' may 
amalgamate the various peoples of the imperial order concerned 
into one single people, and thus transform the imperial system 
into a nation-state. The example of Germany may be considered 
in this case. Most of the 'New States' are trying, in effect, 
to build up a nation state out of their respective imperial 
systems. In other words, they are trying to enter into the 
nation state stage from the colonial stage. After the stage of 
the national state comes that of the supra-national state.
When a number of nation states acquire an approximate equity 
of strength, they can, without much fear of being subjected, 
join into a system on the basis of equal standing. The 
emerging 'supranation' of Western Europe serves a good example 
of the state at this stage. An older example would be that 
of Switzerland.
It is not possible to elaborate much on this theoretical 
aspect here. It demands a separate research project in its 
own right. However, this brief discussion will suffice to 
clarify the present discussion about the disparity between 
the Periphery and the Core in terms of stages of development 
on the state-developmental level.
Peripheral City States, c.10th. Century
(p. 70
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By the tenth century the Periphery's nomadic societies 
had started to evolve into city states. One of the factors 
with crucial role in this respect was the 'latter Semitic' 
i.e. Moslem Arab migration to the Peripheral coasts during 
this period. These migrations were negligible, in terms 
of the number of migrants. But in terms of their impact on 
the state-developmental aspect of the Peripheral societies, 
they were very important. It was these migrants who founded 
the coastal city states from Zeila and Berbera on the North 
Somali coast to Mogadishu, Merca and Brava in the south.
Such Eritrean port cities as Massawa and Assab also were 
probably a result of these Arab influences. These coastal 
Arab settlements evolved, out of the local Peripheral nomadic 
societies, a chain of city states all along the coast. Each 
city of mixed Arab and Hamitic stock, with its almost pure 
Hamitic hinterland, formed an organised city state. In 
the interior also the Arab migrations had important consequences. 
Several Arab Sheikhs, who migrated to the area and inter­
married with the Hamites became nuclei of the several great 
Somali clans. This was, in effect, the beginning of the 
nomadic or pre-state stage of the state developmental process 
amongst the hinterland Hamites of the Periphery (map).
Their very persons and their names with all the prestige 
that went along with them, deriving particularly from their 
religious standing as holy men, became centres around which 
the hitherto warring and fragmented minimal nomadic units, 
usually not bigger than a family, could and did rally and 
unite. For the first time these nomads experienced a
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relationship based on allegiance to someone other than 
themselves. This was the beginning of the State in the 
Peripheral interior.
Both the Peripheral societies and what became later
the Core's polity received their first roots of statehood
from the Semitic immigrants from across the Red Sea.v But
the impacts of the two sets of Semitic immigration were
different. While the earlier, i.e. Sabaean Semites, Semitized
the indigenous society they came into contact with, and
resulted into a Semitic civilisation - that of Ethiopia
Proper, the latter, i.e. Moslem Arab Se.mites, instead,
became absorbed into the Hamitic population itself and the
city states and other polities they resulted into, were
increasingly Hamitic in character. Thus,for instance,
[I]n 1698, when Mogadishu was occupied 
for a short time by Seif I of Oman during the 
period the Arabs were reconstituting their 
trading empire in East Africa, the Omani Arabs 
discovered that Mogadishu had lost its Arab 
character.^  ^
Thus, the latter Semitic migration, though from the 
same source as that of the earlier one, and with serious 
impact on the local scene again like the earlier set, never­
theless, could not wipe out the differences between the two 
body-political units - those of the Core and the Periphery. 
Instead, it in itself became well-fitted to the pattern 
of the dichotomy. There are a number of reasons behind this. 
One is the numerical insignificance of the latter Semitic
43 Hess, op.cit., p.7.
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migrants in proportion to the local Hamitic population as 
compared with the significant size of the earlier Semitic 
settlement vis-a-vis the local Hamitic population at the 
time of its establishment.
Another reason has been the big gap of time-length 
between the earlier and the latter Semitic migrations.
During this long period, situations had changed radically 
both on the Horn and in Arabia. The Semites who migrated
around the 10th century were virtually different people 
from the Semites who migrated at least a millenium earlier.
Thus their attitudes and impact on the societies they came 
across on the Horn were bound to be different from those 
of the earlier migrants. On the other hand, the situation 
on the Horn also had changed much. The socio-political 
dichotomy had taken quite a rigid form by the time the latter 
Semites came into the area. Any new element coming into 
the area's affairs could, more likely, only supplement or 
modify this pattern rather than erase or replace it with 
some other pattern of relationships.
A third factor was the differing socio-economic background 
of the two sets of migrants. While the earlier Semitic 
migrants were agriculturalist, the latter were mainly 
merchants or pastoralist missionaries. Thus, while the 
earlier set of migrants had introduced agriculture and its 
corollary, the feudal system, contributing to the distinction 
between Semitized and the Hamitic units, the latter set 
introduced nothing more to the recepient Hamitic 
society, than an improvement on the already
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existing pre-feudal social system, and this could do nothing
4 4to dilute the distinctions.
In the process of the momadic 'states' transformation 
into the city state and thence to an imperial order, the 
various clan based polities of the interior became integrated 
with the coastal city states while the various city states 
joined to form loose confederations. Sometimes, these 
confederations themselves were linked up into greater but 
very loosely integrated polities. In essence, this was the 
initial period of the imperial system stage of the state- 
developmental process in the Peripheral societies. The 
development of city states and later imperial or cosmopolitan 
polities in the Peripheral societies was not confined to 
the coastal areas alone. Such states emerged in the interior 
and the western fringes of the Periphery also. Ifat and Harar 
in the interior of the eastern Periphery and Jimma in the 
Western fringes emerged as strong Sultanates at one time. 
Certain pagan states also emerged in the south west of the 
Periphery, while the Beja in the north west also evolved 
a pre-nation state polity, loosely affiliated with the Mahdist 
S udan.
These developments did not take place uniformly throughout 
the Periphery. Due to differing environmental factors and
The foundation of city states by merchants is not to be 
confused with the rise of capitalism and with that of the 
bourgeoisie at a post-feudal stage. The citizenry of the 
primitive city state is not a bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie 
essentially lives on a market economy deriving its roots and 
strength from a crumbling feudal rural system in the hinter­
land under its control. But the citizenry of the primitive 
city state lives mainly on trade with other city states and 
does not generally have a 'crumbling feudal rural system in 
the hinterland'.
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differing degrees of Arab or Ethiopian influence, different
parts of thePeriphery took differing lengths of time in
reaching the same level of development in state-developmental
terms. Thus while city states had already turned into
cosmopolitan, imperial systems in the north east and the
south west by the 16th century, it took the south east much
longer to see a serious polity at that level. It was not
until the early nineteenth century that the first entity of
this kind in the south east, that of the Sultanate of Geledi,
incorporating in some way the coastal city of Mogadishu,
45could come into being.
These differences in the levels of political development
within the Periphery would later contribute to internal
46tensions in the country now known as Somalia.
By the 16th century there were on the Periphery, a 
number of polities comparable to Ethiopia in terms of stages 
of development on the state developmental level. So far, 
the confrontation was between a state (at the Core) and 
individuals or minor groups at a far lower level of political 
maturity and strength (in the Periphery), and thus, nothing 
more than a continuous and constant chain of skirmishes and 
raids. In the 16th century, for the first time, the long- 
developing conflict between the Core and the Periphery was 
ripe enough to take the shape of an interstate confrontation.
Hess, op.cit.
46 Vide: supra, Ch.II, pp. 27-28 and infra, Ch.IV, pp.174-176.
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With these developments and the greater extent of
conversion to Islam, particularly as confined only amongst
the lowlanders, the temporary community of interests between
the Chritians and Moslems in the early days of Islam on the
Horn was replaced by a relatively more permanent struggle
between the two. In fact, the Islamic forces, after
expanding into the Horn's Peripheral societies, instead of
injecting their initial friendship for Ethiopia into them,
rather, became absorbed into the local pattern and shifted
from friendship to confrontation in its relations with the
Christian state of Ethiopia. Thus, while for a number of
centuries Christian and Muslim principalities 'existed side
by side in relative harmony' as Christian Ethiopia had very
4 7little to fear from the weak Muslim kingdoms,
In the early decades of the fourteenth 
century the Christian empire and her Muslim 
neighbours came to open conflict, this 
turned out to be the beginning of a long 
conflict which continued into the sixteenth 
century 48
and beyond, down to the present day. This change from 
initial mutual friendship with Christianity into an adversity 
was significant. This, on the one hand, showed the strength 
which the pattern of relationships on the Horn had already 
gained by that time: as long as the Islamic society remained
insignificant on the Periphery as a politico-territorial 
entity - its relationship with the Core had no element of
4 7 . . .Abir, Ethiopia: The Eva of the Evinces , op.cit., p.xix.
 ^ Darkwah, op.cit., p.2.
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confrontation. As soon as this society became established as 
a peripheral power, it found itself, fitting with the Core- 
Peripheral pattern of relationships, in confrontation with 
the Core. On the other hand, it added to the Peripheral's 
pattern of behaviour, an element of conscious zeal in con­
frontation with the Central Highlands.
The spread of Islam was significant in one more way.
It brought the area into direct relation with the global 
power political system. This aspect will be discussed in 
greater detail in the next chapter.
The Core's Vicious Circle of Revolts: Falasha Agaw Revolution
While the Peripheral areas experienced the spread and
consolidation of the Islamic Power, the Core went through three
important events, viz. the Falasha-Agaw and the Zagwe
revolutions, and the 'Solomanic Restoration1 . In the 10th
century A.D. the Falasha Jews as well as other non-Amharic
elements such as the Agaws staged a revolution in the Core's
entity, against its progressive Christianization. The Jewish
Agaw Queen of the Damot region began burning down the churches,
laying waste the land, and driving the King out of one place
after another. The Queen, among other things, had reduced
Aksum, the sacred site of Ethiopian Christianity, to rubble,
leaving only the huge monoliths which she was unable to 
49demolish. The motivation of the rebellion was no doubt to
50revivify the older Judaic-indigenous cults and practices.
The revolution was significant. Along with the choice 
of Monophysite Coptism rather than any other form of 
Christianity before it, and the non-Amharic Zagwe revolution
49 Doresse, op.cit., p.92.
50 Lipsky, op.cit., p.8.
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of the mid-1130s after the revolution reflected as well
as strengthened the quality of conservatism in Ethiopian
society, showing that this society, when forced to deviate
from its course, would do so to the minimum possible extent,
and, whenever possible, revert to its original course.
The Judaeo-pagan society had accepted Christianity under
pressures of the time, but preferred that sect of this new
faith which appeared to be closest to its own Judaeo-paganistic
doctrines. Of all the Christian sects, the Monophysites
51are closest to the Judaic concept of the Deity.
Later, with the advent of Islam the Ethiopian society
seems to have felt attracted towards this renewed form of
Judaism; it became the most generous asylum for the Moslems,
and at one point in the early days of Islam, one of its 
52Emperors even embraced that faith. But again, the inherent 
conservatism kept the society from mass conversion and 
the Emperor was replaced.
Afterwards the Falasha and Agaw revolution betrayed 
the same affinity for conservatism. The same is true of 
the Zagwe revolution of the mid-1130s.
This tendency towards conservatism presents us with 
a paradoxical situation. Pressures over time force the 
Ethiopian society to transform, even if slowly and marginally.
51 While other schools of the Christian dogma believe in a 
dual nature of Jesus, i.e. in his simultaneous divinity 
and humanity, the Monophysites, like the Jews (and later 
the Moslems), believe in the impossibility of this kind of 
dual nature. To the Monophysites, Jesus, being God, is 
purely divine. To the Jews and the Moslems, however, he is 
purely human.
52 Armah, supra> p.64.
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The inherent force of conservatism contradicts this, 
causing revolutions or counter-revolutions. But the return 
to the past finds itself in contradiction with the demands 
of conservatism, because of the very fact that situations 
since the days of that particular 'past have, by the time 
of this 'conservative' revolution, changed substantially.
Thus, the 'conservative return' constitutes a break with 
the past, which is, paradoxically, an unconservative phenomenon, 
which in turn calls for another revolution to undo its 
unconservative effects. This, in effect, means that revolution 
and counter-revolution have become inherent in the Ethiopian 
society. This has been reflected in, and strengthened by 
each successive change and crisis, including the Falasha 
and the Zagwe revolutions.
Zagwe Revolution
The paradoxical pattern mentioned above brought in
one more revolution very soon. After the Falasha revolution
discussed above, the Zagwe revolution took place between 
5 31135 and 1137. Beginning in 1137, a new, Agaw and non-
54Semitic dynasty occupied the throne.
The Falasha revolution had regressed too far towards 
the deserted past. Judaeo-pagan elements had remained 
strong in the Ethiopian value system, but this system had 
also become Christian. The complete reversion to the Judaeo- 
paganism implied by the Falasha revolution proved too sweeping,
Doresse, op.cit., p.23. 
Lipsky, op.cit., p.9.
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and a Christian order with some pre-Christian influence
was called for. The non-Semitic, but Christian Zagwe order
seemed to fulfil this call of the polity at the time. The
new dynasty based its 'claim to succession' on a legendary
marriage (in the 7th century), with a daughter of one of
5 5the last rulers of Aksum, Delna-ad, or Armah, by name and
5 6on 'descent from Moses'. The Zagwe ruler demanded the
dismissal by the authorities in Cairo of a bishop named
Habib on the grounds that he was too old for office, the
truth being that the Abuna (bishop) had in fact refused
5 7to recognise him as the ruler of Ethiopia. However the
5 8new Zagwe dynasty was eventually recognised by the church.
Concern for Legitimacy and Identification with Proto-Types 
The above initial claims and acts of the revolutionary 
regime significantly reflected a continuing trait of the 
Ethiopian polity: its legitimistic mind and its tendency
to derive legitimacy from identification with a 'superior', 
the 'original' proto-type. This remarkable concern with 
legitimacy and legitimization has been reflected at other 
times also. The so-called 'Solomonic restoration', in 
the next century, also was accompanied by claims to legitimacy 
based on legendary elements.
55 Doresse, op.cit., p.53. 
55 Lipsky, op.cit., p.9.
57 Doresse, p.93.
58 ibid.
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This tendency of the Ethiopians to seek legitimacy
from identification with some superior prototype, usually,
the ’original source', and to regard descent as the primary
means of such identification - is reflected also in the
rist-based pattern of land-holding.which has been recognised
as 'the corner stone of the traditional social structure'
59of Ethiopia Proper. According to this system, the right 
of atsme rist, ^  i.e. the right to land-holding and the socio­
political status that goes with it, is an 'exclusive prerogative 
of the descent group' deriving from a common'bone' {atsme) 
or descent from the 'abb at' (the 'fathers') - the original 
settler in the particular area under consideration. 
Traditionally, this descent-based right has been the primary 
basis of socio-political status amongst the Amhara. For 
example, not only the imperial power derived its legitimacy 
from the virtue of the 'Imperial Blood',^ but, also, even 
at the lowest level of administration, only the ristegna
6 2(heriditary rist-holders) have been eligible for local office.
It may be noted here, that the land-holding system in 
Eritrea and parts of Tigre, even amongst the highland 
Christians, known as shehena or diessa has been different 
and is based, not on descent, but on territorial residential
John Markakis, Ethiopia: anatomy of a traditional polity
(Oxford, 1974), p.78.
^  Termed, in the shortened form, also as 'rist'.
 ^Ethiopian Constitution, 1955, quot. in Lipsky, op.cit., 
p.172.
6 2 Markakis, op.cit., pp.76-82.
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status. This supports the presentation of the area's
setting in terms of the Core-Peripheral pattern identified
, . 6 3m  this paper.
The importance of the system of land-holding may be
assessed from the fact that almost ninety percent of Ethiopians
are engaged in subsistence agriculture (a big section, if
not all of the rest,living as lords supported by the same) ,
that agriculture contributes sixty five percent of Ethiopia's
Gross Domestic Product, and that it accounts for seventy
64eight percent of the country's export.
This concern for legitimacy has had significant effects 
on the polity's behaviour and development. It became an 
important aspect of the Ethiopian value system and thus 
to some extent continued to condition the Ethiopian political 
behaviour, and led to a necessity, at times, to create 
legends and falsify.
Thus, to strengthen their claims to legitimacy, the 
'Solomonian' establishment had to exaggerate the existing 
legends to the extent of presenting their dynasty as divine 
descendants of Jesus Christ. Thus, the classic chronicle 
of the Solomonian Kings, Kebra Nagast (Glory of the Kings), 
contends that, Solomon was one of a series through whose 
bodies had passed a 'pearl' first placed by God in Adam and 
intended finally, having entered the body of Hannah, to 
be the essence of her daughter, the Virgin Mary. Christ
ibid . , p . 733.
64 William Lee, 'Economic reform stalled by purges and civil 
war' 3 in Middle East Economic digest (London), Vol.21, No.7, 
18 February 1977, p.5.
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being the Son of God and Menelik a kinsman of Christ [through
Christ's own ancestor and Menelik's father Solomon], the
[Solomonian] Kings of Ethiopia, descendants of Menelik,
65are of a divine line. This deification of the Emperor
had serious implications. Since this deification of the
Emperor, he was seen, by both himself and his subjects, as
above all norms, including even those of religion and ethics.
This view, having become a part of the collective value
system,^ essentially sanctioned absolute autocracy making
the Emperor autocratic and the people docile. At the same
time, for the non-Christian subjects, this legend made the
6 7Emperor-God anathema to their own religion and thus made 
them inherently hostile towards him and his regime. This 
latter aspect sowed one more seed of crisis within the 
Ethiopian Empire. The general reluctance of Ethiopians to 
rise against the Emperor and inherent hostility of non- 
Christian subjects towards him has been evident on many 
occasions.
In the 20th century, efforts to raise insurrections 
in favour of land reform failed because of peasant opposition. 
Even the revolution of 1974 which deposed the Emperor had 
to legitimise itself by publicising a statement from him 
that his deposition was in compliance with his own will. On
A
the other hand, the non-Christian Moslem subjects of the 
Lipsky, op.cit., p.6.
6 6 This has been observed in research on the value orientation 
in the contemporary Ethiopian society. Vide: Asmalash Beyene,
Patterns of Authority in the Ethiopian Bureaucracy (Ph.D. dissertat­
ion, ,Syracuse University, 197^ )»
6yThe most fundamental article of the Moslem faith is a 
declaration that 'There is no god but Allah alone'.
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Empire have at various times fought bloody jihads in
defence of their faith which could not accept the Emperor
. . 6 8 as divine.
The most recent example of the inherent tendency of 
the Ethiopian polity to create legends in the interest of 
some kind of legitimacy, is the equation by the present 
Ethiopian regime of the present revolutionary situation 
with the Soviet revolutionary situation of 1917 and its 
immediate aftermath.
Having uprooted the traditional source of legitimacy -
the descent from Solomon and Moses, this regime looked for
a new source: the Soviet version of the Marxian interpretation
of history. To feel legitimate, in the eyes of not only
69the Soviet Union - the crucial source of strength but also 
the base of the modern elite, versed mainly in the Soviet 
version of Marxism, and the recently organised masses under 
their leadership - the post-Revolutionary Ethiopian regime 
is obviously trying to equate its present conditons with 
those of immediate post-Revolutionary regime of Russia. This 
they are doing even through this equation is as simplistic 
and fallacious as the presentation of actual situations in 
the legends. This significant legend building tendency 
of the Ethiopian policy also led to the creation of the
 ^ Paul Brietzke, 'Land Reform in Revolutionary Ethiopia' in 
Journal of Modern African Studies (14,4), pp.637-660. Peter 
Schwab, Decision-Making in Ethiopia: A Study of the Political 
Process (London, 1972). Keesing/s p.26733. The most 
serious of the jihads was that of the 16th century, led by 
Ahmed Gran. Vide: in fra} Ch.III.
69 Even as late as in 1977 i.e. after three years of consoli­
dation, the 'need of effective and massive external support' 
for Ethiopia's revolutionary regime has been observed as 
'crucial'. Collin Legum, p.310.
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significant legend of Prester John. The significance of 
this legend will be discussed elsewhere in this Chapter.
Solomonic 'Restoration*
The Zagwe Revolution was followed by the so-called
'Solomonic Restoration'. In 1260, the 'Solomonic' dynasty
was restored to the imperial power, with at least two
important consequences. First, it established the Church
as a strong temporal power in the Ethiopian polity. Second,
it removed the Ethiopian capital to Shewa, the then seat
of the restored dynasty. According to the legends, the
restoration was effected with the decisive help of St. Takla
Haymanot, or, perhaps more likely, that of the Church
symbolised by the saint. Thus,
The conditions under which the [restored] 
ruling family made way for the legitimate 
house, are supposed to have provided that 
the former [St. Haymanot] should retain 
certain lands and privileges in perpetuity 
[and] that one third of the land of the 
country should be held by^the Church.70
Hence the Church became for all time to come, until
a revolutionary change, a strong factor in the Ethiopian
economy and thus in its politics, with a number of important
consequences for the country's affairs and history.
[T]he powerful position thus created for the 
Church by the wily monk [St. Haymanot] is 
undoubtedly one of the main causes of the 
non-development of the country and of the 
maintenance of its medieval institution.
Rey, op.cit., p.239. 
ibid., p .240.
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This was partly because of the conservative nature of the 
Ethiopian Church and partly because the acquisition of one 
third of the country's land and concomitant power and
7 2privileges gave it a strong interest in opposing change.
The Church's strong position also meant that political
decisions of the Ethiopian polity henceforth would be more
strongly imbued with religious doctrines and aspirations.
The religious factor in political decision was in essence
already present, but so far held an indirect sway, i.e. through
its influence on the general value system of the polity.
But, henceforth it became direct and institutionalised, and
thus more certainly decisive. This was to influence the
polity's future history, particularly in its relationships
with the Periphery.
[A]fter the rise of the new Solomonic 
dynasty with Yekune Amlak in 1270 was a 
new policy of containing the Muslim 
principaliities adopted.73
Admittedly, there were many reasons other than the new 
strength of the Church for this policy. The Emperor's 
'main purpose became ... weakening and destruction of the
encircling power of Moslem states ... the motivation for 
this policy was to a large extent political and commercial ... 
The wars of the thirteenth, fourteenth and evev fifteenth
centuries could be considered a struggle for authority, 
revenue and land between neighbouring political units'.
72 The Church owned at least 25% of the total land of the State 
of Ethiopia on the eve of the Revolution (1974) . Vide: Karl 
Lavrencie, Ethiopia: the siok man of Africa3 Impact International, 
28 May-10 June 1976, p.5. For a brief discussion on the 
continued resistance by the Church to change and its significance, 
ibid.
Abir, Ethiopia: Era of the Princes , op.cit., p.xix. 
Lipsky, op.cit., p.9.
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Still, the new strength of the Church also played an 
important, perhaps even largely decisive, role in this respect.
Then, in time,the Ethiopian empire came to embrace 
vast non-Christian territories. The continued adherence to 
the settlement whereby one third of the country's land should 
belong to the Church thus meant that many non-Christian 
societies within the Empire were deprived of their land 
and oppressed by a Church to which they, unlike the deprived 
Christians, had no allegiance. This sense of deprivation 
would aggravate their already existing hatred and resentment 
against the Christian Centre.
The Jihad
Reference has been made to the fact that the introduction 
of Islam had added one more dimension, that of ideological 
religious confrontation to the pattern of Core "Peripheral 
conflict and strengthened it. This did not, however, happen 
very quickly. Not until after the so-called Solomonic 
Restoration did the struggle between the Highland Core and 
the Lowland societies became serious as a violent religious 
confrontation. So, not until this time did the Moslem 
Lowland societies seek and obtain assistance from the Moslem, 
Ottoman Caliphate. And then,
[T]he advent of the Ottoman power created 
profound changes in the political situation 
on the Red Sea ... It ... supplied new 
weapons to the Moslem princes with which to 
conduct this war. The Turks [Ottomans] 
introduced firearms into this area and, what 
was as important, supplied to the local princes
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'disciplined bodies of troops capable of 
using firearms.* 7^
The balance between the two subsystems of the Core
and the Periphery was upset in favour of the latter.
A Peripheral confederacy under the leadership of Adal took
an almost decisive offensive. These confederate forces,
under the remarkably able leadership of the Somali General,
Ahmad ibn Ibrahim, with limited but significant Turkish
support and the use of firearms, overran Ethiopia in 1533,
7 7reducing the Emperor into a fugitive.
The balance of forces was re-established and maintained 
only by obtaining European support in the 1540s. First, the 
Portuguese rescued the Ethiopians from the Adalite menace 
by supplementing the Ethiopian resistance with an attack 
on Zeila, the military centre of the Adalite power. And 
then, they recovered the Central emprie from the greatest 
danger ever experienced by that entity, i.e. the occupation 
of almost the whole of the Empire: In his distress,
the Ethiopian Emperor, Lebna Dengel
'naturally' sought Portuguese assistance in 1535 which arrived
in 1541, the year after he died. After having been defeated
twice, the Portuguese and Ethiopian forces however finally
succeeded in killing Ahmad and decisively defeating the
Peripheral forces in a surprise battle near Lake Tsana (map, pp. 
91-92).78
75 A.H.M. Jones & Elizabeth Monroe, A History of Abyssinia
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1935), pp.81-82.
7 6 Generally referred to as Gran, Giran or Granj (the left- 
handed) . Also as Ghazi (Victor) Mohammad.
77 Jones & Monroe, op.cit., pp.82-83.
78 ibid., pp.83-85.
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Ethiopian Era of Anarchy
The failure of the balance of force between the
Central Highlands and the Peripheral society, though only
temporary, had consequences for the Horn's future. 'The
effect of one-and-a-half decades of continued defeat on
79the Christian empire can hardly be emphasised'. As we 
have already seen, it brought in the element of colonialism, 
particularly European. The repeated and humiliating defeat 
of the emperor inevitably cast doubts on his claim to be 
regarded as divine. Given their staunchly Christian faith 
and belief in the Solomonic myth of the Emperor's divine 
ancestry, the doubts centred not on the divinity of the 
institution itself, but on the legitimacy of its occupant's 
claim to it. Henceforth conflict among a number of claimants 
to the imperial power would become common on the Ethiopian 
political scene. Added to the introduction of new religious 
schools by the Portuguese, this conflict resulted in an 
era of a near-anarchy. Recurrent revolts, succession struggles 
and dynastic, regional or religious wars became the order 
of the day.
[S]ince about 1730 upto the advent of 
Theodore in 1855 ... the Kings had exercised 
no real power, and had been murdered, deposed, 
restored and driven out again, or treated as 
nonentities.80
The gravity of the situation can be perceived by the 
fact that prior to Za Salassie's death in 1607, no Emperor had
Darkwah, op.cit., p.2.
8 0 Abir, Ethiopia ..., op.cit., p.xxiii.
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been killed in a rebellion for almost five hundred years.
The situation continued to deteriorate:
In 1813, indeed, no less than six nominal 
'Kings of Ethiopia' were all alive, having 
been successively turned out of office 
by others.81
This series of crises and instability led to and merged
into the 'Zamana Masafint', the period from 1769 to 1855
when the regional rulers held the real power in the country
and the King of Kings of the Amharic Core in Gondar became
but a puppet in the hand of the regents, who from the last
decades of the eighteenth century were of non-Amharic,
8 2Peripheral, Galla origin. One may imagine the extent
of instability and gravity of the situation from the facts
that between 1769 and 1851 there were thirty Emperors, including
one (Takla Giorgis) who was deposed and restored five times,
and another (Sahela Dengel) whose reign was interrupted
three times, that the longest period of uninterrupted rule
was seventeen years (Egwala Seyon, 1801-1818) only, while
between 1794 and 1801 Emperors succeeded each other at an
average interval of less than ten months. All of them except
the first three were 'shadow kings nominally ruling'. Thus,
[I]n Ethiopian history the period called
Zamana Masafint is understood ... to be
the era of the judges, in the biblical sense. 4
according to which,
81 ibid.
8 2 David Mathew, Ethiopia (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1947), 
pp.vi-viii, 39.
83 ibid.
84 ibid.
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In those days there was no king ... every 
man did that which was right in his own eyes.
During the Zamana Mas afint the deeply divided Christian
Amhara-Tigrean Ethiopia, i.e. the Core faced threat of 
8 6'submersion'. The gravity of the situation becomes yet 
more evident if one takes into account the sacredness 
attached to the office of the Emperor and the tradition of 
absolute loyalty given to him by the Ethiopians. Though 
some form of imperial order was restored, later, under TewO' 
doros (1855-66) and his successors, the crises and the 
tendencies of rivalry, intrigue and clash of personal, 
regional and religious nature - characteristic of this long 
period of anarchy, had been, by that time, incorporated 
into the pattern of events within the Core's body politic.
Continued Struggle: The Galla Onslaughts
The Core-Peripheral struggle did not cease with the 
defeat in the 1540s, of the Moslem forces of the northern 
and eastern parts of the Horn. It continued, though the 
initiative on the Peripheral side shifted from the north 
to the south: from among the Danakil and the Somalis to
the Gallas (map, pp. 91-92).
Beginning in the sixteenth century, the massive Galla 
onslaught, in successive waves, took over a third of the 
empire by 1533, i.e. even before the destruction of the 
threat from Jihad in the north. By the time this Moslem 
threat could be destroyed, Ethiopia herself was left able
-— -—  ----------------------  i
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Book of Judges, Ch.21, verse 25, King James edition.
8 6 Abir, Ethiopia ..., op.cit., p.xxiii.
Core peripheral Struggle: The Jihad 
(16th* century) and the Galla Onslaught 
(16th. century - ); p.91•
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to offer only much weaker resistance to the Galla onslaught,
which finally resulted in Galla settlement of the outer
areas of the Ethiopian highlands and their penetration into
8 7all its parts excepting only Tegre.
The Galla migrations had far reaching consequences for 
the Ethiopian Empire. The permanent settlement of the 
Galla at the Core sowed seeds of a permanent contradiction 
within the Core's polity. Their entry into the elite became 
a source of weakness for the Ethiopian state. Their role, 
at times, have been that of treachery with decisive effects
o ofor Ethiopia's fate.
Conclusion
The above examination of the role of historical process 
in shaping contemporary conditions on the Horn of Africa, 
leads to the following conclusions:
1. This process points to the evolution of two broad, distinct 
and, in general, conflicting socio-political units on the 
Horn of Africa. These units roughly coincide with the units 
identified in the previous chapter, viz. (a) the Peripheral 
Lowlands and (b) the Highlands' Core. The former^has grown 
as a loose confederation of Cushitic, Moslem, nomadic 
societies; the latter, as a centralistic, Semitic, Coptic 
Christian, feudal society. Both the units tend to be 
expansionist.
Lipsky, op.cit., pp.12-13. Darkwah, op.cit., pp.3-4. 
Darkwah, op.cit., p.4.
2. The Ethiopian system has grown to tend towards crises 
characterised by personal, regional and ideological rivalries 
and conflicts.
3. The above system, in general, has grown to be 
conservative. When forced to deviate from its traditional 
course, it would do so to the minimum possible extent, and, 
whenever possible, reverse towards the original course.
This leads to an inherent proneness on the part of the 
society towards revolutions and counter-revolutions.
4. The Ethiopian society has grown to be legitimist and 
has developed a tendency for mythical falsification of actual 
conditions to fit into prototypes accepted as 'legitimate', 
i.e. proper' order. Tradition is the generally accepted 
source of legitimacy or propriety; but, the society tends
to be prepared for ideological submission, if necessary, in 
the interest of. more concrete political goals.
The Peripheral 'unit' is likely to suffer from internal 
disunity and contradiction owing to un-uniform historical 
development of its various constituent societies.
6. The Peripheral societies' unity tends to increase with 
the degree of hostility involved in their relations with the
93
Core.
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CHAPTER IV
THE HISTORICAL PROCESS IN THE GLOBAL SETTING
Introduction: Advent of Global Politics on the Horn
The spread of Islam had brought in direct extra-regional 
politico-military involvements into the Horn of Africa.
This was because, unlike Christianity at the time of its 
introduction to the Horn, Islam had a strong and expansive 
base in its ascendancy just on the frontiers of the area (map, pp.
94-95). This had made the Islamic entity on the Horn a virtual 
protectorate of the Islamic state. A similar situation of 
virtual hegemony of an external power had arisen at the 
time of the introduction of Christianity also. But since the 
then Christian base, unlike Islam, was neither a state, nor 
in its ascendancy, nor 'just on the frontiers' of the Horn, 
its protection declined almost immediately in favour of the 
Horn's independent role as an outpost of Christianity in 
the area. Very soon it was not Christendom that championed 
the interests of Ethiopia, but Ethiopia that championed the 
cause of Christendom. But in the case of the Islamic connections, 
the role of the Islamic Caliphate as the protector of the 
Moslem antities on the Horn strengthened with the passage of 
time as the Caliphate continued to rise in power for a number 
of centuries.
Apart from the facts of power political configuration, 
the Islamic doctrine also made it incumbent upon all Islamic 
societies to belong to, and be protected by, the single Islamic
CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM ON THE HORN - EARLY PERIOD: 
PROXIMITY TO THE GLOBAL CENTRES OF THE FAITHS
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State.^ Thus, in their struggle against the Christian 
Highlands, the Lowlanders had sought and obtained the protec­
tive assistance of the Ottoman Empire. This Empire being 
a major actor in global politics, in its own right, had
essentially brought in, as has been seen, this element of 
international politics into the Horn's affairs. Then, the 
Portuguese had intervened to save the collapsing Christian 
Highland Empire of Ethiopia from the fatal onslaught of the 
Moslem Lowland societies supported by the Ottomans. Hitherto, 
the conflicts on the Horn had been essentially of a regional 
nature, at least since very ancient times. External involve­
ments, if any, had been only very limited and, in relation 
to the whole course of the region's history and its outputs, 
negligible. But now, international power political involve­
ment to balance the two conflicting units, became a part of 
the region's pattern of international relations. Whenever 
the balance would become fatally disturbed at the cost of 
one or the other of the contenders, from now on such external 
involvement will be seen to come in to restore the balance.
Thus, such outlying Moslem states as that in India, even if 
virtually independent, theoretically were autonomous units 
of the Islamic State. The Sultans of Delhi usually sought and 
obtained ratification for their regimes from the Abbaside 
Caliphs to attain legitimacy under Islamic Law.
The doctrine of belonging to and being protected by a single 
Islamic polity has always been a strong motivator in the history 
of the Moslem peoples. Cf. for recent examples, its role in 
the rise of Pan-Islamism in the early 20th century; neo-Pan 
Islamic movement of the ’60s and ’70s and the birth of the Islamic 
Secretariat; and the Libyan and other Islamic countries' 
intervention in the Philippines civil war as protectors of the 
Moslem South.
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This factor, since then, became a constant in the pattern
of events in the region. The Islamic power, in one form or
another, would remain, from now, a constant on the flanks
of the Horn. Its role as a -protector of the Moslem societies
as well as a global actor, though perhaps with minor or
sporadic interruptions, also would remain a constant in the
region's affairs. The constancy of these factors essentially
leads to the constancy of their resultant - the factor of
involvements in favour of regional balance.
In a way this first global encounter on the Horn had
also set the general geostrategic pattern of the Horn's powers'
foreign alignments for the future. In this 'pattern',
Peripheral entities would align with the foreign powers in
the immediate neighbourhood, while the Central Highlands would
rely on assistance from powers beyond those immediate
2neighbours - usually overseas powers.
The global involvement had brought in a two-level complex 
of rivalries and conflicts. The same region from then on 
experienced sets of conflicts, which though interrelated, 
nevertheless, were to be separate systems with their own 
independent existence, characteristics and patterns. A set 
of global political rivalries was superimposed upon the 
existing intra-regional contradictions. Though either could 
offset the other, both would have their own reasons for 
existence in the region and also their own independent basic 
courses. This made the situation on the Horn complex and 
to an extent confused. The apparent inseparability of the
two completely different, independent sets of rivalries in
/
2 This aspect has been dealt with in greater details below,
pp.101-102, 106, 108-114, 116-117, 121, 131-132, 162-164, 177. 
Also, Ch.V.
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the region, made it very easy for observers to confuse the 
two different courses and try to interpret and predict one 
in terms of the dynamics of the other. This very confusion 
is responsible for the tendency to see the present confron­
tations on the Horn as resulting from such recent global 
political factors as the renewed American preoccupation 
with a missionary role in world affairs, or current Soviet
attention towards gaining influence in Sub-Saharan Africa
3after losing it in the Middle East and India, or the Arab 
states' bid to control the Red Sea by extending their sphere 
of influence into Eritrea and Somalia. These factors only 
form an extended part of the supra-regional pattern, which 
may have added to the contradictions inherent in the regional 
pattern of the Horn's relationships, but in no case are they 
the regional pattern itself. Nor can one explain this pattern 
of regional contradiction with reference only or primarily 
to those global political factors.
The view that the Soviet Union has lost her influence in 
India following the dramatic change in India's internal 
political conditions owing to the Parliamentary elections of 
1978, is contestable. While, in domestic matters,the new 
coalition regime is obviously right-wing as compared to the 
previous regime led by Indira Gandhi, there are indications 
that, in foreign policy, India still leans towards the USSR.
For example, India allowed Soviet craft, probably with some 
decisive effect, to use the Calcutta airport in their aid 
missions to Vietnam during the Sino-Vietnamese border war in 
early 1979. There have also been talks in March 1979 of 
forming a block, apparently of a functional nature, of Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Iran and India. Inclusion of Iraq and Afghanistan 
marks the proposed block as pro-Soviet, and India's proposed 
involvement seems to be significant. Vide: The Daily Ittefaq, 
Dacca, January-March, 1979.
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Portuguese Hegemony
It has been said, above, that the protective assistance 
from the Ottomans, in favour of the Peripherals,and European 
assistance to counter it in favour of the Core, had brought 
in the element of direct global political involvement on the 
Horn. This was because this global encounter in the Horn 
left the area divided into two spheres of influence, each 
under a global political actor. While the Periphery owing to 
reasons mentioned above, turned, virtually, into a Protectorate 
of the Islamic Power, the Core turned into a Protectorate of 
the Catholic Europe. The European assistance in the restoration 
of the balance on the Horn in the Core's favour was not without 
price. The Ethiopian (Coptic) Emperor, Lebna Dengal, had 
to accept, around the mid 1530s, the religious jurisdiction of 
the Pope. Abuna Mark had, on the order of Emperor Lebna 
Dengel, appointed John Bermudez, a Catholic, as his successor. 
The next emperor, Claudius was forced by his total dependence 
on the zealous Catholic Portuguese, to acknowledge the authority 
of this Catholic patriarch and his demand for submission to 
the Pope.^
The acceptance of Roman Catholic jurisdiction at 
Portuguese will was significant in two ways. First, it brought 
the element of European colonialism to the area. The Pope 
had already allocated Africa to Portugal in a series of 
'Bulls' issued between 1455 and 1781. Thus, by accepting 
the religious jurisdiction of Rome, Ethiopia accepted, in
4 Lipsky, op.cit., P •12; Rey, p.256.
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effect, the temporal jurisdiction of Portugal. This
recognised the fact that the Portuguese had, in course of
their active military assistance in Ethiopia's war against
the Moslems, already, set up some form of rudimentary colonial
regime over parts of the region: after the tide of the
Moslem onslaught was turned in favour of Ethiopia,
[t]he King of Portugal ordered the 
surviving Portuguese, who numbered about 
a hundred, to remain in the country.^
After the defeat of Ahmed Gran [The Moslem 
Peripheral confederacy's general], Bermudez 
began to press his claims, demanding that the 
Roman rite should be enforced throughout the 
country and that all the clergy should be re­
ordained by him. When the king refused 
these preposterous demands ... [t]here was ... 
a battle between the royal forces and the 
Portuquese ... and after a ... submission 
[, the Ethiopian King] scattered the Portuguese 
by granting them estates in different provinces.
Thus ,
,[m]ost of the survivors of Da Gama's 
expedition [that turned the tide of the 
Peripheral Moslems' 'jihad' against Ethiopia 
Proper in the latter's favour] had settled 
down in the country and had received grants of 
land and gold ...7 [W]hen King John III of 
Portugal suggested the despatch of a Latin 
patriarch to Abyssinia, the Pope determined to 
entrust the mission to the Jesuits ... the 
King of Portugal despatched them to India on 
way to the Horn ordering his viceroy to install 
them with a force of five hundred men at their 
back.8
However, the force could not be sent. Notwithstanding 
this failure, the Portuguese established themselves in the 
area and pursued a policy of enforcement of their will on
A.H.M. Jones and Elizabeth Monroe, A History of Abyssinia 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1935) , p.85.
 ^ ibid., p .87.
7 Rey, op.cit., p.242.g
Jones and Monroe, p.88.
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the local system. Jesuit missionaries had arrived in 1557, 
and helped by the Portuguese colony, were making strenuous 
efforts to convert the country to Roman Catholicism and 
overthrow the old national Church.^ A quasi-colonial regime, 
comparable to the European system in China in the 19th and 
early 20th centuries, was in the making. This was the 
beginning, which, though temporarily thwarted by Claudius 
in the latter part of his reign, and by his successors, 
Basilides, and Johannes I,10 nevertheless, later led, as 
elsewhere, to the 'New Imperialism' under which the colonial 
process was fulfilled by occupation of vast areas of the Horn.* 11
Secondly, this Ethiopian acceptance of the European 
hegemony showed, like the Peripheral societies' earlier 
acceptance of Islamic protection that, conflict between the 
Core and the Periphery of the region is likely to be so strong 
and primary to the behavioural character of both of them as 
to override even considerations of security against extra- 
regional encroachments upon their sovereignty. They would 
rather bring in outsiders than unite to fight for collective 
independence from external control. This supports the
Rey, op.cit., p.242. Jones and Monroe, p.88.
Lipsky, op.cit., p.13. Jones and Monroe, op.cit., p.88.
11 . . .European colonialism/imperialism as a worldwide phenomenon 
had proceeded through two stages, viz. (i) old colonialism, 
and (ii) new imperialism. In the first stage/ colonial powers 
only established a few posts, usually on the coasts, and 
extended only a vague, quasi-colonial control into the interior. 
In the second, the colonial power converted their quasi- 
colonial regime into a full-fledged effective imperial order over the whole area concerned.
101
proposition that it is the local contradictions rather than 
the dimensions of global politics that stand primary in 
shaping the intra-regional relationships on the Horn.
The advent of European colonialism was different in 
significance from that of the non-European external inter­
ference from the immediate neighbourhood. There could not 
be a sharp distinction between the expanding external and 
the subjected local actors in the latter case, because, 
being immediate neighbours, the two actors were in fact 
parts of a social continuum. Thus, for the dark Moslem Beja 
tribesmen of Eritrea, there was not much difference between 
a local prince and a similarly dark Moslem, and perhaps, 
also Beja, Mahdist governor from the Sudan or a Moslem naih 
of the Ottoman administration. But the colonisers from 
Europe presented a very readily visible and sharp distinction. 
For the same Eritreans, or the Somalis for that matter - a 
governor from Europe or even his subordinate body of Europeans 
was a sudden shocking novelty. These Europeans were different 
from them in most visible respects, obvious intruders,and
of course, a target of jihad, the compulsory war against the 
12infj del ruler. This difference between the European and 
the local colonial regime perhaps largely explains the 
difference in the Horn's reaction to the two kinds of imperial 
expansion. While this reaction was immediate, very strong, 
and generally on a mass level in the case of European 
expansion, in that of the Ottoman or even the Mahdist and
12 Moslems are bound by faith to be prepared for jihad aaainst 
alien rulers. Vide: Koran, 25:52.
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Omani expansions, it was at times, lacking - or, at other
times, not in the shape of a popular resistance. The
Peripheral masses never seem to have resisted the Moslem
imperial control from without. Whenever there was any
resistance to this control, it was from ambitious local nobles,
and usually, not to directly oppose that control but to obtain
13autonomy under its shadow. In case of the Core, the 
resistance to this extra-regional Moslem expansion was greater, 
because of religious animosity and the power-political interests 
of the royalty and may be regarded as an extension of the 
Core - Peripheral conflict as observed in the pattern of 
intra-regional relationships on the Horn.
This anti-European tendency on a mass level was 
strengthened by a combination of the particular nationality 
and the particular timing of the first European expenditions 
to the Horn. As has been seen, these expeditions were 
Portuguese and the timing was the early part of the 16th century. 
The Iberian Peninsula, the homeland of the Portuguese, had 
only recently been liberated from Moslem domination; 
secularization of politics as an impact of the Renaissance 
and the Reformation was still to come, meaning that many were 
still living in a crusading mood; and the Iberians [both 
the Portuguese and Spaniards], owing to their immediate past 
experience, were yet more zealous in this crusade. The
For further discussion on the difference in the Peripheral 
societies' reaction to European imperialism and that to the 
Ottoman etc. Vide: infra, pp. 115-117.
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legend of Prester John, supposedly a rich and strong 
Christian King living somewhere at the rear of the Moslem 
Empire, was well known to Europe and the Ethiopian Core had 
just been 'identified' as his Empire and seemed to be an 
obvious source of wealth, strength and possibly, even a 
military alliance in this crusade. Alliance, however, in 
the existing mood was of course subject to conversion of the 'Core' to 
the Portuguese version of Christianity, i.e. Catholicism.
All these combined to make the early European expeditions 
to the Horn particularly aggressive and brutal, obsessed with 
excessive religious fervour and intolerance, and with such 
short term profit motives as plunder - rather than much long 
term ideals of the other, latter day colonial missions as 
the integration of the colonial areas into an imperial 
political system, or, a civilizing mission.
Thus, on the introductory contacts, the Europeans
appeared almost solely concerned with plunder and destruction,
had no regard for the local people's emotional attitudes,
and enraged them by their disregard for local places of 
14worship. As a result, local resistance to the European 
was strong and total, in terms of both participation and cost, 
and the whole of the population participated in it. For
For a description of a typical Portuguese raid of this 
period, vide: Justus Strandes, The Portuguese Period in East 
Africa (Germ.; translated by Jean F. Wallwork; Ed.:
J.S. Kirkman, Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau; for 
the Kenya History Society, 1961), pp.76-78. Also Robert L. 
Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia (Chicago and London,
The University oc Chicago Press, 1966), pp.6-7.
10<f
instance, Brava was defended by 6,000 men while the total
population of the city was 4,000 of whom only 200 were under
arms. The rest must have come from the neighbourhood.
Obviously it was a levee en masse - a popular uprising. The
degree of the people's commitment to resistance and the
costs they were prepared to pay are apparent from the fact
that the entire male population was prepared, either to
die or to desert the city, leaving their women to be - as
they could imagine from their earlier and frequent experiences
with the invaders - violated and mutilated, rather than
surrender. They could have surrendered in peace, as the
Portuguese had been conducting quite long negotiations to 
16that end. But, they would not do so.
Popular hatred of Europeans was not much weaker in
Christian Ethiopia than in the Moslem Peripherals. This
may be sensed from, among many other specimens of Ethiopian
folk culture, the following folk song, chanted by the masses
on the occasion of the banishing of the Jesuits in 1632:
At length the Sheep of Ethiopia freed
From the Bold Lyons of the West
Securely in their Pastures feeds
St. Mark and Cyril's Doctrines have o'ercome
The folly's of the Church of Rome
Rejoyce, rejoyce, Sing Hallelyah all,
No more the Western Wolves 
Our Ethiopia shall enthrall.
On that occasion,
[t]he promiscuous Multitude of them and 
Women danc'd and caper'd; the Soldiers wish'd 
all happiness to the Commanders; they broke to 
pieces their own and the Rosaries of all they
Castan Leda (August 1833), II, p.124; cited in Strandes, 
op.cit., p .81.
16 Strandes, op.cit., p.76.
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met. Others ran about Singing for joy 
that Ethiopia was deliver'd from the
Western Lyons ...^
It is not intended here to engage in detailed discussion 
on the existence or nature of anti-European feeling amongst 
the Horn people. This will be further discussed. But the 
above shows that this anti-European feeling came into 
existence very soon after the advent of the Europeans, that 
it existed in both the Periphery and the Core, and that it 
was a direct result of Portuguese policies.
Beginnings of the Modern Horn
The local anarchy and the external involvement supple­
mented and facilitated each other. The intertwined growth 
of these two factors led, by the early parts of the present 
century, to a strong Core and a colonized Periphery. Emperor 
Tewodoros (1855-69) and his successors emerged as supreme 
authority in Ethiopia through an intelligent exploitation 
of the local contradictions and external involvements. One 
by one they reduced the competing claimants to imperial 
authority and sought to strengthen and expand the Ethiopian 
polity through obtaining favourable European connections.
The aims of Ethiopia's European connections and their impact, 
when these were obtained, were mainly two:
J. Ludolphus, quot. in Pankhurst, op.cit., p.89. Emphasis 
added.
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(a) radical improvement of the strength and cohesion
of the Ethiopian polity, particularly in military terms, 
enabling it to conquer parts of the Periphery by force;
(b) acquisition of other parts of the Periphery through 
partition agreements with the European powers.
The former of these two aspects was perhaps also meant 
to, and surely did, enable Ethiopia to talk from a position 
of greater strength vis-a-vis the European powers in nego­
tiations in■connection with the latter aspect.
Thus, Tewodoros 'had intended ... to conquer the whole 
18world1 and pursued a 'policy ... to crush the Turks and
the Egyptians [Protectors of the Peripheral societies]'
19for that reason. With '[e]xtravagant visions of brilliant 
conquests', Tewodoros, intent upon his own plans, thought 
that Britain as a Christian power would come to his aid against 
the Moslems. In 1862 he, accordingly wrote a letter to Queen 
Victoria proposing a thoroughgoing alliance.20 Writing 'as 
a Christian sovereign to another', he suggested to Queen 
Victoria and to the Emperor Napoleon,an Abyssinian embassy to 
Great Britain and France respectively.2“^
Tewodoros did not succeed in his efforts. The British 
Foreign Office, who had just concluded a treaty with Turkey 
Russia, simply 'pigeon-holed' this letter. Neither
Emperor Tewodoros, letter to Sir Robert (later Lord) Napier, 
13 April 1868, quot. in Jones & Monroe, op.cit., p.134.
19 Emperor Tewodoros's statement to Capt. Cameron, British 
Consul in Ethiopia (1862), cited in Jones & Monroe, op.cit., p.132.
20 Doresse, op.cit., p.189.
21 TJones & Monroe, op.cit., p.132.
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did the French respond favourably. On the domestic scene
also, he was not very successful. Though he became the
supreme emperor, the bases of his power were very weak.
' [M]ost groups in the country ... [were] alienated and even
his hold on his military forces was weakened'. When a
British punitive expedition marched to his capital, in 1868,
its leader, Napier 'found plenty of willing helpers all along
the road to [the capital] Magdala'. The centralized system
was still not stable, and, after Tewodoros's suicide following
the above expedition, the country was plunged back into the
2 3old-time chieftains' rivalry for succession.
Though Tewodoros himself did not succeed completely in 
his policy, he set the pattern which was gradually consolidated 
through the successive reigns. The same policy was pursued, 
with greater success, by his successors - Johannes, Menelik 
and Haile Selassie.
European contacts over the years had sown seeds of 
reformative new ideas. With the consolidation of the polity 
itself started under Tewodoros and its bid for admission into 
the Eurocentric world society of the time, these new ideas 
also could be put into application. Thus, under Tewodoros 
started a threefold porcess of (a) imperial centralization, 
and consolidation of the system; (b) expansion into the 
Peripheral areas through partitioning arrangements with the 
European powers, and (c) internal reforms with modernizing 
efforts. For an example of this last aspect of the trend,
Doresse, op.cit., p.199. Lipsky, op.cit., 
Monroe, op.cit., p.132.
23
p . 15. J ame s &
Lipsky, op.cit., p.15. Jones & Monroe, op.cit., pp.133-134.
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Tewodoros had also 'discussed the advantage and
pursued the practice of breaking up the larger provincial
units into smaller ones over which he could establish governors
24loyal to him personally'.
While all the above three aspects of the imperial policy 
were logical, none could be easily accepted by Ethiopia, 
as they clashed with the conservative essence of its history, 
and could not be pursued without constant contradictions 
and crisis. Thus the whole course of modern Ethiopian 
history is saturated with contradiction between reformist 
efforts and opposition to them; centralist moves and 
opposition to them; and involvement in global politics and 
introvertist tendencies.
Tewodoros could only initiate the policy but his 
successors presided over the implementation and thus mobili­
zation of the process. It was not until Emperor Menelik's 
time that a serious Euro-Abyssinian cooperation leading to 
conquest and partition of the Periphery could take place. 
Yahannes IV (John IV) had succeeded Tewodoros after a war 
of succession in 1872. 'Throughout the period of his reign 
he was almost ceaselessly distracted by [i.e. was attentive
to] the aspirations, military and commercial, of
25outside powers', and intended to secure favourable 
European connections. His interest in these connections 
existed even from before his ultimate success in 
the struggle to become Emperor. Thus, for instance, 'He
l2 4 Lipsky, op.cit., p.15.
James & Monroe, op.cit., p.135.25
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[Kassa, later Yohannes IV] sent Mirtcha Worge, [in late 1860s]
one of his principal secretaries, with two letters to Senafe,
where [British] Colonel Merewether and the advance party had
already encamped. In them Kassa offered 'friendship and
assistance' and proposed' ... cordial relations ...' After
having become Emperor, he sent, in 1872, emissaries with
letters to Austria, Russia, Germany, Britain and France
soliciting help in gaining the port of Amphilia and the plains
2 6of Anku - both in the Periphery.
But, like his predecessor, and the initiator of the
policy, Tewodoros, Yohannes also failed in securing any
favourable European connection in this regard.
The reason was a general European lack of interest in 
2 7Ethiopia. But notwithstanding the failure, Yohannes IV
continued the efforts at winning favourable European
connections. He kept on repeating claims on the Peripheral
territories and as late as in 1884, more than a decade later,
he wrote to Queen Victoria, stating that he hoped 'the gates
of heaven would open for her as she had opened Massawa for
him'. He was at pains to emphasize the ancestry of the
Ethiopian claim to the port. This was in spite of the fact
that Britain had done, and as it stated in reply to the
above letter, would do, 'no more [only] ensure free transit
2 8through Massawa'. Yohannes IV obviously was trying to
Gabre-Selassie, op.cit., pp.27-28.
2 7 ibid., pp.49-50. Russel to Stanton, 
dispatch of 5 October 1865, referring to the Anglo-Abyssinian 
treaty of 1849, BPP, Correspondence respecting Abyssinia 
1846-1868, quot. in Gabre-Selassie, op.cit., p.30.
Gabre-Selassie, op.cit., p.152.28
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flatter Britain into greater cooperation with Ethiopia for 
Etniopia's own ends of expanding into the Periphery.
Power Political Vacuum in the Periphery
The violent struggle of the early 16th century, the Jihad,whileit
/brought in European involvement and modernising trends for 
Ethiopia, had consequences for the Peripheral societies also.
The base of the Peripheral power which has been in general 
in the north and east of the Periphery had suffered a serious 
blow as a result of this, 16th century Core-Peripheral 
struggle. The strong sultanates of Zeila, Adal, 
and Harar had crumbled and the Periphery was
left with weak sultanates on the coast, weak city states, or 
in certain areas, virtual anarchy though under nominal 
suzerainty of the Core’s governors. For their security 
against Ethiopian occupation, they became dependent on 
Ethiopia s own internal problems and, in some cases, parti­
cularly in the south western Horn, distance from the Core's 
centre of gravity. But the most reliable single factor 
providing this security was external Moslem Protection. In 
the south and on the eastern coasts, this was provided from 
1823, in differing degrees, by the Sultanate of Oman/29 in 
the north and eastern interior, including Tadjowa, Zeila 
and Harar, first by the Ottomans, and after the mid-1870s, 
by Egypt. The Sultanates of Mijjertein and Obbia, on the
Hess, op.cit., pp.78. This Sultanate has been also known 
as the Sultanate of Zanzibar, since the shift of its capital 
to Zanzibar in 1840, ibid.
30 Jones & Monroe, op.cit., P-135 and Hess, op.cit., p. 11.
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eastern tip of the Horn, could maintain their independence 
because of the cordon of external Moslem protectorates between 
them and Ethiopia (map). A similar cordon was provided
by the rising Galla power for the south western Peripherai 
coast, over which, Oman's protection, though existent, was 
weak.
Moslem Protection along with other factors such as
conditions in Europe, had helped to keep the Periphery free
from European control. Thus, the Periphery' was kept, until
the withdrawal of the external Moslem Protection, free of
both Ethiopian and European control. But,
[i]n 1884 ... when they [the Egyptians] 
evacuated Harar and the coast, it looked as 
if the obstacles to Abyssinian aggrandizement 
were melting unaided.31
At the same time, this withdrawal facilitated the extension 
of European control in the area.
The Omani protectorate as a politico-legal regime, so 
far spread vaguely all over the south eastern and south western 
Periphery, also, was almost dismantled in 1886, by an Anglo- 
German Agreement which limited the Omani Sultan's suzerainty 
to an area of 10 miles around five ports, viz. Warsheik, 
Mogadishu, Merca (Merka), Brava and Kismayu. ^  The 
protectorate was completely abolished when the Omani (Zanzibari) 
Sultanate itself became a British protectorate on 14 June 1890.
Jones & Monroe, op.cit.
32 Information Services of the Somali Government,- The Somali 
Peninsula/A New Light on Imperial Motives, op.cit., p.l and* Map II.
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Partition of the Peripheral Areas: The Beginnings
Thus the Periphery was gradually abandoned by its
traditional protectors. Ethiopia had by that time recovered
to a great extent from the blows of the 16th century
struggle and was emerging once again as a strong polity -
and with deliberate efforts at establishing and using European
connections to obtain as much as possible of the Peripheral
areas. Europe, by that time, due to the dynamics of its own
developments, had become interested in the African coastal
areas, including the Peripheral areas of the Horn. All these
factors combined to lead to the partition of the Peripheral
zones during the latter parts of the 19th century.
The revival of trade in Arabia in the early decades
of the nineteenth century resulted in a renewed international
interest in the Red Sea, which provided a channel between
Africa, Europe and Arabia. The British, French, and later,
Italians, tried to improve trade with the ports in the area,
through measures including establishment of bases on the
Periphery of the Horn. Franco-Ethiopian deals resulted in
French acquisition of Ait near Massawa (1830s), Bay of Adulis
(1859) and Obock, on the north of the Bay of Tajura (1862).
A series of British-Ethiopian dealings starting from 1810
culminated in the establishment of a British Consulate at
Massawa in 1847. Italy, though a late-comer in the race for
the Peripheral bases, began to play 'an increasingly important 
33
role' both on the Red Sea and the Somali Coast, 
by late nineteenth century. The European
33 Darkwah, op.cit., pp.61-62.
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and Ethiopian expansion into the Periphery will be discussed 
in greater detail in the following pages.
Menelik II
As mentioned earlier, it was only with the succession 
of Menelik to power that the course of modern Ethiopia, 
including the partitioning pattern, took full force. Menelik 
succeeded Yohannes IV as Emperor in 1889, following a 
confusing war of succession in accordance with the pattern 
that had already become established. The factor that the 
scene was set favourably for Euro—Abyssinian cooperation in 
colonizing and partitioning the Peripheral areas was 
supplemented by the fact that Menelik had already had some 
success building a set of European connections, even before 
becoming Emperor. This state of affairs, strengthened his 
kingdom of Shewa within Ethiopia, leading to his and Shewa's 
ultimate success in dominating Ethiopia, strengthening 
Ethiopia vis-a-vis the Periphery and partially conquering 
latter, and finally to the Euro—Ethiopian partition and 
colonization of the rest of the Periphery.
Two missions from Menelik to Europe,under Abba Mikael 
in 1872 and a Frenchman, Pierre Arnouz, in 1876, resulted in 
the beginnings of Franco—Ethiopian co-operation on the basis 
of converging French and Ethiopian interests. The most 
significant aspects of the co-operation included systematic 
^^ ui-Prosnt of the Ethiopian Shewan army with modern European 
firearms, the birth of an important, if small corps of 
Ethiopians able to interpret European negotiators and a French
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interest in building up a commercial route, between the
Ethiopian interior and the French coast on the Horn (later 
34Djibouti).
It is interesting to note the course taken by Menelik
in his struggle for the imperial office. Traditionally,
Ethiopia has been a collection of kingdoms wherein the several
kings mutually rival for the office of the Emperor of the whole
of Ethiopia. To become Emperor himself, Menelik, still only the
of ohewa — one of the constituent kingdoms oi the Empire, had
to struggle against the established Enperor, Yohannes. It would have
been most natural for him to join hands with the Emperor's
Egyptian enemies on the Periphery in his own bid for succession
to the imperial power. But he not only refrained from doing
this but also sought European assistance, like his enemy,
Yohannes,against the Egyptians. Thus, though
[i]t has been assumed [wrongly, by some] that 
Menilek cooperated with the Egyptians against 
Yohannes ... nothing more [than mere exchange 
of a couple of missions] appear to have 
happened between Menilek and the Khedive [Egypt].
The Egyptian blockade [presence] at the coast 
[Periphery] hit Menilek hard and in his letter 
to the Khedive in 1876 the Shewan king complains 
bitterly about this. In fact he continued to 
complain to the European powers about this blockade 
throughout the period of Egyptian occupation 
of the Somali coast.35
This course of Menelik's action suggests that this 
pattern of conflict between the two geopolitical bodies or 
sets of bodies and their behaviour has been so deep-rooted 
and strong that it could not be overcome even by more concrete 
immediate considerations of self interest of one or other of
Darkwah, op.cit., pp.60-65. 
ibid., pp. 61-65 , 76 .
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their constituent units. Menelik's course also strengthens
the proposition regarding the pattern of external alignments
of the units of the Horn. Fitting in with the general pattern
3 6of Ethiopia's alliances set by now. Menelik, like his
enemy Yohannes, sought European assistance against the Egyptian
power in the Periphery. It also is interesting to note that
the Ethiopian societies became bitterly engaged in conflict
with even the European powers, whose alliance they traditionally
tended to seek, when these powers established themselves on
the Periphery and thus virtually turned into Peripheral actors
in the local context. This was true, first and more seriously
with Italy, and later, and with a lesser degree of intensity,
3 7with Britain and France. This also points to the strength 
of the pattern of Core-Peripheral contradictions, to which 
all other dimensions of the region's politics seem to concede.
Italy on the Horn
In 1869 a private Italian company bought the Red Sea
port of Assab from a local Sultan, and with this Italy made
her entry into the Abyssinian stage. The port was bought
by the Italian government in 1882. In 1885, Italy occupied
3 8the port of Massawa some 275 miles to the north. Mention
has already been made of the anti-European feeling of the 
Horn's peoples. As pointed out earlier, their reaction,
^  Vide: supra, p.96.
37 This aspect has been discussed further, below: vide: pp.
38 1Ernest W. Luther, Ethiopia Today (Stanford: Stanford
University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1958) , 
pp.16-17.
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especially in the Periphery, to European expansion has
been different from their response to the expansion of a non-
European neighbouring external power, e.g. the Arabs. Thus,
m  1884, Nubar Pasha, the Egyptian statesman, observed that
Italy would have no trouble in occupying 
Beilul at l-east, if she could use Sheikh Saad 
to help prepare the local population to accept 
her as a protector rather than a conqueror. 39
That this statement was made by the Pasha of Egypt, who was
s^ill in control of the area and well informed on the
situation within is significant. That the Pasha was sympathetic
to the Italian takeover is also significant. Obviously, he
feared that Italy could not take the area over even if
Egyptian forces withdrew because of local resistance — hence
his assurance that 'at least' Beilul could be taken over, if
the local population could be prepared to accept the Italians.
This could be done, the Pasha warned again, only through the
local peoples' own leader, the Sheikh, Saad. And finally,
this all could have any credibility, only if the Italians
could come as a protector, not as a sovereign, conqueror.
Recognition of the area's anti-Europeanism and its 
strong loyalty to the Ottoman-Egyptian colonial regime was 
reflected also in the extraordinary care taken by the Italians 
and others facilitating their takeover, in wooing the local 
people into submission rather than conquering them. The 
British Resident and Consul General in Cairo, Baring, advised 
that 'the Italians ought to leave the Turkish flag flying
39 Gabre-Selassie, op.cit., p.162. My emphasis.
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if only temporarily', if their attempt at taking over the
40area was to have any chance of success. The Italians,
following this advice, left the Egyptian [Ottoman] flag
flying even after they took over Massawa. 'By the afternoon
of 5 February the Italian flag was flying side by side with
41the Egyptian one over the palace and forts of Massawa'.
The commander of the Italian naval force that took over the
4 2port proclaimed to 'the people of Massawa':
the Italian Government, in accord with the ...
E gyptian [approval] have ordered me to take 
possession of the Port of Massowah [Massawah] 
this day and to hoist the Italian Flag by the
side of the Egyptian.
By this occupation our Troops will protect 
youj and we are ready to pay for all we want. We 
shall respect your customs and religion.
No obstacle shall be put by me to your trade, 
on the contrary all my exertions shall aim at 
facilitating it, and I can assure you of the 
friendship of my Government.
We beg that you will consider us as friends 
and carry on your ordinary business and feel in 
perfect security.43
Italy was subsequently encouraged by Great Britain to
4 4extend her hegemony inland, and proceeded to do so, thus 
becoming, by 1887, a Peripheral power. Significantly the 
Italo-Ethiopian relationship changed around this time from 
initial cooperation into direct military confrontation. Thus
40 ibid., p.152.
4 1ibid., p .164.
4  ^ibid., p.,165. (My emphasis),-..
4  ^Quot. in ibid.
Gabre-Selassie, op.cit., p.168.44
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Italy fought the battle of Dogali in 1887, its first serious
4 5military clash with Ethiopia.
The change in the pattern of relationship was gradual 
4 6rather than sudden. Thus, there remained elements of co­
operation even after the battle of Dogali. The two signed 
the Treaty of Ucciali in 1889, formally affirming, in a vague 
way, specially co-operative relationship between themselves.47 
The Italians consolidated their coastal and inland positions 
in the north, formally giving the area the name Eritrea
in 1890, and all this, without any military opposition from 
4 8Ethiopia. But during this same period the growing hostility 
could be sensed from the dispute over the interpretation of 
the Treaty of Ucciali, and its consequent denunciation by 
Ethiopia, at one stage, after the formal proclamation of 
the Italian colony of Eritrea in 1890.49
The new pattern of Italo-Ethiopian relations emerged 
finally through the battle of Adowa in 1896, and the two 
countries were never again to co-operate in any way until the
Luther, op.cit., p.17.
46 Any social change has to be gradual.
Even a revolution is a process of transformation. It is 
different, in this regard, from evolution only in terms of 
the speed of this transformation. Revolution is an accelerated 
process of transformation while evolution is a slow and 
gradual one. Even a coup causing sudden overthrow of a 
regime involves a process of transformation, the 'sudden 
overthrow' being only the climax in the process.
47 The Italians claimed the Treaty accorded an Italian pro­
tectorate over Ethiopia. According to the Ethiopians, it 
was nothing more than an agreement that Ethiopia might use 
the Italians in negotiations with other powers. Luther, 
op.cit.
4 8  • -u. ■ -1ibid.
49 ibid.
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final withdrawal of Italy from the Horn after the Second
World War, and thus, her loss of the status of peripheral 
50
power. The change in the pattern of Ethiopia's relations 
with Italy with changes in the latter's position on the Horn's 
Periphery is significant. It supports the proposition that 
the Core-Peripheral pattern of relations on the Horn is the 
most important single factor in the external relations 
of the Horn's politics. Similar conclusions may be adduced from the 
history of Ethiopia's relationship with other colonial 
powers, as may be seen in the following sections of this 
chapter.
The Advent of the British
British relations with the Horn started on a non-
Governmental level, through individual explorers and minor
private commercial deals. The first of these was the
visit to the area by a Scot, James Bruce, who stayed there
51from 1768 to 1772 or 1773. His description of and comments
on the area, however were not taken seriously in London at 
5 2that time, but under a Treaty concluded in 1840 between 
the Sultan of Tajura and the British East India Company, the
ibid., pp.17-22 and 95. Infra, pp.165-169. However, a 
treaty of cooperation was signed between Italy and Ethiopia 
in 1928. This never became significantly effective. For 
this and the surprising attitude of cooperation between 
the Ethiopians and the Italians immediately after the 
expulsion of Italians from the Horn vide: Leonard Mosley,
Haile Selassie/The Conquering Lion (London: Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 1964). Also, E. Sylvia Pankhurst, Eritrea on the 
Eve (Essex, 1952), pp.45-49.
Jones & Monroe, op.cit., pp.101, 72, 127.
52 ibid., p .127.
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Sultanate became an English Protectorate and the island
of Mussa, off Tajura was sold to the English for the harbour
of the company's ships 'without any prohibition' on 'the
5 3coast opposite Aden' i.e. on the north Somali coast. The
British, however, did not attempt to penetrate into the 
54hinterland. In 1843, Chichele Plowden, an Englishman of
twenty-three was persuaded by another Englishman, John Bell,
to join him on an expedition into Abyssinia. In 1847, the
stories with which he returned to England persuaded Lord
Palmerston that a mission to the Horn was called for, and in
1848 Plowden returned to the court of Ali, ras [chief] of
Gondar, with whom he concluded a trade treaty in 1849. Thus,
British relations with the area were elevated to the
governmental level, for the first time in the middle of the
nineteenth century. But the British did not yet consider
them important.- The ras , upon signing the above treaty
remarked that it would do no good as he was certain that no
55English merchant would ever come to Abyssinia. He was 
correct at least for a considerable period.
Both Plowden and Bell died in the Horn during the Tigre 
rebellion of 1860. The British Government decided that 
Plowden must have a successor. Thus, in 1862, Captain 
Cameron arrived bearing a letter from Queen Victoria thanking
Information service ..., op.cit., pp.13-19, and Jones 
& Monroe, op.cit., p.14.
Jones & Monroe, op.cit., p.141. 
ibid., p.129.
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5 6the Negus (king) for ransoming Plowden's body. This
was followed by the Ethiopian King's request for British
alliance against the Moslem power on the Periphery, British
rejection of it, and consequent events leading to a British
57punitive expedition which has already been mentioned.
The episode starting from Ethiopian request for alliance
and ending with British withdrawal after having fulfilled
its mission, was significant in three ways. It showed first,
that Britain was not yet very interested in the Horn. The
expedition withdrew immediately after fulfilling its mission
even though it had captured the Ethiopian capital and could,
very likely, have imposed a British protectorate. Secondly,
as already noted, it reflected Ethiopian aspirations for
European alliances against the peripheral areas. Thirdly,
it confirmed the proposition that the general pat tern of
relationship between Ethiopia and European powers remains
non-hostile until the latter becomes seriously established
on the Periphery. The British punitive expedition, though
hostile, did not change the general pattern. It did not
lead to serious and long term hostile relations between
Britain and Ethiopia. As in their policy towards Ethiopia
' [t]he British ... in their Somaliland settlement [also] ...
were less acquisitive than Italy', as they were busy 'digesting
5 8new possessions elsewhere'. British policy towards the
Jones & Monroe, op.cit., p.32. 
Supra, p.107.
Jones & Monroe, op.cit., p.141.
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Horn at this time, in short, was characterised by what
59has been termed of 'casualness'.
But, it was not very long that two factors combined 
to make the British take the Horn more seriously. One was 
the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. The other was the 
rise of Germany in Europe and of German imperialism in East 
Africa in the 1880s. While the first factor brought the 
British into the northern Peripheral areas of the Horn, the 
latter brought them into the south and the south-east.
The opening of the Suez Canal had drawn Britain's
interest to the Red Sea area. Being basically a mercantile
nation, and dependent, at that time, to a great extent, on
her colonial empire in the East, specially India, Britain
was naturally interested in any feasible trade route from
Europe to the East. After the opening of the Suez, the
best of such routes, if simply because of its shortness, was
the one through this canal and its southern outlet, the Red
Sea. Egypt, as an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire,
controlled this whole area, and thus, Britain, particularly
after having bought a share in the Suez Canal Company, became
involved in Egyptian politics. One of the results was the
succession of events which led, through the Egyptian revolt
led by Ar.abi Pasha in 1882, and increased a more direct
British control over Egypt, to the Mahdist revolt in the
6 0then Egyptian hinterland of Sudan. The Mahdist revolt had
59 ibid.
^  There were other factors responsible for the Mahdist revolt. 
But British control and consequent acceleration in Egypt's 
westernization were perhaps the most important single factor
in this regard.
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forced Egypt to withdraw from the Horn in order to be able 
to concentrate all her forces on the threat nearer to home. 
And then,
this [British] casualness [as regards policy 
towards the Horn] turned to concern when the 
Mahdist victories in 1884 caused the withdrawal 
of the Egyptians from Harar. The British 
suddenly uncertain as to the future of the 
hinterland, began to make treaties first with 
the Somalis, then with the French, then with 
the Italians [April 1891].61
On 8 February, 1884, the British Government announced its
6 2intention of 'protecting' Suakin [Eritrea]. At the same
time, Britain was preoccupied with the disposal of Harar
6 3and with the occupation of Berbera and Zeila.
She restored the Emirate of Harar with Abdillahi Mohammed, 
the son of the last Emir as its Governor, with the instruction 
'Be obedient in all things in our [British] representative ... 
at Harar'. In effect, Harar also became a British protec­
torate. Then first, British troops were despatched to Zeila, 
and then, through a series of stereotype agreements between 
1884 and 1896, and a 'Notification' in 1887, Somaliland from
Ras Jiburti to Bunder Ziadeh and Tana to the Juba basin was
6 4brought under British 'protection'.
In the south east of the Horn also, by this time, the 
British involvement had become serious. Germany emerged as
Jones & Monroe, op.cit., pp.141-142.
6 2 Information Service ..., op.cit., Appendix VII, p.97. Technically, Suakin is a part, now of Sudan. But for this 
area's treatment as part of the Horn, vide: supra, Ch. I, p. 3 
ibid, p. 226 4 1ibid., pp.22-24. Appendices IV, VII and VIII(a, b),
pp.88-89, 98-100. Major Hunter, British Consular Agent on
the Somali Coast, Correspondence with Abdillahi Mohammed,
Foreign Office Paper, 141.
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the most powerful state on the European continent with
the German victory in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71.
She therefore became Britain's major potential rival, as
the pattern of British policy had generally been to preserve
the continental balance by taking sides against the most
f) 5powerful nation on the continent, if necessary. With the 
German move to build up her naval power and overseas empire 
inthe middle of the 1880s, this potential rivalry became 
actual. Germany acquired territory in Tanganyika, opposite 
Zanzibar, a strategic port on Britain's route to the east 
via the Cape of Good Hope - and British commercial and 
imperial interests on that route appeared to be under threat. 
Thus, a sense of insecurity led to negotiations, and finally, 
in 1886, to the British-German arrangements regarding East 
Africa. The British received the area north of a line 
running northwestwards from the mouth of the River Wanga to 
the eastern shores of Lake Victoria Nyanza. Two years later, 
in 1888, the Imperial British East Africa Company, 'formed 
primarily as a trading venture' was charged with the 
administration of a
vast but ill defined territory [in East 
Africa] to be governed on the lines of 
a crown colony.66
In effect, the south and south-east Periphery became subject 
to British administration (map).
Cf. for instance, Britain's role against Spain (the Spanish 
Armada period), France (Napoleonic Wars) and later, against 
Germany (First and Second World Wars). Also, along with 
the U.S.5 against the USSR (the post-IInd World War period).
66 Information Services of the Somali Government, op.cit.,
pp.1-2 .
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The British position in south-eastern Somalia was further
consolidated in the next five years. Under the British-German
arrangements of 1886, certain parts of the coast to the depth
of ten miles and including such south Somali ports as
Warsheikh were left under the sovereignty of the Sultan 
6 7of Zanzibar. In 1890 Germany, in consideration for 
Britain's cession of the Heligoland, withdrew her protectorate 
over the east African coast adjoining with Kismayu in Somalia, 
and surrendered her claims to territories north of the river 
Tana. Following Germany's withdrawal, the Company, by agree­
ment with the Sultan of Zanzibar, assumed responsibility, in 
1891, for the 'whole of Jubaland' i.e. south Somalia. Having 
already transferred to Italy the Sultan's lease of the 
Benadir ports to the north of Kismayu i.e. in south east 
Somalia, the Company delimited its North Eastern frontier 
with Italy along the middle of the Juba river to the 
Blue Nile. This way a vast area, reaching to the western 
watershed of the Nile, fell into the British sphere of 
influence - an influence then exerted by the Imperial British 
East African Company.^
However what began then as a trading venture in south 
Somalia ended in a colonial war; and the Company, having 
been vested with political administrative functions that 
were beyond its capacity, surrendered its charter in 1895. 
Shortly afterwards, the establishment of British colonial 
rule was proclaimed. During succeeding years the new
l
^^  ibid., p.1.
6 8 Information Service of the Somali Government, op.cit.,
pp.1-2.
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administration was almost entirely preoccupied with colonial
'pacification' measures and 'punitive expeditions'. For
the British ' [t]he era of colonialism had begun' in south 
69Somalia also. Thus, by the mid 1890s, British 'casualness'
as regards policy towards the Horn had been transformed
into serious involvement in the southeast of the region.
Thus, by the turn of the century, Britain, like Italy,
was becoming established as a Peripheral power on the Horn,
both in the north and the south east. Fitting into the basic
pattern of geopolitical relationships in the region, the
British-Ethiopian relationship also underwent a transformation
from an air or amity on both sides into a situation of rivalry
and conflicts. Thus, 'although an agreement about British
East Africa's northern boundary, including south Somalia with
Abyssinia was arrived at in 1879 ' 70 the British had to worry
about 'Abyssinian raids in British territory'.71 Ethiopians
on the Highland kept on sending 'detachments of armed marauders'
challenging British administration in the Galla and Somali
inhabited lowlands during the 1890s, and a British Government
report in 1903 had to warn about an 'Abyssinian invasion to
the south' potentially leading to the occupation of the
[British] district between Dana river and Wajheir'. The
British Commissioner dealing with south Somali areas, Sir
Charles Eliot, was worried that
the southward movement of the Abyssinians 
[was] a serious matter,
69 .u -jibid., p.7.
70 Information Service ..., op.cit., p.9.
71 Jubaland and the Northern Frontier District (Nairobi 1917) 
p.90. Quot. in Information Service ..., op.cit., p.9.
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and finally, the British had to take measures to counter 
72the challenge. In that year the Ethiopian King, Menelik 
incited the French to acquire Harar, seen by the British 
as within their sphere of interest, and two years later, in 
1886, the Ethiopians occupied the British protected city. 
Britain on her side, did 'everything' to prevent Menelik 
from obtaining arms from the coast. The following year, 
the Ethiopians sent forces to Jigjiga, sixty miles west of 
Harar and well within the Somali country. This was a 
significant move, as a control over Jigjiga meant controlling 
trade in northern Somalia as the point was the meeting place 
for caravans from Harar, the Ogaden and Berbera.73
Obviously, British-Ethiopian relations had become
conflicting with Britain's establishment on the Peripheral
/ y
areas. Never again would Britian and Ethiopia cooperate 
or even maintain a friendly indifference towards each other, 
except during such periods as that of the wars of the 'Mad 
Mullah', when Britain, though temporarily, ceased to be 
the real power on the relevant Peripheral areas. During 
these periods the two would revert to the pattern where 
Ethiopia would seek overseas alliance against the power on 
the Periphery and the two might cooperate in that regard.
For instance, during the first two decades of the present 
century, the British and the Ethiopians cooperated in
7 2 Information Service ..., op.cit., pp.9, 11, 13-14. Juba- 
land ... op.cit., quot. in Information Service ..., op.cit., 
p. 13.
73 E. Stankie, Arthur Rimbaud in Abyssinia (1937), cited in 
Information Service ..., op.cit., p.23. Also, ibid., pp.29-3C• • /
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military campaigns against the Dervish power under the 
74Mullah.
The French Position
The French, contrary to the Italians and the British,
never established themselves as a serious territorial entity
on the Periphery: they, on the Horn, were 'without territorial
75designs'. It is true that they acquired, through a
'Convention' with three Danakil chiefs in 1862, 'the harbour,
roadstead, and anchorage of Obock, situation near Cape Ras
Bir, with the plain extending from Ras Aly to the south, as
V 6far as Ras Dumeirah to the North'. But in terms of 
territorial establishment, this was negligible. So unheard 
of, and obviously insignificant at the time was the area 
acquired, be it marked, that it had to be identified through 
a reference to another, nearby place (Ras Bir), which in 
itself could never become well known. Even more than a 
century later, when the French left the area in 1977, the 
extent of the Territory was insignificant. The French had 
not shown any serious expansionist tendency towards the 
interior. Whatever minor tendencies of that kind were shown 
were directed against the British and the Italians - the 
Peripheral powers, rather than the Core.
74 For details of this cooperation, vide: Douglas Jardine,
The Mad Mullah of Somaliland (London, 1923). Also, Information 
Service ..., op.cit., p.30.
75 Jones & Monroe, op.cit., p.142.
7 6 Convention between France and the Danakil, for the 
cession of Obock and its Territory to France. Paris, 11 March 
1862, in Information Services ..., op.cit., Appendix VI(a), 
pp.90-91.
129
Interestingly, though not surprisingly, the Franco-
Ethiopian relations never became seriously hostile. The
pattern of relations remained that of the typical cooperation
between Ethiopia and the overseas Europeans against the
Peripheral powers. The French presence on the Horn and
Franco-Ethiopian relations started through private individual
Frenchman and remained all through primarily of a non-military,
peaceful, functional and commercial nature, and centred
round the idea of a railway which would turn their port at
Djibouti(near Obock) into the principal outlet for Abyssinia -
an outlet very much required and appreciated by Ethiopia 
77herself. France also assisted Ethiopia, mainly through 
advice, in the latter's struggle against the Peripheral 
Powers, including Italy and Britain. French advice led to 
Ethiopian repudiation of the Italian version of the Treaty 
of Ucciali, which, otherwise, would have led to the consoli­
dation of an Italian protectorate over Ethiopia. French arms, 
along with arms from other sources, contributed to the Ethiopian 
victory over Italy at Adowa in 1896, following the above 
repudiation and confirming, in the consequent treaty, the 
independence of Ethiopia.
This led to further French involvement in Ethiopian 
affairs. Friendly gestures and high level negotiations finally
Jones & Monroe, op.cit., p.142. Ethiopia's craving for 
an outlet has been recurrently apparent throughout her 
history and has been discussed at other places in this work. Vide: Ch.II.
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led to the acquisition of the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway
7 8concession by a French company in July 1896. The French
also encouraged the Ethiopians in their expansionist ambitions
against the Peripheral areas and advised them to write the
circular letter to the European Powers, asserting their
claims on extensive parts of the Periphery 'including also
the Province of Ogaden [a serious bone of contention between
Ethiopia and Somalia at present]', 'the Essa Somalis [Djibouti]'
and 'the coast of the sea', and telling of their ambition to
expand the 'frontiers of Ethiopia upto Khartoum [Sudan], and
as far as Lake Nyanza [Uganda] with all the Gallas' - and
to acquire, 'our seacoast line, at any rate, certain points
79on the coast' (map).
France remained, all through, a good friend of Ethiopia. 
The closest to something like unfriendly relations between 
the two occurred when, in 1902, the French Government showed 
some disregard for Ethiopian sovereignty and what could be 
interpreted as signs of expansionist tendency in the area. 
Following the bankruptcy of the private French company 
entrusted with the building of the Djibouti railway, after 
having completed only a section of it, the French Government, 
under the pressure of French public opinion, took over virtual 
control of the line in 1902. On learning of this, the
Jones & Monroe, op.cit., pp.142, 146-47. Also supra.
79 Circular letter sent by the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik 
to Heads of European States in 1891: Public Records Office
(London), Foreign Office 1/32 Rodd to Salisbury, No.15,
4 May 1897, quot. in Information Services ..., op.cit., 
Appendix II, pp.86-87.
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Ethiopians refused the French government permission to go 
on with the railway and blocked the scheme for several years.
However, later, with reassuring gestures from the French, 
the railway was completed.
Colonization and Partitioning of the Periphery
The Periphery was colonized and partitioned during the 
latter half and particularly the last quarter of the last 
century, and the first decade of the present, through 
treaties with local societies already noted, conquest by 
force and finally, treaties of partition between the 
European powers and Ethiopia. The period marked with the 
earlier treaties, i.e. those between the colonizing European 
Powers and the local, Peripheral societies may be termed the 
'earlier colonial period' in the Horn's Periphery, while, the 
one marked with the latter agreements i.e. those between 
Ethiopia and the European powers as well as those amongst 
the European powers themselves, may be termed as the 'latter 
colonial period'.
The latter colonial treaties may be divided into two 
categories: (a) Euro-Ethiopian, partitioning the Periphery
between Ethiopia and the European powers, giving the Ethiopians 
de dure control over parts of the Periphery; and (b) Intra- 
European, partitioning the European occupied Periphery amongst 
the European powers themselves. There were seven significant 
agreements in the first category during this latter colonial 
era and five in the second.^
l
8 0 For a list of these Treaties, vide: Appendix at the end 
of this paper.
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These treaties of partition are a significant fruit
of this period of colonial deliberations on the Horn. It
was through these instruments of collaboration between
Ethiopia and extra-regional powers in partitioning the Peripheral
areas between themselves that,for the first time in history,
parts of the Periphery were ceded with the consent of their
ruling authorities, to the Core. For the first time the
Core obtained not only a de facto but also a de jure control
over these areas. This fact brought about later serious
complications in the region's situation. As shown elsewhere in
this work, these complications led to the most serious and
longstanding of the international security problems of the
area, viz. the Somali irredentism and the Eritrean insurgency.
Some of the other problems in the region also derive from
81these complications. At the same time, it was during this 
latter phase of colonization that some societies of the 
Periphery were put, for the first time, under different 
ruling regimes (e.g. Italian, British, French) and divided 
by rigid and arbitrary boundaries. Previously, whenever 
the Periphery experienced extra-regional colonial regimes, 
most of these societies remained either autonomous or under 
the same colonial power. More important, the boundaries 
were never rigid. In fact, there were no defined boundaries 
but vague frontiers that merged into one another. The 
rigidly defined political boundaries set by the colonial and
Vide: supra, Ch.II, pp.23-33.
Vide: supra, pp.110-11.
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partition arrangements were initially kept functionally
8 3flexible to a degree through explicit agreements. But
with the passage of time and advent of indigenous nationalist
regimes at the wake of decolonization, this flexibility
waned and brought about the same kind of complications and
consequent crises situation as resulting from the constitutional
. 84cession of Peripheral areas to Ethiopia.
These partition treaties, supplemented by three more 
subsequent instruments of agreement, fixed the international 
boundaries on the Horn. These boundaries were fixed by 
parties external to the area concerned, i.e. to the Periphery. 
This was done in collaboration with Ethiopia, the traditional 
adversary of these societies concerned. Naturally, the 
boundaries were drawn more on the basis of the contracting 
parties' own power-political interests than on considerations 
of the basic realities of the partitioned societies, or their 
welfare. The result is that, the Horn, at the withdrawal 
of the European powers, was left with a superimposed system 
based on artificial boundaries. As has been noted in the 
previous chapter, this presents us with a potentially dangerous 
situation in the area.
Modernization of Ethiopia: The Military Machine
Before we proceed with further discussion on the 
consequences of the colonial period for the present security
For the details of these treaties vide Information 
Services..., op.cit., Appendices, pp.86-90, 100-115, 118, 121-128
84 Vide: supra, Ch.II, pp.27-28, 34-36;
Vide: Appendix II.
Ch.V, pp.184-186.
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Situation and international relations on the Horn, the 
survey of this particular period of the Horn's history which 
can be identified, internally, with the rise and reign 
of Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia, and externally with the 
conclusion of the colonial treaties will be concluded with 
a brief examination of two particularly important aspects 
of this period, viz. (i) modernization in the area, particularly 
of Ethiopia, and (ii) the reaction to the colonial partition 
arrangements amongst the peoples concerned, i.e. those in 
the Periphery.
Four particular aspects of modernization during Menelik's 
reign merit mention. These are: (i) the growth and modern­
ization of the military machine; (ii) the building of the
8 6new capital, Addis Ababa; (iii) building of the Djibouti
Railway; and (iv) introduction of the concept of public 
utility and welfare in government.
The modernization of the military machine had three
aspects of significance. First, this modernization gave
Ethiopia such a military strength that could be challenged
by none of the other entities on the Horn. At the same time
it made Ethiopia comparable to the European colonial regimes
in the area, in terms of strength, and hence, political
87power and standing. This situation facilitated Ethiopia's
Spelt also as Addis Abeba.
8 7 Ethiopian military strength has been tested at least with 
one of these regimes. Ethiopia defeated Italy in 1896 and 
Ethiopia's Patriot A m y  and other Ethiopian troops played an 
important part in the liberation of Ethiopia in 1941. Vide, 
L. Mosley, op.cit.; Preston King, forthcoming book (title 
yet not known).
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expansion into the Periphery through conquest as well as 
through partition treaties negotiated with the European 
powers from a position of strength quite respectable from 
the European point of view. Then, the way in which this 
modernization was carried out, had two significant results, 
viz. (i) the growth of militarism in the Ethiopian character, 
and (ii) the growth of elitism within the Ethiopian military.
Militarism, like its source - the growth and moderniz­
ation of the military machine, was evident in Ethiopian 
society even before the reign of Menelik and increased with 
his policies. Thus, for example, in Shewa, every subject, 
notwithstanding his normal profession, was a soldier. Right 
from the time of the earliest rulers, Shewa was 'on the 
offensive'. The organisation of the state was closely linked 
with that of the military. Soldiers, while off duty, were 
expected to be available at a moment's notice: obviously,
the whole society was on constant military alert. The spirit 
of the whole society was militant and the society seemed to enjoy 
war: large crowds would gather immediately at the beating
of the war drum and the flavour of the declaration of war 
would be very militant and boastful. The Ethiopian war was 
total in terms of participation. Even the women and the 
children would join the campaign. Now under Menelik, a 
deliberate effort was made at enhancing this subconscious 
militarism of the Ethiopian society through such calculated 
devices as hosting of «massive feasts following battles and 
awarding of the greatest rewards for courageous display in - 
war. Military campaigns were conducted as many as two or three
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times in the few months left before and after the rainy
season each year. There was punishment for not rising up
to the demands of military duty, but it was not very high
compared to punishment for such a failure in any modern army.
This simply shows that there was not much apprehension of
such failures: people were usually willingly ready to fight.88
The modernization and strengthening of the military led to
strengthening of the Ethiopian monarchy as absolute, and
since development of 1corps d'elite' seems to be
a process inherent in the development of 
states with absolute rulers. Thus, the 
modernizing process led, at the same time, 
to the growth of an elite within the armed 
forces, which decided the issue.89
Both militarism and elitism within the military had 
their own consequences. Mass militarism bolstered the already 
existing military expansionist tendencies of the Ethiopian 
P°lity. Internally, it not only ensured a sense of admiration 
for force and the military but also made all the individual 
members of the society, in general, temperamentally violent. 
This aspect of the national value system might have had 
something to do with the ease with which the military could 
take over the leadership of the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974 - 
initially spear headed by the civil elite, particularly the 
students; stay in power; and raise the masses, particularly 
the peasants, in its own support.
Darkwah, op.cit., pp.180-182, 186-199. Charles Johnston,
TraveIs in Southern Abyssinia through the country of Adai to 
the kingdom of Shoa during the years 1842-42 (London, 1844) 
Vol.II, pp.76-77.
89 Darkwah, op.cit., pp.81-83.
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Elitism (meaning an oligarchist system),within the
military in particular, sowed the seeds of professional rivalry
within the armed forces and the tendency towards eliminating
the rivals to make or secure one's own position in the elite.
This has contributed to the intra-military politics of
elimination in Ethiopia, particularly since the army took
9 0over power in 1974.
One more significant aspect of the way in which the 
growth and modernization of the military took place is 
the fact that recruitment into the army and promotions, after 
the initiation of the modernistic policies, took place on 
the criteria of military merit and not, as before that, on 
that of birth, e.g. ethnic, regional or class identity.
This meant, the army provided a serious means of infiltration 
of elements from the non-Amharic groups and areas, and the 
lower classes into the otherwise closed circle of the ruling 
elite. Thus, many persons from the lower classes, subject 
peoples and the outlying areas rose to high positions in 
the army, and, for example, by the 1880s,i.e. even before 
Menelik's modernizing campaign, the 'backbone of the provincial 
garrisons' were mostly Galla.91
The fact that elements from without the Amhara nobility 
could infiltrate into the Ethiopian military introduced a 
significant element of tension within this dominant circle
For the politics of elimination in the Ethiopian army elite, 
vide. Africa Confidential^ (London) , 22 July 1977; 9 September
1977. Africa Report (Washington, D.C.), July-August 1975;
March-April 1979. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, pp.28761-62, 
28221. Also, Mosley, op.cit., 'Epilogue'.
91 Darkwah, op.cit., Ch.VI.
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of the polity. The interests of the holders of political 
power and legal authority, now, differed from and even clashed 
with those of the military forces. This led to a kind of 
continuing crisis within the ruling circle. This infiltration 
of the Galla and other 'lesser' people into the army owing 
to recruitment policy - and the consequent conflict within 
the elite may be seen,as on numerous earlier occasions, also 
in the recent Ethiopian Revolution of 1974 which has led 
to the present military distatorship of Mengistu - originally 
a son of a Galla gate-keeper. Many of the other members 
of the junta that initially took over also were from without 
the Amhara nobility.
The growth of militarism had one more important consequence. 
The administration became, gradually, a military one. The 
most distinguished soldiers started to be appointed governors 
of the provinces. This could have several reasons. A 
genuine admiration for the military as well as their strength 
might have required to reward them with positions of importance; 
as the supreme at the centre was the emperor himself, the 
military heroes could be made so only in the provinces. One 
reason could be that the emperors felt threatened by the 
military heroes and chiefs and thus wanted to keep them at 
safe distance from the centre of power. Whatever be the 
reason, while the centre remained a political government of 
the aristocracy, though supported by the military, the 
provincial administration became, in effect, predominantly 
military. The struggle between the nobility and the military 
discussed above, put in this context, led to a conflict
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between the centre and the provinces. In case of such 
provinces as Harar or Eritrea - that are part of the Periphery 
this contradiction simply supplements and strengthens the 
basic tension between the Core and the Periphery of the Horn 
of Africa.
It is not surprising, therefore, that most of the members 
of the 'Committee' that brought about the Ethiopian Revolution 
of 1974 were military leaders of the provinces, and those 
from the Peripheral provinces were the most prominent of all 
(Aman Andorn from Eritrea, Mengistu Haile Mariam from Harar).
For the Ethiopian military rulers of the provinces, in 
each case, where an Ethiopian has been appointed a governor 
of a Peripheral province - this appointment presents an 
internal contradiction. Appointments to the provinces would be 
usually accompanied by rewards of provincial estates. The 
rulers would then find themselves split in their loyalty 
between the Core and the Periphery. While their vested 
interests and long term settlements - sometimes over 
generations - tie them to the Periphery, their ethno-cultural 
background and emotional attachment tie them to the Core.
This dual loyalty presents the area with an additional factor 
of instability and tension.
Building of the Capital - Addis Ababa
The building of Addis Ababa, near Entoto, as a permanent 
capital city under Menelik and its development under Haile 
Selassie I was important in more than one way. First, 1
with it, for the first time, the Ethiopian polity received 
an urban elite or the bouvgeo'is'le. So far,
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the [Ethiopian] elite was not an urban elite; 
for there were in Ethiopia prior to the 
present century [prior to Addis Ababa] virtually 
no cities, with their attendant occupational 
specialization, their doubting intellectuals, 
their scholastic skeptics, and their independent 
commercial classes
9 2in short, with a bourgeoisie. The only other urban centres 
during the whole period of Ethiopia's traceable history 
were Axum and Gondar. Axum had collapsed more than a milleneum 
ago and never formed an urban -centre for Ethiopia as presently 
conceived, i.e. as an inland, highland, agrarian society.
After that, no urban centre existed in the Ethiopian polity,
Q Ountil after the growth of Addis Ababa as such. Gondar was 
developing as something close to such an urban centre 'briefly 
in the seventeenth and eithteenth centuries'. But it could 
not retain its position as the centre of gravity of the polity, 
as the empire whose capital it happened to be, was being, 
simultaneously 'eroded by subinfeudation, internecine strife, 
and the inroads of Galla tribesmen from the south'.94
Thus, Addis Ababa with its creation and development 
became the cradle of the Ethiopian bourgeoisie and thus, 
the source of a break with the feudal past. The immediate 
seeds of the next class revolution were sown with those of 
Addis Ababa. Revolution had been common to the course of 
Ethiopian history, as already noted.95 But 
class revolution is far less common a phenomenon as it is
Allan Hüben, Land Tenure Among the Amhara of Ethiopia/The 
Dynamics of Cognitic Descent (Chicago and London: The
University of Chicago Press, 1973), p.4.
9 3 Pankhurst (1961), Ch.VI.
94 Hoben, op.cit., p.4, fn.6
95 Vide: supra, p.93.
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not only a political but an overall revolution perceived
and organised on the basis of the class struggle and resulting
into a 'jump' from one stage of development (e.g. feudal)
to the next one (bourgeois). Thus while class struggle
may be discerned in the past history of the Ethiopian polity,
it could never produce a class revolution, after the one
with the Sabaean settlements that transformed the pre-feudal
society into a feudal one - until the development of Addis
Ababa as the seat of a bourgeoisie in the twentieth century.
Ail other revolutions were mainly political. These struggles
were, in general, within the same upper class and were neither
aimed at,nor resulting in any fundamental changes in the
structure of the society and its polity.
The building of Addis Ababa had other aspects of
significance also. For example, with the growth of Addis
9 6Ababa and other cities on its pattern the society took the
shape of a dichotomy of conflicting units: the country and
the city. This would have serious consequences in the long
run. In fact, it is worth reflection that the Ethiopian
Revolution of 1974 started with agitations demanding redress
9 7for certain grievances of the country people. However, 
in a way, this aspect can be taken as only a facet of the 
class revolution. This was the struggle between the rising
9 6 Menelik started a deliberate policy of building up cities 
on the pattern of Addis Ababa, one at least in each province. 
Moreover, certain other cities (e.g. Harar, Assab and Massawa) 
came within the Ethiopian frontiers with conquest or 
partition treaties.
\
91My interview with Fessahai Abraham, Eritream exile,
Sydney, 1978.
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bourgeoisie and the crumbling feudal base. This country-
city contradiction was to become inevitable, because, with
the passage of time, the people in the country and those in
the city became, in effect two different peoples. Prior
to the growth of the urban elite, '[t]hough there were great
differences in power, honour and wealth between the peasantry
and the elite, the cultural distance between them was not 
9 8so great ...' But now, the urban elite and the peasant
masses looked at life and everything including their mutual
relationships through two different cultural perspectives.
The Ethiopian society was culturally split.
Then, the turning of the Shewa capital into the permanent
capital of the whole of Ethiopia 'confirmed the southern
9 9orientation of the empire'. This orientation, among other 
consequences, became 'a source of Tegrean disgruntlement'.
It simply fuelled the already existing regional conflict 
between the three sub-cores of the society of the Core, 
viz. Tigre, Gojjam and Shewa.100
The building of a permanent and proper capital city 
was important also in view of the centralistic nature of 
the Ethiopian polity, as these two factors - a capital city, 
and centralistic tendencies of the polity - when combined, 
can make the polity more prone to revolutionary crisis.
This is so because of the fact that
Hoben, op.cit., p.4.
99 Lipsky, op.cit., p.18.
100 ... j . .. ibid.^ This conflict continues. For recent examples
visde: Africa Confidential, V.18, No.16; V.18, No.23.
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[I]n a centralistic state ... the 
Place d ’armes of a revolution in the 
capital city is much more crucially 
significant than revolutionary outbreak in 
a provincial town. In such a political 
structure, revolution in the capital ... 
can paralyze the state. On the contrary 
in a federal and democratic state, the 
outbreak of a revolution in a capital city 
has different significance because of the 
relatively decentralized power structure.10!
Thus, in a centralistic state with a capital city the
credibility of staging a revolution and its success
is, when other factors are the same, higher than that in
any other kind of polity. This makes attempts at staging
revolutions more likely. By adding a capital city to an
already centralistic polity, chances of such revolutionary
crisis were increased in Ethiopia.102
Djibouti Railway
The Djibouti railway, built under Menelik, as originally 
planned, turned out to carry a high percentage of Ethiopian 
international trade. 3 In fact, at present at least sixty 
six percent of this trade is carried by the Djibouti railway.104 
This fact has two aspects of significance. First, the control 
of the railway, and particularly of the area through which
Felike Gross, The Seizure of Political Power: in a Century
Revolutvons (N.Y.: Philosophical Library, 1958), p.180.
. Tllls' however, is not to say that a centralistic state 
with a capital is sure to have a revolution. There are 
many other factors which come into shaping the milieu and 
thus may enhance or limit the chances of revolution in a given society.
103 _Jones & Monroe, op.cit., pp.142-48.
104 Peter Robbs, 1Africa and the Indian Ocean' , in 
Report, May-June 1976, p.42. Africa
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it passes, became an important strategic issue (map, pp. 2-3). 
Secondly, the port of Djibouti, the international terminal 
of the line, itself became important and its control also 
became an important matter. It not only assured high transit 
revenue from the Abyssinian international trade but also 
gave a strategic command on the whole of the Horn of AFrica, 
as, in many ways, control of Abyssinian economy and thus 
its polity gives special leverage in the region. Ethiopia 
Proper for its highland topography, central location, settled 
society, advanced position in terms of stages of historical 
development and in relation to the other parts of the Horn, 
and relatively greater economic and military strength might 
serve as a promising base for expansion, at least in terms 
of influence and pressure into the rest of the area.
The enhanced importance of the Somali inhabited area
including Harar through which the railway passed, made
Ethiopia particularly obstinate as to her continued control 
105over it. For the external powers involved also, this
area became of particular concern. Thus, control of the 
railway and sphere of influence over the adjacent areas 
was one of the issues that had led to the Franco-Italo-British 
tripartite colonial arrangements of 1906.^^ During the 
Second World War and immediately afterwards, the Allies, 
the British in particular, treated this area with special care. 
Thus, while Ethiopia Proper, liberated with help of the
See also, Ch.II, pp.30-32.
This included, along with a Tripartite Agreement, an 
agreement on the railway. Jones & Monroe, op.cit., p.148.
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British forces, was soon restored to Ethiopian authorities,
this area i.e. the Ogaden, Haud and the 'Reserved Area'
was not. This separate treatment of this area and its
consequent effects have been used later by the Somalis as
one of the justifications for their irredentist claims for
its independence from Ethiopia and caused serious troubles, 
107and even war.
The enhanced importance of Djibouti also created later
complications and made the area a subject of international
10 8as well as intra-regional rivalry.
Public Welfare in Ethiopian Government
The concept of public utility and welfare introduced 
during this transitional period of modernization, particularly 
under Menelik, was something new in Ethiopian government 
planning. Not that Ethiopian emperors or individual high 
officials had never shown any concern for the welfare of 
their people at all. One can, possibly, find instances of 
such kindness from the long history of Ethiopia. But, as 
an organised, deliberate government policy, it never existed 
before. Government planning was primarily concerned with 
the continued supremacy of the imperial government, collection 
of revenues and exacting obedience, conquest and defence 
of the empire - a policy, in which the most that the public 
could expect was - protection, welfare being left to the 
individual members of the public. The modernizing regimes,
10 7 Vide'- Information Services 
supra, Ch.II, pp.23-30.
108 T/. ,Vide: Ch.II, pp.34-35.
op.cit., Ch.VII. Also,• • /
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particularly that of Menelik and subsequently Ras Tafari/
Haile Selassie took up plans and projects which mobilised
the state machinery for provision of such utilitarian and
welfare facilities as postal service, health measures,
electrical and telephone systems, education, broadcasting
system etc. for the benefit of the general public. Among
the abovementioned facilities, all but the last two were
109introduced under Menelik. The last two, under Haile 
Selassie 1.^^
The introduction of this new concept and the consequent 
reforms had dangerous consequences, from the point of view 
of the imperial, ancien regime. The taste of new amenities 
and privileges brought about, particularly among the educated 
commoners - themselves a product of these reforms, a 
'revolution of rising expectations'. This in turn, with 
the passage of time, posed a challenge to the very basic 
doctrine of state and the legitimacy of the imperial order 
of Ethiopia. It became a fundamental question, with the 
passage of time and through the questioning mind of the 
Western educated, that whether or not public owes to the 
government and the state, as a matter of right and not favour, 
such public utilities. Posing this question, in effect, meant 
a challenge to the unquestionable and absolute supremacy 
of the imperial government over the state i.e. a challenge 
to the doctrine that it is the divine Emperor's absolute right 
to dispose of it in whatever manner and for whatever aim he
Lipsky, op.cit., p.20.
Vide, also: infra, pp.159-162.
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may decide to be right. The welfare concept, an element
of the popular systems of Western Europe, was introduced 
to a polity organised on autocratic lines and thus, naturally, 
was an anomaly that could not but result in contradiction 
within the polity. Consequently, the Ethiopian imperial 
order headed for exactly what the benevolent but absolute 
monarchies of central and eastern Europe of the 
18th and 19th centuries had suffered for
similar reasons. It took time, and the results came out 
too clear only recently, particularly in the Ethiopian 
Revolution of 1974.
Apart from what has been said above, the public welfare 
concept and the associated reforms sowed seeds of more 
contradiction in a society already suffering from chronic 
contradiction, in certain other ways also. The fruits of 
the reforms, very limited as these were, could not reach
everybody in the society. The introduction of these 
fruits' could bring about radical changes in the way and 
standard of life of those few fortunates who could avail 
them. This, coupled with the fact of the 'limitations' 
of these 'fruits' resulted in a sharp division of the 
society in yet one more way: into a fortunate minority and
a jealous and disgruntled majority.
The fact that the Ethiopian monarchy was based on the 
doctrines of divine monarchy has been already discussed. 
Vide: supra3 Ch.III, pp.82-83. For the doctrines of divine 
monarchy, vide: J.N. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings 
(Cambridge, 1914).
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Of all the reforms carried out in this spirit, perhaps,
the most significantly consequential were those in the
fields of education and mass media. This aspect will be
112discussed later in this Chapter.
Periphery's Reaction to Colonial Occupation
The Peripheral societies' reaction to the colonial 
regimes, both European and Ethiopian, in general, were strong 
and hostile. As already noted, these societies had histori­
cally developed as strongly resisting overseas intrusion 
into their areas. It was only through a posture of a friendly 
protector on an equal standing, and not as a sovereign 
conqueror, that the European powers could have signed the 
various treaties with the local societies that, however, 
in effect and ultimately, had resulted in colonial subordin­
ation of these societies. As soon as the foreign authority 
became effective and was realised as such by the local 
societies, the anti-foreigner tendencies re-emerged. Thus, 
vast areas of the Somali inhabited eastern Peripherals, 
for over twenty one years, remained in a formidable state 
of rebellion led by Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, the so-called 
'Mad Mullah'. This rebellion, starting formally with the 
declaration of a jihad, at Burao in British Somaliland in
August 1899, 'spread like wild fire and became very powerful 
113in the north' and soon, 'throughout Somalia', meaning all 
112
Vide: infra, pp.159-62. Also, supra,pp.146-47.
113 Jardine, op.cit., p.42. Hess, op.cit., p.138.
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114the Somali inhabited areas. It, as viewed by a responsible
officer of the then British Colonial Office, 'had been a
thorn in the side of the British administration for [all
115these] more than twenty years'. For the officers responsible
for the administration of the British Somaliland, it was
116'seldom out of ... official thought' and no less a person
than the Secretary to the Administration of Somaliland seems
to have been driven by it into a paranoia of having been
117put to 'roasting ... [as] an infidel over a slow fire'.
The position of the Italians in their section of Somalia 
was not better. The Italian Consul at Aden, Eugenio Capello,
'who had long experience in Somalia , 118 observing the effects
of the rebellion,declared, 1906, '... our position [in Somalia]
119could not be worse'. Few months later, after having visited
the area, he felt the situation to be yet worse as he wrote,
'... not only is our present position in Somalia false, but
120it is also beginning to be ridiculous'.
114Hess, op.cit., p.134.
115 Rt. Hon. the Viscount Milner, K.G., G.C.B., of the British 
Colonial Office (during the period of the revolt), Foreword 
in Jardine, op.cit., p.vii.
116
117
118
119
Jardine,op.cit., p.16 
ibid., p .15.
Hess, op.cit., p.135.
Capello, Aden, to Foreign Minister, 20 March 1906, Archives 
Storico dell'en Ministero dell'Africa Italiana, Rome (ASMAI) 
Pos.59/4, f.59, quot. in Hess, op.cit.
120 Capello, Aden, to Foreign Minister, 15 August 1906,
ASMAI, pos.59/4, f.59, Hess, op.cit.
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The position in the Ethiopian section was not good either.
Even the very first attack by the rebels on the Ethiopian
fort at Jigjiga within only a few months of the outbreak
of the rebellion 'caused great alarm at Harar [the relevant
121Ethiopian military centre]' and a force of over sixteen
122thousand was sent to crush the rebels.
This rebellious reaction was confined neither to the
Mullah's movement nor to the areas under his influence.
The Sultanates of Mijjertein and Obbia, which have been
entities independent of the Mullah's control, usually hostile
to his regime, and technically protectorates of the colonial
powers, also, showed signs of uneasiness with their protectors
and rebellious tendencies against them. Thus, from the very
beginning, Italy's co-operation with the British against
the rebels disturbed whatever 'loose agreements' she had with
the northern Saltans. Her popularity in Obbia diminished
greatly and, at one stage, the Italians faced a threatened
12 3rebellion by the Obbians.
At the same time, the Mujjertein Sultan, 'a possible
ally against the "Mad Mullah" ... [who even] expressed his
willingness to cooperate in their [colonial powers'] plans'
124against him, also, nevertheless, 'refused to yield' to 
colonial pressures which went to the extent of even military
121
122
123
124
Hess, op.cit., p.131. 
ibid., p.130.
ibid., pp.131-132.
Hess, op.cit., pp.132-133. N
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actions including a blockade of the Sultanate's coasts and
125bombardment of its villages. His opposition to the Mullah,
finally, could only be manipulated and not forced into action
in favour of the colonial powers. The ultimate success in
126this regard was due to British diplomatic skill.
The tribes in the south, particularly the Wadan and 
the Bimal, similarly,independent of the Mullah's de facto 
regime also recurrently showed rebellious tendency both before 
and after the rise of the Mullah. In the latter case, they, 
at one stage, joined the Mullah against the colonial powers.
From as early as 1893 rebellious acts, and later, since 1903, 
widespread revolt became a constant source of problem for 
the administration in the southern Somali area including 
European strongholds along the coast, e.g. Kismayu, Merca 
and Mogadishu.
The rebellion continued, even after the decisive Italian
victory at Dadane in 1907 and pacification measures could be
abandoned not until the late 1920s, when, under the new
Fascist policy, Italy presented itself as a protector and
benefactor for the Moslem peoples of the Periphery in general,
against the Christian Core - rather than as a colonial sovereign
127in league with the Ethiopian enemies.
125
126
ibid., p .132. 
ibid., pp.132-133.
Hess, op.cit., pp.41, 45-47, 87-90, 92, 134. Eduardo 
Ruelle (Commander of the Italian gunboat Volturno's exploratory 
mission to southern Somaliland), Report, to the Italian 
Naval Minister, Zanzibar, 1 December 1893, Libro Verde, doc.83, 
pp.187-88.
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In the north, Eritrea also experienced serious revolts
and anti-colonial wars, inspired mainly, like the revolt
in the Somali areas,by the religious nationalistic doctrines
of the Sudanese Mahdists. In Eritrea, the rebels in most
cases were directly linked with the Mahdists. The existence
of anti-colonial tendencies in this area has been discussed 
12 8above. Here only one letter will be quoted which, however,
being typical of the communications of the local rebels, 
adequately reflects the existing mood in the area and the 
pattern of relationships between the rebels on the one hand 
and the colonial powers and their collaborators on the other. 
The letter, dated 29 August 1885, was sent by Mustapha Hadel, 
commander of anti-Ethiopian anti-Anglo-Egyptian rebels to 
Ras Alula, the Ethiopian governor of Eritrea. This reads 
as follows:
From the slave of God and faithfuly Mustapha 
Hadel to the king of infidels [Ethiopian king] 
to Ras Alula his devil, and to Mussa Mohammed,
Chief of the Beni Amer tribe ... This is to 
tell you that I know you said you would bring 
English troops to fight against the servants of 
the Prophet ... you say you will fight me with 
an Abyssinian army; but in this you cannot 
succeed. The Emir of Emirs, Osman Abu Bakr 
Diqna [Chief of the anti-colonial forces], 
has now decided to conquer every province, he 
came to Kassala,where all the inhabitants joined 
him (: rebelliousness on mass level), and now 
we have come down to the hills in your neighbour­
hood. Therefore come out and meet us. Do not 
delay but if you cannot come and are afraid then 
let me know by the bearer of this and I will come 
to you with my ansars [literally: volunteering
assistants; troops], and will fall upon you and 
utterly exterminate and destroy you and all
128 Vide: supra, pp.115-17.
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those who do not believe in God and his 
Prophet, and all your souls shall go down 
straight away to hell.129
The situation was so grave that the Ethiopian Governor,
even after a decisive victory in the battle of Kufit
following the above letter, could not dare to re-enter his
own capital and base in Asamara without
sending a Muslim Sheikh to warn all the 
rebels to obey the Mudier [Governor] of 
Kassala, that is to say not to obey the 
King of Abyssinia whom he serves, but the 
[local] ally ... 130
Less noted but significant are the facts of similar 
tendencies of anti-colonial hatred and rebellion in such 
other parts of the Peripheral belt as the south and south­
western Oromo lands and the Peripheral areas close to the 
Core like Wollo. Thus, the anti—Ethiopian anti-European 
Mahdists were particularly active amongst the people in such 
south and south-western parts of Ethiopia as Kaffa and Goffa. 
Obviously, they had found the area particularly fertile for 
their anti-Ethiopian anti-colonial rebellion. The people 
in these areas were regarded, by the Mahdists, as put in 
one of their handouts, as 'friends and brothers'.131 During 
the same period, areas close to the 'Core' in the north 
saw recurrent rebellions amongst the Wollo, who
held ... their hatred of the conqueror, 
in common with their 'love of independence'
F.R. Wingate, Mahdism and the Egyptian Sudan (London, 1891), 
pp.250-51 quot. in Gabre-Selassie, op.cit., p.177.
130 Gabre-Selassie, op.cit., p.178.
131 Ibrahim Fawzi, Al Sudan bayn yaday Ghurdun Wa-kitshanar 2
(Cairo, 1901-2), p.120, cited in Gabre-Selassie, op.cit.,
p.159, fn.l.
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and the districts of Crerfa, Rique and Woreqalu became
'centres of dissent'. The jihad, proclaimed 'as a pretext
for a politically based revolt', spread along with the
disciplines of its leader, Tolha ben Gieafer, over more distant
132Moslem areas amongst the Galla and the Gurage.
It is desirable here to make two points. First, it is
true that in all the abovementioned rebellious areas there
have also been forces that joined the colonial forces. Thus,
for example, the Sultan of Geledi, chiefs of the Shidle,
Hawadleh and Mobilen, the Warsangli Sultan Mahmoud bin Ali
Shirreh, Abdulla Shahari, Musa Fara et al in Somaliland,
Ras Mikael in Wollo, Chiefs Musa Muhammad and Muhammad al-Fil
of the Beni Amer in Eritrea, had, one time or other, fought
13 3against the rebels' cause. But this should not lead to
doubts as to the conclusions we derive from the facts of 
the widespread tendencies of anti-colonialism and rebellion 
in those areas in general. No rebellion can claim a total 
support of people whose interests it claims to serve. The 
acts of anti-foreigner rebellion were widespread and not 
localised; were recurrent; and the calls for such action 
were made through an appeal to mass sentiments against the 
out-group and were popular amongst the masses - as in contrast 
to the loyalist efforts, which rested, mainly on the manipu­
lation of personal and dynastic rivalries and concerns of 
concrete immediate self interest - and usually, popular less 
among the general masses and more with the nobles and groups
T. Noldeke, Orientalische Shizzen (Berlin, 1892), cited 
in Gabre-Selassie, op.cit., p.195. Gabre-Selassie,op.cit., 
p .196 .
133 Gabre-Selassie, op.cit., pp.177, 196. Hess, op.cit., p.90 
Jardine, op.cit., pp.78, 183-186, 256-258.
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immediately involved in the particular rivalries. This
suggests that the hatred against the out-group and rebellious
tendencies represented the general pattern of behaviour of
the societies involved, while acts of loyalty to such out-
134groups were mere exceptions.
Secondly, the various revolts and similar acts as well 
as acts of loyalist nature have been attributed to different 
motives and different causes by different writers. Inter­
pretations are controversial in this regard. But the fact 
remains that whatever be the motives and causes, revolts 
and similar acts took place, hatred against the out-group 
and rebellious tendencies were visible, and these were wide­
spread throughout the Peripheral areas. This strengthens the 
already noted support for the proposition that the Peripheral 
societies tend to have a strong tendency to resist out-groups, 
and to rebel against external, particularly overseas colonial 
control. The above discussion also reconfirms the proposition 
that the Peripheral societies are inherently in conflict 
with the Ethiopian Core and any attempt by the latter at 
controlling the former, or any part thereof, is likely to 
meet the rebellious reactions.
The various rebellious and other acts of the type in the 
Peripheral areas during this period, and measures taken to 
counter them have been dealt with in some detail, in Jardine, 
op.cit.; Gabre—Selassie, op.cit.; Hess, op.cit. However, these 
writers, particularly the first one, have their own bias and 
their books are useful more as a source of information than as 
a reliable presentation of history. The bias, given the 
personal background of the writers concerned, is natural. 
Jardine himself, as he tells in his book, was directly involved 
in the counter-insurgency in Somalia. Gabre-Selassie is from 
the Ethiopian imperial dynasty. Vide: Jardine, op.cit.,
Edward Ullendorf, Preface to Gabre-Selassie, op.cit., p.vii.
156
Menelik to Haile Selassie I: A Test Case Period
The next and the last of the great imperial statesmen 
vvhe may be called the forerunners of modern Ethiopia, was 
Ras Tafari, who assumed power as Regent to Empress Zauditu 
in 1916 and formally became Emperor Haile Selassie in 1930.
The period of transition from Menelik's rule to that of 
Haile Selassie I is marked with events which simply reaffirmed 
the pattern of events concerning succession, as well as the 
socio-political tendencies, deeply set in the body politic
t
of Ethiopia Proper.
The period following Menelik as an effective Emperor,
was marked with 'political confusion' and 'determined intrigues'
and Ras Tafari/Haile Selassie could become the supreme authority
only after going through four serious revolts (1916, 1928, 
i 351929, 1930). This reaffirms that succession in Ethiopia
is likely to involve a transitional period of crisis.
At the same time, events of this period provide yet 
another confirmation also to the proposition that any effort 
at imposing a system on Ethiopia that does not confirm to 
her natural tendencies that evolved through ages is likely 
to fail in the face of strong opposition from within. Menelik 
was succeeded by his nephew, Lidj Yassu, who having been 
attracted to Islam and converted, proceeded to turn Ethiopia 
into an Islamic state. In effect, he, like one of his 
predecessors, Armah (7th century), was trying to impose upon
Menelik lost effective control of the imperial affairs 
during his last days, i.e. the first decade of the present 
century. For details of the succession struggle leading 
to Ras Tafari/Haile Selassie's accession, vide: Leonard 
Mosley, op.cit.
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the Ethiopian polity what was in contradiction with its 
basic socio-political tendencies that partly originated 
from, and went with the Coptic Christian value system.
While he found his support amongst the Peripheral and 'lesser' 
peoples, the Core itself rose against his regime and over­
threw him. Thus, when the Emperor was away to Jigjiga, in 
the Periphery, to gather supporters and troops to aid him 
in his pro-Islamic struggle, the Shewan nobility marched 
into Addis Ababa, and proclaimed Zauditu, daughter of Menelik, 
Empress, and Ras Tafari Makonnen, regent and heir presumptive. 
The archbishop confirmed their decision and excommunicated 
Lidj Yassu, who then fled into the Danakil region.136
Failure of Lidj Yassu's efforts, like similar results 
ensuing from similar efforts at going against the tendencies
of the polity, confirmed the proposition that such attempts
1 77are likely to fail.
Apart from affirming the strength of Ethiopia's socio­
political tendencies, the failure also affirmed, once more, 
the strength of the pattern of relationships on the Horn: 
the dichotomy had remained insurmountable as the effort of 
unification of the Core and the Periphery like other particular
1 o o
similar efforts, utterly failed.
136
137
Lipsky, op.cit., p.21. 
See also, supra3 Ch.II, p .36-39 .
Only three times in history the whole of the Horn came 
close to something like complete unification under a single 
sovereign system: in the 16th century, under the Adalite
forces of Ahmad Gran; in around 1916, under Lidj Yassu; 
and in late 1930s and 1940s, under first the Italians, and 
then, the British.
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The Core-Peripheral struggle within Ethiopia did not
cease even after Lidj Yassu's failure. Soon after the
replacement of Lidj Yassu by Zauditu, rebellion broke out
in such Peripheral areas as Arussi, Semyen, Wolkait, Wo.jju,
Dessye, Pinor, Dola and the Wollo territories - against
the Core. Both Moslem and pagans of these Peripheral areas
139rose against the Christain Highlands. Such tension between
forces based on the Peripheral areas and those on the Core 
continued in the subsequent years and flared up into violent 
clashes, whenever the suppressed forces on the Periphery 
could perceive an opportunity to revolt. Such opportunities 
were continuously sought after and presented by internal 
conspirations and external interference.^^
Haile Selassie I
Ras Tafari, Haile Selassie,^   ^purused the policies 
outlined by Tewodoros and put into effect as an overall 
broad, vigorous movement with some success, for the first 
time, under Menelik. If these policies started under 
Tewodoros and Yohannes like a rudimentary spring, under 
Menelik they turned into a forceful river and continued
Leonard Mosley, op.cit., p.114.
14 0 Mosley (op.cit.) deals with this tension in some details 
throughout his book. Also, vide: infra, pp.166-68.
It is very difficult to separate his virtual rule as 
Regent, Ras Tafari (1916-1930) and formally acknowledged 
reign as Emperor, Haile Selassie I (1930-1974), particularly 
in terms of policy trends. Thus, no such distinction will 
be made in this work in discussing the policies pursued by 
him and, he will be referred, in this connection, now onwards, 
as Haile Selassie irrespective of the policies being 
initiated during his regency or the imperial reign.
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through the reign of Haile Selassie. Haile Selassie 
introduced nothing new of significance to the essence of 
the course of history of his country. He advanced the same 
trend signalled by Tewodoros and ably set in motion by 
Menelik. The range of internal reforms as well as external 
links and activities were broadened, but the basic principles 
and characteristics of the trend remained the same. In 
short, Haile Selassie was to Menelik in the history of modern 
Ethiopia what King Frederick the Great was to Frederick 
William the Great Elector in the history of modern Germany.
He consolidated the achievements of his predecessor, and 
built upon the foundations laid by him. Thus, though very 
long (fifty eight years) and eventful, his regency and reign1* 
will not be dealt with in any great detail in this work. 
However, a few aspects of this period require mention. First 
of these aspects is the reforms in the fields of education 
and mass media.
14 2Haile Selassie took education as 'a prime concern'.
His interest in education may be gauged from the fact that 
he served as his own Minister of education. ^ ^
Traditionally education in Ethiopia was a concern of 
the Church and theological in nature. The very fact of 
establishing a secular ministry of education and putting 
it under the direct control of the State, represented by 
the Emperor, indicates the secular direction of the policy 
as regards education. This secularization of education
Andrew Jaffe, Haile Selassie's remarkable reign/The 
Emperor at 78 seeks to keep up with forces of change, Africa 
Report, May 1971.
143 Luther, op.cit., p.51, fn.6.
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coupled with the policy of its universalization in terms of 
access to academic institutions, contributed, in the long 
term, to the revolutionary forces in a serious way. 
Secularization of education meant, in effect, its Western­
ization, essentially leading to inclusion of Western ideas 
in its substance. These Western ideas, be these liberal, 
democratic or radical, are based on the concept of popular 
sovereignty and popular rights. The newly educated, thus, 
in most cases, came out as disgruntled idealists feeling a 
need for change. The policy of universal right to access
to education meant free education and an unrestricted entry
144to the institutions for all. Many from the less privileged
sections of the population could have access to these 
revolutionary ideas. These young people, with genuine reasons 
to be disgruntled, now having been awakened to this fact 
by these ideas, became a potential base for genuine revolu­
tionary efforts. It is no wonder that the Revolution of 1974
started with agitations at schools and other academic 
145institutions. Then, while the policy of universality
of access to education gave a sense to all Ethiopians of 
a right to this access - due to lack of resources and 
efficiency as well as naturally urban orientation of the city­
dwelling policy-makers, not all of them could receive adequate 
facilities for this education. This brought in a sense of 
alienation and anger amongst the areas with lesser facilities
My. interview with Fessahai Abraham, exile from Ethiopia, 
Sydney, May 1978.
145
ibid. Also, my interview with Rowie Dillon, Australian 
volunteer nurse in Ethiopia, 1973-74; Sydney, May 1978.
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for the academic institutions, particularly the countryside.
This anger was more prominent, amongst the educated section -
the students and the teachers - in short, the intelligentsia
or the thinking section of the less privileged people.
This section could, and, in the final run did, trigger
agitations and uprisings. The agitations that led to the
Revolution of 1974, not surprisingly again, had started in
the rural areas, in the shape of the rural institutions'
demands for parity with those of the cities, in terms of 
146facilities. The education policy, thus, in a way,
intensified the already existing contradiction between the
147country and the city.
The introduction of a broadcasting system, under Haile 
Selassie, had a somewhat similar impact. With this, radio 
sets became increasingly common in the country and these sets 
would catch broadcasts not only from local stations but also 
from stations in various other sources - meaning that 
the people were left, to a greater degree, susceptible to 
broadcast from foreign countries. As a consequence, it made 
it very easy for people in one part of the country to know 
of the privileges enjoyed by people in another part; 
similarly, this enabled the Ethiopian masses to know of the 
privileges enjoyed by the peoples in other countries. This 
resulted in an intensification of the internal contradiction
Interviews with Abraham and Dillon, op.cit.
14 7 Vide: supra, pp.141-42.
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on a regional level as well as a 'revolution of rising 
expectations' throughout Ethiopia, in general. These 
expectations could not be sufficiently met, due to reasons 
already noted and *thus resulted in increased dissatisfaction, 
i.e. increased potential for conflict and revolutionary 
crisis. The broadcasts from such neighbouring radical 
sources as Egypt, Sudan and later,Somalia along with Ethiopia's 
own broadcasts, did for the masses what the policy of secular 
universal free education did for the students and the 
educated.. Liberal and even radical ideas reached the masses 
and affected the psychological milieu in a way as to be 
relatively more conducive to conflict and revolutionary crisis. 
Somali broadcasting went as far as directly inciting the 
Somalis inhabiting areas under Ethiopian control, into secession­
ist uprising. These Somalis, now with radio sets, could 
listen to the broadcasts and be affected.
Haile Selassie, proceeding ahead with the policy of 
building up relations with the overseas European powers, 
aspired for, and succeeded in obtaining a seat for Ethiopia 
in the League of Nations. Though nothing new in terms of 
Ethiopian policy orientation, the event was significantly 
novel in terms of implications and consequences. It had
reaching effects, both on a global level as well as for 
Ethiopia and the Horn.
This was the first time that a non-white underdeveloped 
state was formally accepted into the comity of nations.
Since there is no scope for a detailed discussion of the
l
Slofoal implications of developments on the Horn in this work,
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this aspect will not be discussed here any further. For
Ethiopia herself, membership in the League provided her with
an international forum to be heard at, in such times of
distress as that following the Italian invasion and occupation
of the country in 1935-36. This made it possible on her part
to attract some international support and to be treated as
14 8one of the Allied powers during this episode. This was
significant, as it meant not only a kind of guarantee for
her independence after liberation - instead of being put under
trusteeship like other colonies of the vanquished powers,
but also a claim to the administration of territories liberated
from such powers, particularly such adjacent territories
liberated from Italy as Somaliland and Eritrea. Ethiopia
149did advance such claims, on both the territories.
Though she failed in the case of Somaliland, in that 
of Eritrea, ultimately, she succeeded. The United Nations 
put Eritrea under Ethiopian administration in 1952. This 
aspect was significant. The very act of showing an interest 
to administer Somaliland only added to the traditional Somali 
suspicion of Ethiopian ambitions against their interests, and 
thus strengthened the factor of Somali-Ethiopian contradiction 
on the Horn. The putting of Eritrea under Ethiopian adminis­
tration facilitated, later, the complete incorporation of
Vide: Mosley, op.cit., p.285. This, however, was not 
without opposition from within the British administration, 
ibid., pp.273-285.
149 Ethiopia's claim to Eritrea was advanced as a claim for 
'compensation to Ethiopia for her invasion by Italy in World 
War II' and Haile Selassie had laid claims on Somalia also. 
Anonymous, 'From the pages of Eritrean History: the Eritrean
Question in the U.N. in 1950' in Eritrea in Struggle/News 
Letter of Association of Eritrean Students in North America , 
Vol.II, No.9, June 1978, p.4.
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the territory into the Ethiopian empire, thereby giving
rise to Eritrean resentment and the consequent insurgency.
By being able to be considered as an Ally, Ethiopia
could manage to receive some of the spoils of war, from the
ex-Italian territories. Apart from Eritrea, she also regained
the Ogaden as well as received new territories of the Somali
inhabited Haud. The Ogaden and the Haud have later caused
serious problems, including secessionist movements, and
15 0irredentist wars between Somalia and Ethiopia.
The entry into the League of Nations, and later, as
a consequence of that, her emergence as the most prominent
indigenous diplomatic power on the continent, gave Ethiopia
the status of the doyen of the African states. This status
was significant in two ways. First, it gave Ethiopia an
extra edge of diplomatic strength vis-a-vis the Periphery,
to counter which, the Peripheral societies had to seek such
'respectable' links as those with the Arab world or the
socialist bloc. Given the strength of both Arab and radical
states in Africa, a special link with the Arab World and a
recognised championship of the socialist cause could give
such an extra amount of diplomatic strength, that could
possibly balance the 'extra edge' enjoyed by Ethiopia for
other reasons. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that
Somalia, obviously not Arab and hardly Marxist in terms of
social psychology, became an Arab League member as well as
151the most vigorous champion of Marxism on the continent.
150 Vide: Ch.II, pp.22-32.
151 This is, however, not to suggest that these considerations 
were the only or certainly the cause behind Somalia's Arab 
oriented and socialist policy.
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The Eritrean struggle also identified itself with the 
Arab world and became increasingly Marxist in rhetoric. 
Djibouti also, immediately after independence, applied for 
membership of the Arab League. These affiliations in turn 
strengthen the pattern of Core-Peripheral contradiction as 
well as bring in external factors in the region's affairs. 
Both increase the region's conflict potentials.
15 2Italo-Ethiopian Struggle of 1934-41
Another aspect of importance of this period was the 
Italo-Ethiopian struggle that started in 1934 and culminated 
with the liberation of Ethiopia in 1941.
From the view point of this work, the most important 
aspects of this struggle are the local reasons behind its 
outbreak, its geopolitical as well as strategic nature and 
its consequences.
The struggle started with a dispute involving the 
crossing of an international boundary to use the few wells 
around Wal Wal,in the Somali country. Given the topography 
and the local way of life, as already seen in the previous
It is more common, while discussing this point of history, 
to refer to the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-36, as if the 
fighting started in 1935 and ended in 1936. It is true 
that full scale fighting that may be termed as a 'war' in 
the conventional sense, did start in 1935 with 'an Italian 
invasion [of Ethiopia] on October 1935 and lasted seven 
months' ending with 'the formal annexation of the country' 
on 9 May 1936. But, actually, fighting had already started 
at Wal Wal on 5 December 1934 and continued, in the guerrilla 
form, even after the 'formal annexation'. Thus, it is more 
appropriate to look at the phenomenon as a military struggle 
stretching from 1934 to 1941.
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chapter, any boundary dividing the Somali country is 
likely to affect the normal life in the area and thus 
bring about contradiction. The fact that the struggle 
did break out with a dispute involving the crossing of 
the boundary to use water across it confirms that particular 
proposition about the conflict potentials inherent in the 
boundaries cutting across the Somali country. It has been 
argued that the Wal Wal water right dispute was only a 
pretext, used by 'the Italian Fascist government, determined 
to create a casus belli', and that the war had other, more 
serious reasons behind it. Not denying these arguments, 
though some of them may be controversial, one can still 
see some point in the capability of a minor dispute on use 
of water from a few wells across the imposed boundary, to 
lead, even if only as a pretext, to a full fledged war.
Geopolitically speaking, the Italo-Ethiopian struggle 
was, apart from being an imperialist war of expansion on 
Italy's part on the global level - also, on the regional level, 
a struggle between the Core i.e. the Ethiopian Empire and 
the Periphery, i.e. the Italian colonies of Eritrea and 
Somaliland. The fact that local Peripheral population, 
in the form of regular troops and otherwise, took an active 
part in the war against Ethiopia is also significant in 
this respect. In fact, in cases, especially in the crucial 
initial conflict at Wal Wal, the local people's enthusiasm
153
153 Vide: supraj Ch.II, pp.25-27.
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in the struggle against the Ethiopians was significantly 
greater than that of their Italian commanders and adminis­
trators. Equally significant was the pro-Peripheral stance 
of Italy's colonial policy in her treatment of Ethiopia.
It was not just an Italian war launched from the Periphery, 
annexing Ethiopia. It was as much a regional war of the 
body politics of Eritrea and Somalia, including of course, 
and inevitably, the component of Italian administration -
against that of Ethiopia - as an Italian international war
154of colonial expansion.
Thus, the Italo-Ethiopian struggle of 1934-41, once 
again confirmed the Core-Peripheral conflict pattern of 
relationships on the Horn of Africa (map),
Strategically, the war very soon became a subconventional, 
guerrilla war. This meant, the war for the most part, was 
not a non-political functional operation of the relative 
organ of the state - as it is normally in the case of a 
conventional war - but, a political war, with the active 
participation of the people within Ethiopia. In contemporary 
jargon, it may be termed a 'people's war'. This signifies 
the strength of the anti-foreign tendencies and obstinate 
love for independence of the Ethiopian people, to which 
reference has already been made.
It also is interesting that the Peripherals, notably 
the Somalis, who themselves had been in constant rebellion
For a discussion on this struggle, vide: A.J. Barker, 
The Civilizing Mission: The Italo-Ethiopian War (London,
1968); Mosley, op.cit.; Thomas M. Coffey, Lion by the 
Tail/The Story of the Italo-Ethiopian War (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1974). Significantly, the Galla (Southern 
Periphery) also helped the Italians against Ethiopia. Mosley, op.cit.
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in anti-foreign uprisings against the European occupation
until very recently, and could be crushed only with much
difficulty and only as late as 1927, generally cooperated
with the Italians at this point. This also may serve to
confirm the strength of the pattern of the Core-Peripheral
struggle. However, this also suggests the ease with which
one can play upon the general hatred of the foreigners
amongst the Peripherals, notably the Somalis. In fact,
it is the use, by the colonial powers, of this factor of
the Peripheral behavioural tendency that played a crucial
part, along with others (especially these people's reverence
for religion), in bringing about the final defeat of the
formidable anti-colonial rebellions in the different parts
155of the Periphery, including both Somalia and Eritrea.
In terms of consequences, the Italo-Ethiopian struggle
caused fundamental damage to the office of the Emperor.
The effects of this on that office in Ethiopia was similar
in some way to that of the Second World War on that office
in Japan. For the first time, the Emperor, some kind of
156a God incarnate in his own times, was seen so publicly 
and so obviously to be utterly humiliated in the hands of 
mortals, that, again, of the 'lower kind', the 'ferengie'. 
Notwithstanding the publicity the Ethiopian Emperor received 
during his exile and the international stctture that went 
with that - at home, his unquestionable 'divinity' was hurt. 
Though he still remained, as observed as late as in 1971,
------------------------ I
155 Vide: supra, p.151. The reverence for religion was mani­
pulated by the colonial counter-insurgency authorities against 
the rebellion. Vide, alsoi Jardine, op.cit.
156 Vide: supra, pp.82-83.
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15 7’something like God' with the general population, he 
was perhaps no more seen to be as inviolably divine in 
himself as he was traditionally regarded. More important, 
with the educated,including an important section of the 
elite, he was proven to be violable by and, given the 
right circumstances, which can be created - even subject 
to worldly forces. These realizations, shaking the abstract 
but ages long and thus, strongly entrenched restraints of 
culture and value - with the force of the tangible 
and concrete proof, strengthened the conviction and commitment 
to the need as well as credibility of change in favour of 
populism in Ethiopia - with the educated in particular, 
and further prepared the grounds for initiatives in that 
field - with the population in general.
Effects of European colonialism
It has been seen that European colonialism had, though 
with much difficulty, entrenched itself in the Peripheral 
areas, excepting those left to the Ethiopians, by the middle 
of the 1920s. The Peripherals left to the Ethiopians 
i.e. those in the Ogaden and the Oromo lands, also, eventually, 
came under European control since 1935 - first under the 
Italians, and later, the British. The impacts of the 
colonial rule in the area, in spite of its briefness, were 
great and significant. Apart from the widespread manifestation 
of anti-colonial hatred, confirming this aspect of the
157 Jaffe, op.cit.
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societies' behavioural traits, and strengthening it, as 
well as organisation and conversion of that into modern 
nationalism, the colonial period had other significant 
consequences also. For one thing, it changed the landscape 
of the area as well as the quality of life therein. The 
Italians, like their Roman ancestors everywhere, were great 
road builders and constructors of public utilities like 
schools, hospitals and other public buildings.
The British, who initially held only a section of the 
whole area and later succeeded (temporarily) to the entire 
Italian East African Empire of the Horn- in pursuance of 
their welfare oriented colonial policy and in view of 
the military necessities and strategic importance of the area 
during the Second World War, followed in this respect (road 
building etc.), in the footsteps'of the Italians. The 
French, as already noted, concentrated most of their energy in 
the area in the building up of communications including the 
Djibouti railroad and the Djibouti port. In short, the 
European colonial regimes resulted in the building up of 
better and faster communication systems. This factor
helped integrate various sections of the relevant societies 
and thus forge their respective nationalisms. As the 
European colonialism had a longer period of functioning 
in the Peripheral areas than in the Ethiopian Core, and, as 
the lowland and coastal character of the Peripheral areas 
made them more suitable as well as more immediate a target 
of communications build-up, these works of construction were 
greater in extent in the Periphery than in the Core. This
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meant that the integrative impact of these works were 
greater in the Peripheral lowlands than in the highlands 
of the Core. Thus, the constructions integrated, primarily, 
the Peripheral groups into each other rather than integrating 
them into the Ethiopian imperial system centred at the Core's 
highland polity. This strengthened the bases of Peripheral 
nationalisms, particularly Somali, also Eritrean, and 
potentially Afari, as well as the relevant irredentisms.
While communications have obvious integrative effects, 
hospitals, schools, and administrative buildings also help 
a function of integration of all those different groups, 
which avail themselves of these amenities. This way, 
not only the communications build-up, but also other welfare 
oriented constructions contributed to the rise of the 
Peripheral nationalisms. The rise of the modern 
nationalisms in the Periphery (Somali, Eritrean) was 
facilitated by European colonial powers not only indirectly 
through the general impact of their rule on the area but 
also directly through their encouragement in the creation 
and activities of such organisations as the Somali Youth 
League in the Somali areas and the Muslim League in Eritrea.
The strengthening of Somali and Eritrean nationalisms 
strengthened the potential for conflict between Ethiopia 
Proper and the Peripheral areas. The consolidation of Somali 
nationalism and in consequence, the growth of Somali 
irredentism, due to, among other factors, the impact of 
colonialism, contributes to the conflict potentials on the 
Horn, not only on the inter-actor level in the shape of
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Somali-Ethiopian, or more precisely, the Core-Peripheral 
contradiction ,but also on an intra-actor level, within 
Somalia. As has been already noticed, the Peripheral 
Somali society tends to be an egalitarian, open and 
pluralistic system of loosely bound units. But, the growth 
of irredentism creates a new situation in which the same 
society also tends to favour a centralistic and dictatorial 
system, since,
When irredentist objectives are given priority 
... the internal power structure of the country 
is likely to develop in such a way as to favour 
those advocating order and unity at home and 
militancy abroad. Such groups generally include 
the military ... or some single leader with 
dictatorial tendencies. There is a strong 
tendency for the military to assume political 
power in irredentist political systems. There 
is a tenedency for voluntary institutions and 
the mass media to become subservient to central 
authority, and a tendency on the part of the 
central government to resist genuinely free 
elections and a representative process that 
might change the existing power structure. 
Frequently opponents of the regime will be 
arrested and charged with espionage and 
collaboration with the enemy.
In shorts an irredentist society tends to be dictatorial,
repressive, closed and centralist.
This way, the consolidation of nationalism, through 
the growth of irredentism as amongst its highest-priority 
public policies/has put the society of the Somali state 
confronted with a basic internal contradiction. Both the 
tendencies, basic as those are, direct the Somali society 
in two opposing directions. The society has, obviously taken
Myron Weiner, 'The Macedonian Syndrome/An Historical 
Model of International Relations and Political Development', 
in World Politics, Vol.23, No.4-, July 1977 .
173
to the direction of centralistic military dictatorship in
the recent years, showing all the characteristics of an
irredentist state turned to such dictatorship as in the
above quotation. The state machinery was taken over by
the military in 1969 and since then, democratic pluralism
has been suppressed and replaced by centralistic military
dictatorship. The Somali government's policy of hanging
159on charges of 'tribalism' are but signs of centralism 
as against the autonomous functioning of the tribes which essen­
tially involves the sense of belonging and favouring one's own 
respective tribe. The curtailing of tribal autonomy and all 
that goes along with it, in the Somali context, is tantamount 
to the curtailing of pluralism, as the tribe and tribe alone 
is the basic social unit of the Somali society:
... the so-called 'dia-paying groups' ... 
composed of men descended from a common 
ancestor from four to eight generations 
removed from living men ... is ... politically 
and legally a corporation [and, the] ... 
political entity which is the basic unit of ...
Somali political structure.160
and
it is through his genealogy of birth 
[i.e. tribal or clan-based identity] 
that the individual is placed in society.
President Barre declared, on 16 July 1971, that 'anyone 
who ... promotes tribalism should be hanged', quot. in 
The Standard, Nairobi, March 1, 1978.
I.M. Lewis, 'Historical Aspects of Genealogies in northern 
Somali Structure', in R.A. Oliver and J.D. Fage (eds), The 
Journal of African History (Cambridge, The University Press, 
1962), Vol.III, No.1, p .38.
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As Somali themselves loosely put it, what 
a person's address is in Europe, his pedigree
is in Somaliland.161
Intra-Peripheral Apathy and Conflict
The above presentation of the area's history, drawing 
attention to the pattern of Core-Peripheral conflict as it 
does, however, should not convey any idea of a perfect 
unity of the Peripheral societies as a single unit in the 
dichotomy. While these societies have a degree of unity 
in terms of their objective characteristics and behavioural 
tendencies, particularly as in contrast to and in conflict 
with those of the Highlands Core, a complete and conscious 
unity of all these societies as one single political unit 
comparable to the Ethiopian polity of the Highlands could 
never become a fact. However the unity in terms of 
characteristics and tendencies, particularly in relation 
to the Highlands Core have led to recurrent occasions of 
partial and ad hoc unification of significant parts of the 
Peripheral areas and a permanent, but vague and mostly 
unconscious co-operation of most, if not all, these areas
161 ibid., p.39. For the purpose of this study, 'tribe' 
and 'clan' will be used loosely and interchangeably. The 
Somali authorities convicting on charges of 'tribalism' 
also (above), obviously, use the term in this manner, as, 
nothing like a tribal difference in the rigid sense, or 
comparable to that in the sub-Saharan context exists in the 
Somali society. However, given their size in relation to 
the whole Somali population; the extent of area they occupy; 
the extent and intensity of their mutual distinction and 
rivalry; and the basic identity of the tribe and the clan 
in their being based on lineage - the Somali clans may be 
loosely termed also as tribes.
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in actions against the Highlands. Notwithstanding
this qualified unity of the Peripheral societies in
relation to the Core-Peripheral conflict, however, these
societies have a history of conflict amongst themselves.
The most serious of the examples of such intra-Peripheral
conflict may be found in the long term conflicts between
the Galla and the Somali in course of the Somali migration
southward from northern Somalia, evicting the Galla and
later, Galla migrations from the south into the western parts
161aof the Somali inhabited area. Even within the broad ethnic 
group within the generally Cushitic Periphery, such as the 
Somali for instance, internal feud has been a matter 
of tradition. Thus, for example, even during the hey days 
of the Somali's nationalist struggle under the 'Mad Mullah' - 
one of the rare times when the normally individualistic and 
mutually apathetic Somali families could be seen consciously 
united in as broad a unit as stretching all over the Somali 
inhabited areas, Somali groups fought each other. In fact 
this intra-Somali feud had been used as one of the major 
weapons in the long and ultimately successful counter­
insurgency war against the Dervish movement. There is no 
scope here-For greater elaboration of the intra-Peripheral 
conflicts. But it is a fact that the Peripheral societies 
have had a history of recurrent conflicts amongst, and within 
them, and this, unlike . the case of intra-Ethiopian
struggles, neither for the capture of, nor under, any 
centralistic system superceding the struggling groups.
161a Starting in the 10th and the 16th centuries respectively. 
Vide: I.M. Lewis, "The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa"
in Journal of Africa H i s t o r y, I (1960), pp. 213-30. There is
some controversy regarding the patterns of Somali and Galla 
Migrations. Fcpr a view oppositing the generally accepted theory,
u i q  " T h a  n-ritino n  -F ^  -h b, ^  n ä  7 7 => a  n  C ^ r r , a ] f  » i 1-1 J 1vi de : H . S . 
Journal of
Lew s, "The Origins of the Galla anq Som 
Africa Historu. VTT T M966) nn ?7 —4 6
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This has two implications, viz. (a) the Periphery did not 
develop, unlike Ethiopia, as one centrally organised single 
polity, and (b) in this case - like Ethiopia - is likely 
to have developed a tendency for internal feuds due to 
repeated engagement in such feuds and consequently, 
form, what may be termed, a 'social habit'.
All this means that in view of its historical developments, 
the Periphery, while in relation to the pattern of relation­
ships on the Horn of Africa in general, may be treated as 
a unit in the dichotomy of the pattern - in terms of its own 
internal conditions, it is a unit only at the minimal level, 
being nothing more than a pluralistic system of a very loose, 
incomplete, vague and unconscious confederation of highly 
unindividualistic, mutually apathetic, and at times hostile, 
groups.
Conclusions
The above examination of the historical process on the 
Horn of Africa after its being brought into the global power 
political system,leads to the following conclusions:
1. The Horn of Africa tends to experience a two level 
complex of rivalries and conflicts at the same time. A set of 
global rivalries and conflicts is superimposed upon a set of intra-
regional contradictions. Though either could offset the other, both 
would have their own reasons for existence in the region 
and also their own independent basic courses.
2. It is, generally, the local pattern of relationships 
and contradictions, that generally prevails, notwithstanding 
external involvements, in shaping the inter-actor relationships
on the Horn.
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3. The Core-Peripheral balance of power tends to persist.
If and whenever this balance is fatally threatened, it 
tends to be maintained or restored through external 
intervention, invited by one or the other of the local actors.
4. The Horn's societies are characterised by a strong 
feeling against foreign, particularly European domination. 
However, as an important exception to this, the Peripheral 
societies, in general, do not tend to resent foreign 
'protection' from the immediate extra-regional neighbourhood.
5. The Peripheral societies tend to seek protection and 
support from extra-regional powers in their struggle against 
other regional actors. They tend to prefer protection from 
the immediate extra-regional neighbours, particularly the 
Moslem ones - over that from the overseas powers, but tend 
to accept the latter if the former is not forthcoming or 
satisfactory.
6. The Central Highlands tend to seek and receive assistance 
from powers beyond the Horn's immediate neigbours.
7. Ethiopia Proper tends to seek and obtain overseas 
assistance in the interest of its own policy of expansion 
into the Periphery and retaining the fruits of any successes 
for this policy. For this, Ethiopia is likely to compromise, 
if necessary, with the overseas powers, at the expense of 
the Peripheral societies. However, she tends to prefer 
direct, unilateral, military expansion over such 
diplomatic arrangements.
8. Overseas powers, if and when established on the 
Periphery, tend to fall into the regional pattern of relation­
ships and to come in conflict with the Core.
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9. The Ethiopian society has developed as militarist.
The society tends to admire the military and force. This 
provides a popular base for the military in its bid for 
power and in pursuance of its policies.
10. The military in Ethiopia provides a means of infiltration 
of the 'lesser' peoples and classes, including those from
the Peripheral areas under Ethiopian control, into the ruling 
elite. This sows seeds of contradiction within the ruling 
elite, between the political authority and the military force.
11. Administration in the Ethiopian system tends to be 
political, closer to the centre, and military in the outlying 
areas. The politico-military contradiction translates into 
Centre-Provincial conflict of interests.
12. The Ethiopian military is characterised by elitism 
and internal rivalries.
13. Modernization increases internal contradictions within 
Ethiopia. One such contradiction characterizing the state 
is that between urban and rural interests. With the rise
of a small but significant bourgeoisie, the Ethiopian society 
has developed as pregnant with potential for exploiting 
the many and ever increasing internal contradictions for 
a revolutionary change.
14. Modernization increases potential for Core-Peripheral 
conflict also, by consolidating modern, conscious nationalisms 
and, consequently, relatively stable and stronger, and 
territorially wider, states/entities on the Periphery as
well as by enhancing the value, both actual and perceived,
l
of the Peripheral areas, particularly the ones under 
Ethiopian control.
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15. Unresolved irredentist questions tend to subject the 
relevant Peripheral societies to dictatorial, centralist 
systems. This causes fundamental internal contradictions 
in these societies, adding to potential for revolutionary 
crises on the Horn.
16. The polities on the Horn tend to follow the socio­
political tendencies set by their respective long historical 
experiences. Any effort at imposing systems on them that 
do not conform to these historically evolved tendencies
of theirs, is likely to fail in the face of strong opposition 
from within their respective polities.
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION
Introduction: Potentials for Crisis on the Horn
The study of the local milieu of the Horn of Africa, 
in terms of the most permanent of its factors - the geo­
graphical setting, and its past history, leads to a number 
of conclusions, which are supported by recent develop­
ments. The study indicates that there exists a basis for 
international conflict and revolutionary crises in the 
Horn's local milieu as independent of, though not necessarily 
unaffected by or unrelated to, the dynamics of global 
politics. These indigenous potentials requuire to be 
understood as a prerequisite for an understanding of 
the strategic situation on the Horn of Africa.
A number of factors contribute to this situation: 
traditionally landlocked Ethiopia's concern for an outlet 
to the sea and an unsatisfied Eritrean demand for self- 
determination; arid resource poor Somalia's irredentism 
aiming at uniting the Somali inhabited areas lying under 
Ethiopia and Kenyan administration - and Somali-Ethiopian 
competition for natural resources in the south eastern areas 
of the state of Ethiopia; contradiction between the interests 
of the various classes, regions and ethnic groups in each 
of the three states of the region; modernization infused 
to the traditional societies in piecemeal measures instead 
of in an overall, well-coordinated movement; difference in
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the levels of historical development of Ethiopia
Proper and the Peripheral societies - all these factors 
combine to serve as bases for both international conflict 
and revolutionary crisis in the area. One other major factor 
presenting the potentials is the general pattern of naturally 
evolved socio-political behaviour and strategic relationships 
that is presented by the Horn's geopolitical setting and 
centuries of its historical development. This 'general 
pattern' which may be termed, for convenience, as 'the Pattern', 
is in fact an integrated composition of the geopolitical and 
.he historical patterns.
The Horn's 'Pattern* of Strategic Relationships
The Pattern presents the Horn's system of strategic 
relationships and behavioural tendencies as a dichotomy of 
two distinct and generally contrasting as well as conflicting 
sets of actors. These two sets roughly coincide with the 
Peripheral Lowland's Moslem, non-Amhara, generally Cushitic, 
pastoral-nomadic societies on the one hand, and the Highland's 
Coptic-Christian, Amharic and Semitic/Semitized, feudal 
societies on the other. These two sets may be termed 
conveniently as (i) the 'Periphery', the 'Peripheral Lowlands' 
or simply the 'Lowland(s)', and (ii) the 'Highland's Core', 
the 'Core' or the 'Highlands', respectively. Extra-regional 
powers, if and when they become established on either the 
Periphery or the Core, are likely to fit into the local Pattern 
in terms of the regional alignments.
Revolutionary Movements on the 
Horn of Africa: Scenes of Operation
S U D A
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EPRP
Dergue
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0(N)LF
Lesser Oromo 
Groups
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The Horn
International Boundaries
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The Core coincides with Ethiopia Proper, i.e. the 
traditional Empire of Abyssinia or Ethiopia. This includes 
the highland parts of Eritrea. The Periphery includes 
the states of Somalia and Djibouti as well as the Lowlands 
of Eritrea, the Somali inhabited parts of the present state 
of Ethiopia, her Galla inhabited southern provinces and a 
narrow fringe of her territory in the west, bordering on the 
Sudan. Given the mutually distinct and generally contrasting 
and conflicting nature of the Core and the Periphery, this 
means that there is a tendency rooted in the area's geopolitical 
and historical realities for the lowland Eritrea, the Somali 
inhabited areas of Ethiopia (e.g. the Ogaden), her Galla 
inhabited southern provinces and her Western borderlands 
to seek an identity distinct from Ethiopia Proper and 
to engage in conflict with it.
Thus the present movements in Eritrea, the Afar areas 
of the Ogaden and the southern provinces of Ethiopia for 
independence and autonomy, and the respective relevant 
guerrilla struggles have roots deep in the area's indigenous 
milieu, rather than being the creation of foreign intervention 
or of a reaction to certain recent reformative measures - 
as has been sometimes suggested.
At the same time, for example, there is nothing much 
surprising, in view of the observation made above, in the 
'dramatic' switch in the Soviet position on the Horn.
Following the Somali 'Revolution' of 1969, Soviet power 
had become well-established in Somalia on the Periphery.
The Soviet Union, through its support to the Eritrean
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Insurgents, had become a power in Eritrea, in the north of 
the Periphery, also. After the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974 
and the Marxist orientation of the Revolutionary regime, the 
USSR gradually became established on the Core. Following 
the Pattern, the Soviets had to withdraw from the Periphery. 
Like a number of other efforts in the past, the recent Soviet 
effort at unification of the Core and Periphery, this time 
under Soviet influence, also failed.'*'
Intra-Peripheral Co-operation Against the 'Core*
The various Peripheral units appear to tend to co-operate 
against the Core. Thus, it is likely that some, if not all, 
of the insurgent movements and established states on the 
Periphery will co-operate in their common struggle against 
the Ethiopian Core.
Contemporary conditions on the Horn also, like the past 
history, support this proposition. Thus the West Somali 
Liberation Front (WSLF) of the Somali inhabited areas of 
Ethiopia have won open and active support of Somalia, who went
For the past efforts at unification of the Horn, vide: supraj 
Ch.II, p. and Ch.IV, p.157. For contemporary Cuban ini­
tiated efforts (March and September, 1977) and its failure, 
vide: Keesing's Contemporary Archives , p.28402.
For a general discussion on the realignment of powers on the 
Horn, and particularly, the switch in the Soviet position, 
vide: Colin Legum, rRealities of the Ethiopian Revolution' 
in The World Today, Vol.33, No.8, August 1977. Mohammed Ayoob, 
The Horn of Africa: Regional Conflict and Super Power
Involvement (Canberra: The Strategic and Defence Studies
Centre, ANU, 1978), pp.14-18. 'Special Correspondent',
'Indian Ocean/The Spectre of Big Power Rivalry' in Africa 
Magazine (London), No.83, July 1978, pp.81-82.
184
to the extent of engaging in a full fledged war with Ethiopia,
even if at the cost of dislocating her own longstanding
international military and other alignments - in this support.
At the same time, Somalia has been supporting the
guerrilla movement in the Galla areas and also that in 
2Eritrea. On the other hand, the Eritrean and the West
3Somali guerrilla movements have been supporting each other.
Similarly, the Afar rebels of Ethiopia have found a safe
refuge and base in Somalia and Djibouti while these latter two
3 cthave shown mutual affinity.
Intra-peripheral Disunity and Conflict
However, the 'Pattern' of intra-Peripheral co-operation 
against Ethiopia does not relieve the several Peripheral 
entities of their own mutual contradictions. Thus, quite
There have been indications of Somalia's support for the 
Eritrean insurgents as well as that of these latter's trust 
in, and support for the former. For instance, cf. 'A very 
important historical fact to us [i.e. Eritrean insurgents] 
is that Somalia was the first country to allow the ELF to 
open an office. Our relations with that country remain 
excellent. We know that Ogaden is part and parcel of Somalia, 
even though it was colonised by Ethiopia': Statement by
Ahmad Nasser, leader of the ELF Revolutionary Council in his 
interview3 New Africa (London), December 1977. Also, the 
fact that on 13 September 1969, in one of their earliest 
hijackings, the Eritrean terrorists directed the pilot of 
an airliner to fly to Mogadishu - displaying a measure of the 
terrorists' trust in Somalia. Keesing's, p.23604. The 
existence of an 'Eritrea-Somali Friendship Association' also 
is known. Catherine Hoskyns, Case Studies in African Diplomacy: 
2/The Ethiopia-Somali-Keny a Dispute^ 1960-67 (Dar Es-salaam,
1970), p.19. For Somalian support of WSLF and Oromo 
'liberation' movements, vide: Africa Confidential, Vo.18, No.24, 
pp.2-4.
3 . .iCf. 'We [i.e. the Eritrean insurgents and W. Somali guerrillas]
have a very good political co-ordination at military level':
Ahmad Nasser (1977), ibid. Reportedly, the WSLF, the ALF and
the ELF-PLF concluded an agreement of military cooperation on
29 May 1978, Keesing's , p.29359.
3a. Legum, oo.cit., p.309. Anthony Hughes, Djibouti/France: The 
Reluctant Colonialist? in Africa Report3 November-December 1975.
Also.. Africa Confidential, Vol.16 No. 17, no °-4. ____________
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parallel to the likelihood of the different Peripheral
entities co-operation against Ethiopia, exists a likelihood
that these entities will experience tension, both mutually
and internally. Thus, these entities, while co-operated,
as seen above, against the common 'enemy', they took care
enough to point out or maintain their separate identity,
and signs of contradiction between as well as within some
of them have been apparent. Thus, Eritrean rebels point out
that the Eritrean struggle is completely different from that 
4of the WSLF. Similarly, Djibouti leaders have shown appre­
hension about a possible Somali absorption of their entity.
The Eritrean movement is fragmented into at least three
5public factions, a record of full fledged civil war between
My interview with Tadesse Kahsai, Eritrean in exile, Sydney, 
1977 .
5 At least six names have come to notice as representing 
Eritrean insurgent movements. These are: (1) the Eritrean
Liberation Front; (2) the Mahber Showate; (3) The Arab Front
for the Liberation of Eritrea; (4) the Eritrean Popular 
Liberation Armed Forces; (5) the Eritrean Popular Liberation 
Front; and (6) the Eritrean Liberation Front-Popular Liberation 
Forces. Vide: Keesing's, p.23306. Also, Jim Paul, Introduction
to his interview with Amdeinichael Kahsai, EPLF Central 
Committee Member, 31 August 1977, in Upheaval in the Horn/ 
Somalia-Eritrea-Ethiopia (Middle East Research & Information 
Project Report No.62), Washington D.C., November 1977, p.19.
The intra-Eritrean contradiction is contributed to, 
also, by the fact that, in terms of the 'Pattern', Eritrea 
includes parts of both the two fundamentally contrasting and 
conflicting units viz. the Periphery and the Core. Vide: supra3 
p.182. This basis of contradiction is reflected also in the 
contrasting treatment, by the Ethiopian counter-insurgency 
forces, of the highland and the lowland parts of Eritrea.
For example, when military rule was imposed on Eritrea on 
16 December 1970, certain parts of the territory were exempted. 
These parts were the primarily Christian districts, identical 
with the 'Core'. Keesing's, p.24507.
It has been observed that the 'Eritreans ... practised 
at least two major religions, and lived under markedly 
different social conditions ... the armed struggle did not unite
(cont' d)
uni a
Ethiopia p r o p e r.
ERITREA: ELF and EPLF STRONGHOLDSy
ELF strongholds 
EPLF stronghold
Areas taken over by 
the EPLF in a spectacularly 
swift campaign (1977-*70) 
and administered efficiently, 
carrying out symbolic reforms - 
but lost in the face of the 
next massive Ethiopian operation , 
0978).
LoU l-AM As
Based, primarily on: Africa Confidential, 3 March 1978; Impact International, 
9-22 September 1977; Keesing^ Contemporary Archives, pp. 29357-58.
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two of these factions, . a likelihood of renewed civil
war, in an independent Eritrea, if this ever becomes a 
6reality. Djibouti's internal system shows signs of
7contradictions between the Afars and the Issas; the Ogaden
Qstruggle has experienced at least two separate movements; 
so does the struggle in the Oromo lands, and Somalia experiences- 
as observed in the preceding chapters - a cleavage between the 
north and the south as well as other lesser contradictions.
The Peripheral's Source of Support
One may discern, from the preceding chapters, a geo­
political pattern of the region's foreign relations also. It
5 (cont'd)
all Eritrea. It was based mainly on the Muslim population 
of the coastal lowlands and took the form of a ... rebellion, 
with a strong emphasis on Muslim opposition to the domination 
of Christian Ethiopia'. The Christian highland parts of 
Eritrea also joined the secessionist movement, later. But 
still, perhaps one can discern the difference and contradiction 
between the two in the pattern of affiliation of the populations 
of the two parts with either of the two major guerrilla 
organisations - predominantly Moslem ELF and the 'Marxist' 
predominantly Christian EPLF. Vide: Jim Paul, ’Struggle in 
the Horn: A Survey ' in Jim Paul, Upheaval in the Horn. . . , 
op.cit., p.4. Also, Appendix, infra> Africa Confidential,
18 November 1977, p.3.
Vide: Appendix III, map, pp. 185-.186 , infra. For apprehensions o 
civil war in an independent Eritrea, vide: 'Eritrea Emergent',
interview with Ahmed Nasser, leader, ELF Revolutionary Council 
in Hew African, December 1977, pp.1183-1184. Also, Statement 
by Osman Saleh Sabbe, leader of the ELF-PLF in Impact Inter­
national, 26 May-8 June 1979, p.3.
7 For example the recent 'great concern' over the 'alarming 
atmosphere' due to 'upsurge of a virulent and widespread of 
atrocity in Djibouti' owing to the 'negative ethnicity ... 
eschewed between the Issas and Afars'. A.O. Chienjina,
'Djibouti on tightrope' in 'Letters to the Editor’3 Africa 
Magazine (London), No.83, July 1978, p.ll.g
WSLF, Statement (reprint) in Young Pakistan (Dacca), Vol.XXI, 
No.385, 24 August 1969.
The Hornfs Pattern of Extra-regional
Alignments
®  Ethiopia and friends (traditional/ new) 
Peripheral polities and friends 
0  Ethiopia*s first girdle of alignments 
Q  Ethiopia's second girdle of alignments
?*? Alignments doubtful/ unclear
Q  Peripherals' first belt of alignments 
[T] Peripherals' second belt of alignments
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appears that the Peripheral entities generally,seek and 
obtain protective assistance from the immediate neighbourhood 
of the region, particularly, the Moslem powers.
Thus, it should not be surprising that all the neighbouring 
Arab countries (excepting Libya and doubtfully, South Yemen) 
and Iran, with all their numerous longstanding mutual 
conflicts, seem to be in unison in supporting the Peripheral 
entities - against the Ethiopian Core. Such strange bedfellows 
as radical Iraq and Syria on the one hand and the conservative 
Gulf States and Saudi Arabia on the other, such longstanding 
rivals as the Saudis and the Iranians, such old enemies as 
Syria and Iraq, and Iraq and Iran - all have joined each 
other in assisting one or the other of the Peipheral entities - 
Somali, the WSLF, the Eritrean insurgent movements.
On the global level, the Eritrean insurgents have identified 
themselves with the Arab world and have viewed it as their 
patron, protector and spokesman. It is not without significance 
that in their earlier handouts and similar papers, the Eritrean 
insurgents called themselves as the 'Arab Liberation Front 
for Eritrea' or the 1 Arab Front for the Liberation of Eritrea' 
(emphasis mine). As an instance of the Eritrean insurgent's 
view of the Arab world as their protector and spokesman, one 
may note ELF's request on 29 December 1970 to three Arab (and 
not any other - not even any of the African) states - Libya,
Syria and Iraq, to call an emergency meeting of the UN Security 
Council to halt 'the mass annihilation of Eritrea's population'.^
ELF Statement , 29 December 1970 , cited in Keesing's, 
p.24507. Also, Keesing’s, pp.23306 and 23604.
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At the same time the ELF threatened to 'annihilate the 
Ethiopian economy' and to extend its fight - against Ethiopia 
with help of Iraq> Syria and Libya (emphasis mine).
The Arab world also acted as a protector of the Eritrean 
interests. As far back as the late 1940s and the early 1950s 
Egypt showed tendencies of treating Eritrea as a sphere of 
her influence and acted in the UN in favour of the Eritrean 
nationalists' stand against Ethiopia. Later, after these 
nationalists rose in armed struggle, the Arab world became 
increasingly active as a protector and patron of the struggle. 
Thus, Cairo, Damascus and the Sudanese towns became the 
earliest external bases of the Eritrean movements^ and Iraq 
was reported, as far back as in 1966, to be supporting the 
'Front for Liberation of Eritrea'. Egypt was reported in
12January 1967 to be sending help to the Eritrean insurgents.
By 1967 Sudan was serving as a shelter for 7,000 Eritrean
13'nationalist' refugees and by 1970, the number had risen to 
14over 16,000. Damascus has been a public base for the
15Eritrean terrorists at least since 1969. Iraq, Syria and 
South Yemen have been training Eritrean guerrillas with new
ELF Statement , 3 January 1971, cited in Keesing's, p.24507
 ^My interview with Johannes, Eritrean exile, Canberra, 1978. 
Amdemichael Kahsai, EPLF Central Committee Member, interview 
with Jim Paul, o.p.cit., p.20.
12 Keesing's, p.2166.
13 Government of Sudan, estimates, cited in Keesing's, p. 24507
14 Osman Saleh Sabi, Secretary General of the ELF: Statement
(Beirut), 13 January 1970; cited in Keesing's, p.24507.
15 Keesing's, p.23604.
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small arms on credit.  ^ Saudi Arabia and Sudan were assisting
the Eritrean insurgent in early 1977 and Sudan pledged support
to the movement at the same time. Kuwait decided, reportedly
17in May 1977, to donate $1,500,000 to the ELF-PLF. In
August of the same year, the Iraqi Baath Party warned the
USSR against assisting Ethiopia in its counter-insurgency
18war in Eritrea. By June of 1978, Iraq had threatened to
sever diplomatic relations with the USSR if it would not listen
to her warning. Even Libya, who switched against the Eritreans
at a later stage due to reasons quite peculiar to its own
particular conditions, had been sending arms to the insurgents
20as late as the middle of 1976.
The particular pattern of relationship between the 
neighbourhood of the region and its peripheral areas, appears „ 
to be true in case of the Somali areas also. The Somalis, 
like the Eritreans, have identified with the Arabs and, the 
Somali insurgents, in their earlier handouts and similar 
papers, have looked upon the Moslem states as patrors and 
protectors.
It has been observed that, for the Somalis, the 'Arabs
had been significant even before [they] joined the Arab
21League in February 1974'. During and following the War
ibid., p.24507. 
ibid., p.28635.
^  ibid., p.28636.
Facts on File, (New York: Facts on File, Inc.), 2 June 1978.
20 ibid., 24 July 1976.
21 Karl Lavrencic, Somalia/Living without, Russiat in Africa 
Magazine (London), No.83, July 1978, p.40.
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in Ogaden, Somalia sought protective assistance from the
Arab states and also from Iran. Thus, the Somali President
visited the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar and Syria during
June-August and September 1977, some of the countries more
than once - asking for protection and assitance. Another
Somali high official visited Oman and Kuwait in August, and
later, Iran in November of 1977 to the same end. The
President once again went on a tour of most of the Arab
countries and also Iran during the period between December
1977 and March 1978, with the same aim.22
All these Arab countries and also Iran responded
favourably. The Egyptian President sounding like a
'protector', spoke in February 1978, of the Horn of Africa
2 3as an Egyptian sphere of interest. At the same time Egypt
2 4indicated her will to intervene in Somalia's favour and
2 5promised to send an armoured brigade to that end. She
had already sent weapons worth $30,000,000 to Somalia by
2 6that time, by airlifts and otherwise.
Saudi Arabia also took the stance of a 'protector'. In
2 7July 1977 she assured Somalia of her security and in
Keeping's, p. 28993.
22 ibid., p.
24 Facts on File 1978, pp.99-100.
25 Africa Report, March-April 1978, p.31.
9  C-\
Keesing’s, p.28992; Facts on' File 1978, p.99; 
Report, March-April 1978, p.31.
27
Afri ca
Keesing's, p.28636.
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2 8September 1977, offered 300 million in general aid and
29$400,000,000 for arms in particular, to that end. By
March 1978, Saudi Arabia was supplying limited amount of 
30weapons and at least a substantial part of the Egyptian
31arms aid was being financed by her.
Sudan, also, like Egypt, had, by March 1978, pledged
32a brigade to Somalia's defence. Similarly, Iraq decided,
by August 1977, to contribute $700,000 and 3,000 men to the
same end. Both Iraq and Syria, traditionally hostile towards
33each other, were sending arms to Somalia.
Iran also has acted as a Protector for Somalia. On
1 January 1978, the Shah commented that Iran would not stand
idly by if Somalia were invaded, and later supplied weapons
34for Somalia's defence, supplied Somalia with anti-aircraft
guns and pilots. Even Pakistan has been reported to have
35supplied Somalia with anti-aircraft guns and pilots.
Military assistance was supplemented by economic protection 
also. Thus, since November 1977, Somalia's economic development
28
29
30
31
32
33
Facts on File, 24 September 1977, p.715. 
Keesing's, p.28636.
Africa Report, March-April 1978, p.31. 
Facts on File, 10 September 1977.
Africa Report, March-April 1978, p.31. 
Facts on File, 1 September 1977.
Keesing's, pp.28992-3; Africa Report„ March-April 1978;
also, November 1977; Facts on File, 27 January 1978.
35
Editorial: 'The Source of Somalia’s arms’ in The Standard,
Nairobi, 13 February 1978, p.4.
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planning became based on Arab aid. Symbolic of this position
is the $200 million sugar project financed by Saudi Arabia
and Abu Dhabi and the $21 million 'Rangeland Conservation
Project' to set up 'thousands of kilometres' of grazing
36reserves with a soft loan from the Kuwait Fund.
The Geopolitical Pattern of Ethiopia's Alignments
On the other hand, Ethiopia appears to tend to seek and 
obtain assistance from powers across these immediate neighbours 
of the region who support the Periphery, and particularly, 
from overseas powers. Thus again, it is not very surprising, 
that Ethiopia should seek and obtain support from both Libya 
and Isreal, two very strong in their mutual enmity, but, geo- 
politically lying beyond the cordon of the Periphery's 
apparent 'Protectors' in the immediate neighbourhood of the 
region - composed of the Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.
Tnen, beyond, the second line of the Periphery's 'Protectors' 
enveloping this (broken) line of Ethiopia's supporters, lies 
Ethiopia's own second line of sources of support: traditionally,
the West, particularly the US; and since 1974, the USSR - 
this latter's own system extending over Eastern Europe, the 
Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, and possibly, also, India 
(map, pp. 186-187).
It is interesting to note here, that Ethiopia recognised 
Israel and sought her assistance in training Ethiopian forces
Karl Lavrencic's interview with a Somali 'planner': 
Lavrencic, op.cit., p.41.
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in counter-insurgency in 1961, remarkably just after the 
establishment of the Somali Republic with its irredentist
37moves and the beginnings of the armed struggle in Eritrea.
Israelis have been alleged to also have piloted Ethiopian
3 8planes shelling in Eritrea, during the recent years.
Ethiopia's traditional affinity towards the West,
39particularly Western Europe, has already been discussed.
Following the Second World War, with the shift of the West's
centre of gravity from Europe to the US, Ethiopia became
very closely attached to the latter. She became the greatest
recipient of American military aid in Africa and received,
between 1953 and 1969, US military aid worth $147,000,000.
In early 1970s this aid was, at the rate of, on average,
4 0$12,000,000 per annum.
The Soviet position has been discussed, above, though 
only briefly.41
Global Alignments and the Local 'Pattern'
Whatever may be the system of global political alignments 
of the various entities on the Horn, these are likely to be 
determined among other things, by the local pattern of intra-
37 Keesing’s, p.2166. For the establishment of the Somali 
Republic, its irrendentism, and the Eritrean insurgency, 
videj supra: Ch.II, p.22-30, 32-33.
38
39
40
41
The Baghdad Observer, the 1978 file. 
Vide: supra, Ch.III and IV. 
Keesing's, p.24507.
Supra, p.192. For greater details, vide: Legum,
'Realities of the Ethiopian Revolution' , op.cit.; Ayoob, 
op.cit.
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regional relationships. This has been observed during the 
recent international realignment on the Horn.
Prior to the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974, the system 
of international alignment on the Horn was marked by Ethiopia's 
co-operation with the West notably the US on the one hand, 
and Somalia's friendship with the socialist states, notably 
the USSR and such other radical states as Libya and South 
Yemen on the other. With the Soviet pledge of support for 
Ethiopia after its socialist Revolution (1974), Somalia swung 
sides, broke off with the USSR, sought US support, and 
received assistance from such pro-Western sources as Iran,
Saudi Arabia and Egypt. At the same time, Ethiopia, while 
breaking off with the US - her traditional ally, built up 
a military alliance with, not only the USSR but also with 
such of her traditional enemies as Libya and South Yemen.
Ethiopia's Pattern of Internal Dove1opments
There appears to be a pattern of behavioural tendencies of
the region's entities. Ethiopia Proper tends to be a centralist 
hierarchical, expansionist polity, torn by internal rivalries
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and conflicts, both horizontally - between regional interests, 
and vertically - between classes and other interest groups 
transcending the regional limits. One important aspect of 
these internal conflicts is that within the military,owing 
to its elitism.
The polity also tends to be conservative, but to divert 
from its original course when forced, but that again, only 
to the minimum possible degree,and - to revert to its original 
course, whenever and to whatever degree possible. At the 
same time, the polity tends to be concerned with legitimacy, 
which its authorities tend to derive from identifying their 
own position and the polity's conditions with some accepted 
prototype - usually something regarded as 'the original'.
The polity also has inherent tendencies towards a constant 
succession of revolts followed by crises, particularly with 
each succession.
Thus it is not surprising to find that, these fundamental 
tendencies of the Ethiopian polity remain visible even after 
its Revolution of 1974 and its being subjected to an order, 
apparently committed to a radical change of the polity.
The polity has shown its centralist tendencies and its 
proneness to internal rivalries and conflicts of the kind 
mentioned, in the fact that the originally multiple leadership 
of the Revolution has been reduced through the above kind 
of internal rivalries into a narrow dictatorship centred on 
one single person, Mengistu Haile Mariam.42 The concern for 
legitimacy and the tendency to derive it from self-identification
42 Vide: supra, Ch.II.
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with prototypes is apparent in the efforts of the Revolutionary
regime in equating the Ethiopian post-Revolutionary conditions
43with those of the post-Revolutionary Russia.
The current counter-revolutionary moves and crises 
also are perfectly to be expected and originate from the 
indigenous 'Pattern' and milieu, rather than being due to 
any kind of foreign interference. However, this is not to 
deny that these moves and crises may be supported and 
aggravated by foreign interference, as much as they may be 
opposed and contained by the same factor.
The Peripheral's Pattern of Internal Conditions
The tendencies of the Peripheral societies appear to
be not only distinct from, but also, in many ways, opposite to
those of the 'Core' or Ethiopia Proper.. These societies
tend to be pluralistic and loosely organised. At the same
time, Somalia and Djibouti tend, simultaneously, as long as
reasons for their irredentist aspirations remain alive - to
be subject to centralised dictatorial systems. This means,
both the states, at present, suffer from fundamental internal
contradictions, presenting a likelihood of a constant struggle
for and against their present orders. This has been reflected
in contemporary developments, particularly in Somalia and
44can be expected in Djibouti also.
43
Vide: supra3 Ch.III, pp.
44
Vide: Ch.IV, pp.172-174.
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The Peripheral societies, in general, also tend to be 
strongly Islamic, which in turn, means that the Marxist regime 
of Somalia and the Marxist movements in Eritrea can expect 
continued popular support, if any - in their respective 
'terrains', only at the cost of modifying their commitment 
to Marxism in the light of the demands of the Islamic 
principles.
This proposition also finds support in the fact that
the Somali regime and the Marxist faction of the Eritrean
struggle (EPLF) seem to have realised this as a significant
truth, and have consequently modified their Marxist orientation
45accommodating Islam within its framework.
Finally, to sum up the major conclusions of the study - 
the local milieu of the Horn of Africa at present holds 
high potential for international conflicts and revolutionary 
upheavals, which may lead, even in the absence of any world- 
political contribution, to international crises. The general 
pattern of relationships and conditions identified above will 
certainly be of help in understanding not only the present 
crisis on the Horn, but also its future strategic situation.
For Somalia's position in this regard, vide: supra, Ch.II. 
For that of the EPLF, vide: National Democratio Programme 
(in Tigrinya), published by the EPLF; Translation of the 
relevant section: Fessahaie Abraham (interview, Sydney, 1979).
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APPENDIX I
BASIC STRATEGIC INFORMATION ON THE STATES 
OF THE HORN OF AFRICA1
Ethiopia:
Area: 457,000 sq.miles.
Population (estimated, early 1977): 29,330,000
Total armed forces (early 1977) : 53,500
GNP (estimated, 1975): $2.9 billion
Defence expenditure (1976): $103.4 million
Somalia:
Area: 246,000 sq.miles.
Population (estimated, early 1977): 3,335,000
Total armed forces (early 1977): 31,500
GNP (estimated, 1972): $300 million
Defence expenditure (1976): $25 million
Djibouti:
Area: 8,500 sq.miles
Population (estimated, 1976): 220,000
Defence (at independence, June 1977): Dependent of
French troops (5,000) stationed in Djibouti under 
the Franco-Djibouti Provisional Military Protocol 
of 27 June 1977. Djibouti Army being raised with 
the assistance of French military instructors 
(strength unknown).
Sources: IISS, The Military Balance 1977-1978 (London, 
1977; Moshe Sacks (ed.), WOrld Encyclopaedia of nations/ 
Africa (New York: World Mark Press, 1971); Keesing's 
Contemporary Archives (London), p.28499; John Paxton (ed.), 
The Statesman's Yearbook 1978- 79 (London, 1978) .
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APPENDIX II
COLONIAL ÄND PARTITION AGREEMENTS 
REGARDING THE PERIPHERAL AREAS OF THE HORN
A . Euro-Ethiopian Agreements:
(i) Italo-Ethiopian 'Treaty' of Ucciali, 2 May 1889.
(ii) Italo-Ethiopian 'Additional Convention', 1 October 1889.
(iii) Franco-Ethiopian 'Convention' on 'Somaliland',
20 March 1897.
(iv) British-Ethiopian 'Treaty' on 'Somaliland', 28 July 
1897 .
(v) British-Ethiopian 'Agreement' on the 'frontiers of 
British East Africa' [including south Somaliland],
6 December 1907.
(vi) Italo-Ethiopian 'Convention' on Somalia, 16 May 1908 .
(vii) Italo-Ethiopian 'Convention' on Eritrea, 16 May 1908 .
B . Intra-European Agreements:
(i) Italo-British 'Agreement' on the 'Spheres of Influence 
in East Africa', 5 May 1884.
(ii) Franco-British 'Agreement' on 'the Somali Coast', 
February 1888.
(iii) Italo-British 'protocol' on the 'Spheres of Influence 
in East Africa', 24 March 1891.
(iv) Italo-Franco-British Tripartite 'Agreement' on 
'Abyssinia', 13 December 1906.
(v) Italo-Brtisih Exchange of Notes on Sheikh Mohammad
Abdille Hassan [the so-called 'Mad Mullah'], 19 March 
1907.
C . Supplementary Instruments:
(i) British-Ethiopian 'Agreement' on 'The Ogaden and
Reserved Area', 19 December 1944. i
(ii) British-Ethiopian 'Agreement' on 'Britain's Withdrawal
from Ogaden and Reserved Area1' , 29 November 1954.
(iii) UN Resolution on Eritrea, 1952.
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APPENDIX III
REVOLUTIONARY1 MOVEMENTS ON THE HORN OF AFRICA
Apart from the two "revolutionary" organisations,
2 3the Dergue and the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC),
in power in Ethiopia and Somalia respectively, there are
at least eighteen other, anti-government movements on
the Horn of Africa. These are :
1. Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP)
2. Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army (EPRA)
3. Twentienth Century Bolsheviks (TCB)
4. Ethiopian Revolutionary Army (ERA)
5. Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU)
6. Ethiopian People's Democratic Revolutionary Party 
(EPDRP)
7. Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF)
8. Oromo (National) Liberation Front (ONLF/OLF)
9. West Somali Liberation Front (WSLF)
10. Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF)
11. Somali Democratic Action Front (SDAF)
12. Front for the Redemption of Somalia (FRS)
13. Afar Liberation Front (ALF)
14. People's Liberation Movement (MPL)
'Revolutionary', here, is defined broadly as one committed 
to a violent change of the status quo and would refer 
primarily to anti-government forces.
2 Literally, the "shadow"; refers to the ('Revolutionary') 
Armed Forces do-ordinating Committee. Tom J. Farer, War 
Clouds on the Horn of Africa - A Crisis for'Detente (New 
York and Washington, D.C. : Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1976), p. 15
3 ibid, p . 93
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15. Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)
16. Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF)
17. Eritrean Liberation Front-Popular Liberation 
Forces (ELF-PLF)
18. Eritrean Liberation Front-Democratic Forces 
(ELF-DF)
While the greatest numbers of the above anti­
government guerrilla movements are ethnocentric nationalist, 
aiming at independence (e.g. ELF, ALF) or at autonomy 
(e.g. TPLF, ONLF), most of the major ones are Marxist 
in inelination (EPRP, EPRA, EPLF). Two of the major 
movements aim at liberal democratic ideals (EDU, SDAF).
Following is a breif resume of whatever introductory
4information could be available on the above underground 
movements on the Horn.
EPRP : The major Marxist underground opposition to the
Ethiopian Government in Ethiopia Proper. Regards the
Dergue's concept of a Revolution through military
Sources : Africa Confidential (London), 4 November 1977, p.8; 
7 October 1977, p. 4; 18 November 1977, pp. 1-3; 9 September
1977, p. 6; 3 March 1978, p. 3. Colin Legum, "Realities of 
the Ethiopian Revolution" in World Today (London), Vol. 33, 
No. 8, standard (Daily, Nairobi), 19 December 1977; 1 March
1978. Impact International (London), 9-22 March 1979,
p. 4; 12-25 May 1978, p. 8; 23 December - 12 January 1977.
My interviews with Kahsai, Dillon, Alazar, Abraham,
Yohannes (for detailed reference, vide : infra, Select 
Bibliography, p. 212); also, with Preston King, Sydney 1978 
and Ansera from Somalia, Sydney 1978. Keesing's Contemporary 
Archives (London), 1969-1979. BBC Summary of World 
Broadcast, 1974-78. WSLF Statement, quot. in Young 
Pakistan (Weekly, Dacca), Vol. XXI, No. 385, 24 August 
1969 . EPLF handouts , 1977-78 . News Letter of the 
Eritrean for Liberation in North America, 1977-78.
Africa Report, 1973-1978. *
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government as "adventurism", and aims at re­
establishment of a Parliamentary government as a 
prerequisite for the creation of cadres for a 
genuine Revolution. Strategically, seems to rely 
mainly on urban terrorism. . Its subscription to the 
idea of class struggle constitutes the main reason of 
its clash with the other major underground movement 
operating in Ethiopia Proper, the EDU.
EPRA : The military wing of the EPRP. Operates 
primarily in East Tigre and maintains close relations 
with the EPLF.
TCB : Breakaway (1978) from the EPRP due to strategic 
doctrinal controversy; disapproves of the EPRP-EPRA's 
coup d'etat strategy, and professing the Maoist line, 
wants a protracted people’s war in the countryside in 
Ethiopia.
ERA : Much smaller compared to the Horn's major 
underground movements (EPRP-EPRA, TPLF, ELF, EPLF). 
Operates in the north of Ethiopia.
EDU : The only major trans-Ethiopian underground 
organisation other than the EPRP-EPRA. Operates as 
an umbrella organisation seeking to unite all opponents 
of the military regime on a national front basis for a
Constituent Assembly. Is regarded as conservative and 
suspected of being royalist due to its refusal to commit 
itself against any effort at a royal restoration; its 
leadership’s containing members from the royal family
(etg. Gen, Nega Tegagne, grandson-in-law of Emperor
Haile Selassie); its supporters including such persons as
203
Ras Mangasha Seyum (traditional King of Tigre) and Ali 
Mirreh (exiled Sultan of the Afar). The movement's 
position is that it wants to avoid predetermination and 
would accept whatever system (royal or otherwise) a 
popularly elected Constituent Assembly would decide 
upon. It has contacts with the royal family in exile; its 
chairman, Gen. Yasu Mangasha had resigned as Army Chief 
of Staff under Haile Selassie in opposition to imperial 
policies.
The organisation carries out guerrilla activities 
mainly in the northwest of Ethiopia Proper, in Begemdir, 
West Tigre and along the Sudanese frontier; however, 
membership is from all the provinces, except Eritrea. 
Enjoys some assistance from ELF.
EPDRP : Breakaway (1978) anti-royalist section of EDU. 
Co-operates with TPLF.
TPLF : The major, ethnocentric, local underground 
movement within Ethiopia Proper. Started in 1975.
Demands autonomy of Tigre as well as its enlargement, 
including the Christian highlands of Eritrea.
The movement is popular along the Tigre-Eritrean 
border and particularly around Axum and Adi Addi area.
Its strongholds are the local urban elites. Strength 
(1977, November) : 800 in arms; 1500 in reserve.
Co-operates with EPDRP on condition that it keeps 
its operations confined to Begemdir (i.e. leave Tigre 
to TPLF). Also with EPLF, which assists in TPLF's urban 
terrorism in Tigre in return for the latter's ambushes on 
Ethiopian advancement into Eritrea.
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QNLF : Support mainly from the Galla; aims at 
autonomy for the Galla/Oroma areas, as well as social 
change. Leadership : 'Marxist-Leninist'.
Other Promo groups : Ethnocentric autonomist; insignificant 
in strength.
WSLF : Started in I960, became significantly active 
since 1964. Active in Hararghe, mainly Ogaden. Works 
in close co-ordination with the SALF. Openly supported 
by Somalia. Secretary General : Abdullahi Hassam 
Mahmoud.
SALF : Active in Bale Province; Supported by Somalia.
SDAF : Operates presumably from exile since early 1978. 
Includes Somali high officials in exile. Appears to 
command Kenyan sympathy.
FRS : Started in February, 1979. Claims to be a front of 
of all those stand against the present military regime 
of Somalia. It operates a clandestine radio, "Radio 
Kulmis". The Secretary General is Mustafa Haji Nur.
ALF : Started operations around the middle of 1975. Led 
by Afar Sultan Ali Pierre, conservative, feudalist, very 
old, now in exile in Saudi Arabia. His heir, believed to 
be democrat, now in exile in Somalia. The movement 
opposed Ethiopian land reforms in the Afar areas. Ultimate 
aims not very clear.
MPL : Started terrorist activities against the Somali- 
dominated Government in Djibouti in December 1977 and 
is since banned. Aims at advancing Afar interests in 
Djibouti and maintains links inside Ethiopia.
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ELF : The oldest and probably the most established of 
the revolutionary mass movements on the Horn. Started 
in late 1950s, but as a massive guerrilla movement, 
in 1962. Demands independence from Eritrea but 
reluctant to commit on the post-liberation social 
system of the country. Inclinations seem to be democratic, 
reformist. Wants a single national democratic front in 
Eritrea for her liberation struggle. Strength at least 
4000 in arms. Founder, believed to be : Abdullah 
Idris, currently Head of the Military Bureau; Chairman : 
Ahmed Nasser; foreign relations spokesman : Alzein 
Yassir.
ELF is the parent organisation of breakaway, but 
now strongly independent groups, EPLF, ELF-PLF and 
ELF-DF. The existing ELF also is divided in few 
factions, the strongest, led by Idris, leans towards 
Iraqi Baathists. ELF remained in a virtual civil war 
with EPLF since the latter's birth in 1969, until Coazien 
and Khartoum agreements (1975, 1977) led to end of 
hostilities and limited unity.
EPLF : Breakaway (1969) from ELF on doctrinal ground. 
Marxist and aims at, alongwith independence, a Marxist 
social system for Eritrea, but executes Maoists for 
"radicalism". Probably, the most organised and dynamic 
of the Eritrean revolutionary movements. Interested in 
United Front arrangements with other Eritrean movements 
rather than a complete merger, as proposed by ELF, ELF- 
PLF; however, accepted limited merger (1977).
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In membership, it is the predominant representative 
of the Christian Eritreans, and the leadership appears to 
be predominantly Christian, the most prominent being 
the "extremely powerful deputy Secretary" Issayas 
Aferwerki. However, Moslems also are represented and 
the Secretary General is a Moslem, Ramadan Mohammad 
Nour.
EPLF co-operates with EPRP-EPRA and TPLF.
ELF-PLF : The third major guerrilla group in Eritrea; 
numerically not very significant (2000 in 1978, October), 
but well funded, particularly by non-Marxist Arab 
states. Breakaway from EPLF; leader : Osman Saleh 
Sabbi, once ELF Secretary for foreign affairs, then 
a leader of the EPLF.
Nationalist and non-Marxist. Wants a single national 
revolutionary organisation. Openly supports EDU.
ELF-DF : Breakaway (1977, July) from ELF presumably in 
protest of conservative sympathies of the latter.
Based in Khartoum. Strength : around 1200. ELF regards 
them anarchist ("fallol").
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